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Abstract
This thesis asks, what are the social, ideological and historical trends that have brought 
Salafi Jihadism into conflict with the US at the turn of the 21®^ century? It is proposed 
that one of the primary factors driving Salafi Jihadist violence against the United States 
and its allies lies in an incompatibility between the contemporary international system 
and the Salafi Jihadist vision of an Islamic political order.
There has been since the origins of Islam a search for unity among the Muslim people 
and a political order legitimised through religiously sanctioned governance. Though 
these aims have been ongoing since Islam’s origins, in the contemporary era this is met 
with particular challenges. The international system is characterised by the sovereignty 
of nation-states. Despite persistent challenges to the international system and the greater 
interconnectivity of states through globalising processes, the state remains the most 
prominent manifestation of sovereignty.
The contemporary period is unique as the most significant hegemonic power, the US 
along with other great powers, not only accepts the given order but as well actively 
seeks to maintain it. This has hampered the ambitions of Islamic actors who seek to 
continue to strive for the unity of the Islamic world and governance that has its 
legitimacy based in religion defined by a particular actor’s notion of what constitutes 
legitimacy in Islamic terms. These ambitions are presented with more profound 
obstacles than has been the case in previous historical settings. These historical 
ambitions have met with an international system that is structured in such a way that it 
is incompatible with this particular Islamic political narrative.
The Salafi Jihadists are attempting to be the vanguard of Islam itself with their 
particular ideological understanding of Islamic political order, derived fi*om the Salafist 
tradition. This imagined order is contradictory to the status quo of the contemporary 
international system that is in part characterised by state sovereignty. It is, therefore, the 
strategy of the Salafi Jihadists to disrupt the hegemon’s ability to maintain this order, in 
what could be understood as reflective of competing universalisms.
Introduction
Salafi Jihadist terrorism^ began to emerge as a distinct subject of interest for scholars 
during the latter part of the 20^  ^century. The Iranian Islamic Revolution, the 
assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the bombing of the US Marine 
barracks in Lebanon, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, as well as a number of 
other violent events raised perplexing questions for scholars of International Relations. 
In particular, the question was raised as to what are the roots of this “Muslim Rage,” as 
Bernard Lewis would come to term it.^ More succinctly, scholars sought to both explain 
why this “rage” had come to be directed against the West in the form of international 
‘terror’ organisations and why the appeal of such groups appeared to be increasing.
Many scholars endeavour to find the explanations for the rise of the Global Jihad by 
looking at contemporary issues that emerged in the 20^  ^century.^ However, there does 
not exist a great deal of research that seeks to understand the phenomenon by looking to 
contemporary issues coupled with an historical perspective. Instead, existing 
explanations focus either on very specific issues of the modem era or timeless meta-
 ^Terrorism is understood here absent of any normative connotations, but rather as politically motivated 
asymmetrical violence. In particular, this work investigates a specific brand of terrorism that is related to 
Sunni Islam termed Salafi Jihadist. This kind of terrorism, as associated with Sunni Islam, has been 
known by various terms including Islamic terrorism or Islamist terrorism. However, the most appropriate 
term for the phenomenon under investigation here is Salafi Jihadist terrorism, understood as 
representative of those who take a position that could be said to embody a “respect for the sacred texts in 
their most literal form and an absolute commitment to jihad.’’ Giles Repel, Jihad: The Trial o f  Political 
Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 220.
 ^Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1990.
 ^See, Eqbal Ahmed, “Profiles of the Religious Right,” Dawn, March 7, 1999; Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs 
McWorld (London: Trans-world Publishers, 2003); George Caffentzis, Globalize Liberation (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 2004); Muhammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel; Repression and Resistance 
in the Islamic World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006); Stanley Hoffman, “Clash of Globalizations,” 
Foreign Affairs 81 (2002); M. Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind o f  God: The Global Rise o f  Religious 
Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); W.H. Thorton, New World Empire: Civil 
Islam, Terrorism and the Making ofNeo-Globalism (New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005)
narratives. Contemporary issues that are commonly cited include undemocratic rule in 
the Middle East, the Israeli state, unequal economic practises, US foreign policy and 
globalisation. The most prevalent meta-narrative that has been proposed focuses on 
inevitable confrontations between competing cultures, religions and civilisations based 
on realities that have existed for centuries.
This thesis endeavors to observe where historical objectives intersect with 
contemporary conditions. The conflict between the Salafi Jihadists and the US is 
relatively contemporary. However, this is related to historical conceptualisations 
regarding statehood, legitimacy and sovereignty that are present in Islamic thinking.
The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire following World War One resulted in the 
end of nearly thirteen centuries of Islamic empires, and possibly more significantly, the 
end of the institution of the caliphate. The end of Ottoman authority not only resulted in 
a new kind of political order through the division of the region into nation-states by 
colonial powers, but also weakened the possibility of religiously sanctioned governance. 
This particular historical moment remains significant in the collective Muslim 
consciousness, as it marked the moment where distinct obstacles to the notions of unity 
and legitimacy emerged.^
Samuel Hunting’s Clash o f  Civilizations thesis supposed that future conflicts in the post Cold War era 
would no longer be based on material or ideological concerns, but rather culture would be the primary 
source of future conflicts. Greater attention will be given to this subject in the next chapter. Samuel 
Huntington, Clash o f  Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster 
Press, 1996)
 ^On March 3, 1924 Kemal Ataturk, the first president of Turkey, constitutionally abolished the caliphate 
ending nearly thirteen centuries of an institution which provided religious legitimacy to those who 
governed in the Middle East. This paved the way for the implementation of sovereign nation-states in 
former Ottoman territory. This convulsive moment of the collapse of Ottoman authority and the end of 
the caliphate put the possibility of Islamic unification and rule by God’s sovereignty into question. The 
events of 1924 have cast a shadow over Westem-Islamic relations and the affairs of Middle East politics 
in general.
Legitimacy to rule in the Islamic world has historically been challenged by competing 
powers seeking to unify the Muslim community under a particular ambitious actor. 
There has been consistent competition over who should lead the community of 
believers, a desire for its unity and appeals to religion to justify political power since the 
time of Mohammed. However, the struggles between competing Islamic entities vying 
for power remained largely contained within the Islamic world and its periphery until 
the later portion of the 20^  ^century. The development of the contemporary international 
system that privileges state sovereignty and is in part maintained by the unprecedented 
power of a hegemonic actor, however, made a politically unified Muslim community 
legitimised by God’s sovereignty a distant possibility. The creation of artificial modem 
states by outside powers and the consolidation of the international system brought 
political stmggles indigenous to the Middle East into the international sphere, and thus 
influenced the rise of contemporary Salafi Jihadism. Further, as the US plays a 
significant role in preserving the international system, it becomes a necessary target for 
Salafi Jihadists.
The research question that underpins this thesis is: What are the social, ideological and 
historical trends that have brought Salafi Jihadism into conflict with the US at the turn 
of the 21®^ century? The hypothesis proposed here contends that: One of the primary 
factors driving Islamic, or more specifically Salafi Jihadist, violence against the United 
States and its allies lies in an incompatibility between the structure of the international 
system and the historical search for the unity of the Muslim peoples and religiously 
legitimised governance for these people. Salafi Jihadists seek to achieve these aims. 
Three key assumptions are supposed in support of the hypothesis, one based on extra-
rational belief, one historical and the other contemporary. 1) There are distinctly Islamic 
concepts of order, legitimacy and statehood that differ from the Western concepts that 
characterise the contemporary international system. 2) Historically, there has been a 
drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic political order based on the 
unity of the Muslim people, governed by a religiously sanctioned leadership rooted in 
these Islamic principles. 3) The US, and to a lesser extent other great and emerging 
powers, are engaged in preserving the status quo international system. In this the US is 
an obstacle to the unity and legitimacy aspirations that al-Qaeda and Salafi Jihadism in 
general seek to actualise. It is through the prism of the historical and the contemporary 
with these three key assumptions that this thesis will engage with the research question 
and demonstrate the validity of the hypothesis. These assumptions will be explored in 
Sections II, III and IV respectively.
A large quantity of literature has been produced over the last half century on the 
subjects of political Islam, terrorism and Islam in general, and how they are related to 
the West and the US in particular. Since 2001 this has increased dramatically and 
significant attention has been given to Salafi Jihadism. Notable scholars, such as 
Esposito,^ Halliday,^ Roy^ and Kepel,^ have joined in on the debate proffering a 
multitude of causes and explanations for why Salafi Jihadists have made the West and 
the US in particular their target. No consensus has yet been reached. Alan Richards 
notes that Muslims who dislike the international order, US policies or their own
 ^John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name o f  Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
 ^Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth o f  Confrontation (London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 1996)
* Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam and the Search fo r  a New Umma (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2002)
 ^Gilles Repel, The Roots o f  Radical Islam (London: Saqi Books, 2005)
political systems are diverse, making generalisations difficult.’® Robert Irwin, however, 
posits that the degree of hatred with which the West is regarded among many Islamists 
is not widely understood.”  Albert Bergensen and Omar Lizardo offer a suggestion for a 
starting point of inquiry for this kind of research question in International Relations:
Our present understanding of international relations appears as a jigsaw, where we are 
able to identify some pieces but not others, so that the whole thing fits together with of 
course spaces left out by missing pieces. As we do not have all the parts to the puzzle 
we begin with what pieces are discernible and on the basis of how they fit together offer 
a tentative account.
There are number of offerings from countless scholars, pundits, journalists, politicians 
and others who seek to understand why the Salafi Jihadists have targeted the West and 
the US in particular. The next chapter will engage with the most significant of these 
claims. These claims do warrant merit and work within the broader scope of the central 
question this thesis asks. However, not every jihadist has the same vantage point. 
Individuals are motivated for all manner of reasons, be they personal, religious, 
economic, political, psychological and so forth. It is argued here that jihadist 
organisations do share, if reduced to the least common denominator, similar objectives, 
methods and end goals. However, it could reasonably be argued that there is in fact no 
single qualified answer to the proposed research question, only a litany of suppositions. 
What this thesis attempts to do is not to dismiss in absolution other observations and 
arguments regarding the Global Jihad, but rather to demystify the phenomenon by
Alan Richards, Socio Economic Roots o f  Radicalism (Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2003)
"  Robert Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and its Discontents (New York: Overlook Press, 
2006)
Albert Bergensen and Omar Lizardo, “Terrorism and Hegemonic Decline,” in Hegemonic Declines 
Past and Present, eds. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Jonathan Friedman (London: Paradigm Publishers,
2005), 277-8.
observing it holistically as something related to the international rooted both in history 
and the modem period.
The Global Jihad is not timeless, nor is US hegemony. They have intersected in a 
particular moment on the historical timeline and become significant features of the 
contemporary period. In essence, this is a perspective from the position of International 
Relations taking a realist understanding of human nature, the international system and 
the role of states. Yet, this thesis endeavours to go beyond this by combining these 
realist perspectives with a more nuanced understanding of the role of ideas, the value of 
history and non-Western concepts of the international and legitimacy, without scuttling 
the basic ontology of the realist tradition. The subject of the Global Jihad is one that is 
highly charged both in political, academic and lay circles. It is difficult for the 
researcher to engage in a project of understanding it without bias. However, by 
positioning the Global Jihad as something that is part of the titanic movement of world 
politics it can be understood, as best as possible, absent of these highly charged 
emotions in much the way historians have sought to look at events in the past out of the 
shadow of living memory to search for causes and reasons.
What is clearly discernible as a focal point of concern for Salafi Jihadists is the political 
division of the Muslim peoples and the absence of religiously sanctioned governance. 
The division of the Middle East into separate political entities significantly hampered 
the long going unification and legitimacy project. The watershed event of dissolving the 
caliphate in 1924 and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire has had a significant 
effect on the emergence of the specific breed of international Islamist terrorism directed
against the West that emerged in the latter half of the 20* century. The contemporary 
Salafi Jihadist movements are similar to preceding Arab/ Muslim imperialist 
contenders, in that broadly speaking they work to the same ends, unity and legitimacy. 
The Sunni al-Qaeda organisation offers a Pan-Islamic vision for the Middle East and the 
Islamic world, visions that Bruce Lincoln claims “challenge the enlightenment 
restructuring of culture and its preferred model of the secular, pluralistic nation-state, in 
an attempt to invent institutions to replace it.””
The end of colonisation resulted in a rapid movement to reunify the Middle East under 
the banner of Pan-Arabism. Emile Durkheim made the claim that nationalism becomes 
the chief religion of the secular non-theist state.”  Secular attempts at unification, 
however, failed and in doing so failed to quell religious voices that demanded not only 
unity but for rule by God’s authority. Fred Lawson noted that by the end of the Pan- 
Arab movement Arab states “came to constitute an anarchic state system characterised 
by the norm of Westphalian sovereignty.””  He argues that state interests have since 
been primary and acting in the collective interest has been rare.”  David Pryce Jones 
adds that Arab movements are indeed nationalist and attempt to replace religious 
identity with a narrative of nationalist loyalty.”  It is this very resignation to state centric 
norms that allowed Salafi Jihadists to challenge its leaders and the maintainers of the 
status quo with a particular discourse of unity and religious legitimacy.
Bruce B. Lawrence, Holy Terrors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003)
Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms o f Religious Life 1912 (New York: Free Press, 1995)
Fred D. Lawson, Pan Arabism, Post Imperial Orders and International Norms (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 2006), 341.
Ibid.
David Pryce-Jones, The Closed Circle (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 2003), 283.
Through surveying the current literature it is clear that in regard to the conflict between 
the Salafi Jihadists and the US the jigsaw puzzle, as observed by Lizardo and 
Bergensen, has not been completed. When approaching the question with a degree of 
humility it is possible to surmise that the puzzle may indeed never be entirely 
completed. In explaining the phenomenon of Salafi Jihadism answers are sought in the 
trans-historical and in the contemporary, crediting both outside forces and internal 
dynamics for its growth, popularity and objectives. While no single factor could 
adequately explain why Salafi Jihadist organisations challenge the West, this thesis 
argues that it is necessary to consider the incompatibility of the contemporary 
international order, characterised by state sovereignty, and the desire of some Muslims 
for unity and legitimacy. This must be done in such a manner as to take account of both 
trans-historical and contemporary factors as well as extra-rational belief. As Ayla Gol 
rightly points out, ahistorical approaches and those that seek mono-causal explanations 
for political violence suffer distinct limitations.”  Further, when investigating what leads 
organisations to challenge the status quo it is necessary to take account of ideological 
power structures.”
The international system, characterised by nation-states, is an obstacle to a particular 
kind of order envisioned by the Salafi Jihadists. The US as a hegemonic actor helps to 
maintain the status quo system and finds itself embroiled in this conflict. It is observed 
that hegemony does not exist in a singular definable form, but rather can be expressed 
through a variety of forms historically.^® In this instance hegemony refers to an
Ayla Gol, “Editor’s Introduction: Views from the ‘Others’ of the War on Terror,” Critical Terrorism 
Studies 3, no, 1 (April, 2010): 2.
Ibid.
Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9.
international order building project in which the US professes a leading ro le /’ As such, 
it helps to maintain the international system and the facets that characterise it/^
Methodology
This thesis seeks to conceptualise the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the West. It 
is argued that there exist competing universal visions of political order, and that the long 
going search for unity and religious legitimacy in the Islamic world is severely 
hampered by a contemporary international system characterised by the division of the 
world into nation-states. Further, the US as a powerful actor that helps to maintain such 
a system is a challenge to the vision of world order that Salafi Jihadists hold. To engage 
with the question this thesis proposes requires both an understanding of the international 
system as it is and a view into the historical. To observe the Islamic search for unity and 
legitimacy and the lineage of thinking on Islamic political order and international 
relations that inform the al-Qaeda ideology, the method of historical analysis is 
employed. However, this work also deals with the contemporary international system as 
it is and the Salafi Jihadist organisations that challenge it. To conceptualise al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates and the collective struggle against the international order it is necessary 
to take them on their own terms, that is to analyse the content they produce. In this, a 
more empirical direction will be taken in looking to these sources.
Ian Clark, “Bringing Hegemony Back in: The United States and International Order,” International 
Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009)
22 The concept of hegemony will be further elaborated upon in part 2 of Chapter 2.
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This thesis looks to both the historical and the contemporary to conceptualise the 
phenomenon of the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the West. In this, it seeks to 
engage with big questions that cannot be exclusively understood through an 
examination of the contemporary condition, and rather requires an historical approach 
to complement an understanding of the contemporary. Historical analysis is the 
appropriate tool for this endeavour, and as Mahoney and Rueschmeyer suggest, there is 
an affinity between asking big questions and the use of historical analysis.^^ Historical 
research does not typically seek universal knowledge on a subject. As this is the case, 
this kind of research is limited by some reduction in ambition when compared to the 
goal of producing complete specified causal prescriptions that hold true in all socio­
cultural contexts in all historical periods.”
As was acknowledged in the previous section, the current crisis exists in a fixed 
temporal condition. It is the long going historical quest for unity and legitimacy within 
Islam coming into contact with a particular kind of international order that significantly 
hampers this being realised. Additionally, when investigating the key arguments for the 
rise of Salafi Jihadism, it is argued that many of the suggestions offered by scholars do 
warrant merit, but fail to observe the phenomenon as a whole or take sufficient account 
of historical processes. Historically grounded research seeks to provide explanations of 
large scale substantively important outcomes, but does not seek to argue for a timeless 
meta-narrative. Historical understandings are of importance to this work, not only 
because it is relevant to arguing that there is an observable long term trend within Islam 
that seeks unity and legitimacy, but also because it is important to the Salafi Jihadist
^  James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 14.
^Ubid, 10.
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narrative. This traditional approach to research is characterised by the exercise of 
scholarly judgement and a consideration of historical questions regarding international 
politics.”  It is rooted in assumptions and observation.^^ Propositions of International 
Relations must, therefore, be derived from scientifically imperfect processes that have 
only a tentative status.^^
The extent to which the Salafi Jihadist narrative is based upon absolute historical facts 
is less important. The Salafi Jihadists act and function under a religious ideology 
constructed from their understanding of history. Neither is it necessary to bring into 
question their theological understanding of Islam. Salafi Jihadists are not interested in a 
debate, they act on their own understanding, thus, it is necessary to take them on their 
own terms. To conceptualise how Salafi Jihadists understand the contemporary world 
order and why they challenge this it is necessary to address content. Content analysis, as 
Downe-Wambolte explains, aims to provide understanding and knowledge of a given 
particular phenom enon.W here this may appear to give the research something of a 
positivist spin it is not on the whole a positivist analysis, as the role of history and ideas 
remain central. However, observing the most significant of the jihadist literature gives 
insight into the Salafi Jihadist ideology. Looking at the works and statements produced 
by leading figures of subset jihadist organisations helps to demonstrate the general 
jihadist agreement on the broader scale of the problems facing the Islamic world and the 
required solutions.
Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach,” in Contending Approaches 
to International Politics, eds. K. Knorr and J.H. Rosenau (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969) 
J. Richardson, “The Academic Study of International Relations,” in Order and Violence: Hedley Bull 
and International Relations, eds. J.D.B. Miller and R.J. Vincent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 162. 
Bull, “International Theory,” 20.
B. Downe-Wambolte, “Content Analysis: Method Applications and Issues,” Healthcare fo r  Women 
International 13 (1992): 313-321.
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This thesis is not a transformational prescription. As such it seeks to avoid normative 
approaches and in this seeks to take a detached approach. As Bull rightly observes, 
there is no such thing as value free research. However, the detached approach allows the 
researcher to be firmly aware of one’s own moral and political position while 
attempting to hold them in check.^^ The objective, then, is to understand the topic on its 
own terms.^® As such, this thesis looks to Islamic concepts of the state and the 
international in Section II (Chapters 3 and 4) and attempts to offer an historical account 
of the Islamic quest for unity and legitimacy in Section III (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapters 
7 and 8 of Section IV analyse the content produced by al-Qaeda and other Salafi 
Jihadist organisations to uncover al-Qaeda’s ideology and observe the groups that have 
joined it in the Global Jihad. Finally, Chapter 9 observes the international system fi*om 
the realist perspective as it is, and looks at the contemporary international system and 
the Salafi Jihadist challenge to it. By looking to both historical analysis and content 
analysis it is possible to engage with the primary research question proposed by this 
thesis: What are the social, ideological and historical trends that have brought Salafi 
Jihadism into conflict with the US at the turn of the 21®’ century?
Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into four sections. The first. Chapters 1 and 2, examines 
contemporary arguments regarding the research question and outlines the orthodox IR 
concepts that inform the thesis. Section II, Chapters 3 and 4, deals with Islamic concepts
Hedley Bull, “International Relations as an Academic Pursuit,” Australian Outlook 26 (1972): 256. 
Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen, International Relations, Theories and Approaches (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 234.
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of international theory, the state and sovereignty, engaging with the first assumption: 
There are distinctly Islamic concepts of order, legitimacy and the state that differ from 
Western concepts that characterise the contemporary international system. Section III, 
Chapters 5 and 6, observes the importance of the notions of unity and legitimacy in 
Islamic history from the Islamic imperial period to Pan-Arabism and Political Islam in 
the 20* century. It will deal with the second assumption: There has historically been a 
drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic political order based on the 
unity of the Muslim people governed by a religiously sanctioned leadership based on 
these Islamic principles. Section IV, Chapters 7, 8 and 9, look at the emergence of 
Salafi-Jihadism and al-Qaeda. This section engages with the third assumption. In the 
contemporary period it is the US, and to a lesser extent other great and emerging 
powers, that engage in preserving the status quo international system. In this the US is 
an obstacle to the unity and legitimacy aspirations in a profound and unique way that al- 
Qaeda and Salafi Jihadism in general seeks to actualise with its particular ideological 
understanding of Islam.
Chapter 1 of this thesis seeks to identity the key arguments in relation to the research 
question. Numerous explanations have emerged in an attempt to conceptualise the rise 
of Salafi Jihadism and explain why Salafi Jihadists have sought to challenge the United 
States and its allies. Among these are issues concerning globalisation, the effects of 
modernity, the culture of the West, economic disenfranchisement, US foreign policy, 
Israel/ Palestine, as well as the Clash o f Civilizations thesis proposed by Samuel 
Huntington. These arguments provide limited answers to a question that is more 
extensive and complex. These suggestions confine the origins of Salafi Jihadism and the
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conflict with the United States into a temporal geographical fixed position while 
ignoring the larger trans-historical nature of the question. In opposition to this, framing 
the question as a meta-narrative in terms of a clash of civilisations,^’ gives too much 
credence to the notion of a unified Islamic and Western civilisation and rejects the role 
of ideology. These accounts can be understood to be valid on a micro-level but appear 
limited when trying to grapple with the larger question. These explanations warrant 
merit but cannot account for the phenomenon as a whole. Where any number of these 
proposals may shed certain light on the motivations of individual agents or groups and 
have a role to play the Global Jihad, they do not account for Salafi Jihadism in general 
and the historical currents that have led to this particular crossroad in history.
Chapter 2 will set out the first portion of the theoretical aspect of the thesis. Employing 
a realist interpretation from the perspective of orthodox International Relations it 
provides a sampling of major realist thought and observes its evolution in the discipline 
of International Relations. This thesis draws from the base realist assumptions regarding 
the state of nature, power seeking and the significance of the state, arguing that these 
basic principles can be correctly applied to the study of the research question. The state 
is the key actor, however, not the only actor in international politics. Salafi Jihadism is 
evidently a trans-national stateless entity, yet, its chief concern and the supreme 
obstacle to establishing the political order its ideology espouses to is the state.
Therefore, the state as it exists as a political entity, sovereign and geographically bound, 
is a concept that is necessary to theorise around. It is also noted that there are 
limitations in contemporary realist thought and this alone is not sufficient when
Huntington, Clash o f  Civilizations.
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engaging with Salafi Jihadism. The ideational is therefore of concern, as Cornelia Byer 
observes:
One may regard the material and the ideational as quite distinct, they are, however, 
closely related and partly independent. Material factors have fundamentally shaped 
human affairs from the beginning of our existence. While historically life has been 
constrained by material natural conditions such as water, mountains, deserts and so 
forth, ideas (in particular norms) also have constrained power on individuals societies 
and states. For material change to occur ideas have to be expressed in creative or 
destmctive action. Humans therefore act as creators of ideas and as mediators between 
ideas and the material. Regarded by realists as material facets (population) and in 
constructivism as bearers of ideas (agents) humans operate in both dimensions able to 
transform the ideational into material and vice-versa.^^
Hence, it is not only material forces that are of significance when observing Salafi 
Jihadism. As Beyer further explains, ideas are equally of value and have a role to play. 
To understand Salafi Jihadism it is valid to take an historically based approach. As 
Colin Wight insists, “a problematic issue of terrorism research post 9/11 is an almost 
complete lack of historical awareness.”^^  What is required is “a more historically 
grounded understanding as opposed to the dominant presentism.” '^’ Chapter 2 will, 
therefore, also include a defense of history and underpin the validity of understanding 
historical processes.
It is argued that to investigate this research question it is necessary to move beyond the 
confines of Western IR theorising. Section II (Chapters 3 and 4) investigates Islamic 
concepts of the international, statehood, sovereignty and legitimacy in an attempt to 
intersect them with Western understandings, however, without scuttling the 
International Relations intellectual project in its entirety. It engages with the assumption
Cornelia Byer, “Hegemony Equilibrium and Counterpower: A Synthetic Approach,” International 
Studies 23, no. 3 (September, 2009): 414.
Colin Wight, “Theorizing Terrorism: The State Stmcture and History,” International Relations 23, no. 
1 (March, 2009): 103.
Ibid, 100.
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that there are distinctly Islamic concepts of order, legitimacy and the state that differ 
from Western concepts that characterise the contemporary international system.
Chapter 3 focuses on concepts of the state as an organising principle in international 
politics, looking at Islamic concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty and statehood, while 
making connections with Western concepts and attempting to observe where they 
intersect and where they differ. It is essential to conceptualise Islamic views on what the 
state is, who may claim to govern it legitimately, and what the Islamic concepts of 
territorial space are. This chapter will further demonstrate that there is a long Islamic 
tradition of statehood that in many ways is in contrast to, but is not in all aspects 
entirely alien to. Western concepts. Islamic thinking in regard to the state, as applied by 
the Salafi Jihadists, recognises ontologically different concepts of sovereignty, 
legitimacy and territoriality regarding political organisation, than that which has come 
to characterise the contemporary international system. Al-Qaeda’s drive for the re­
creation of a trans-national caliphate is based in this historical Islamic thinking. Simply, 
the current international order is an obstacle to this realisation.
Chapter 4 deals with Islamic concepts of international politics. There is a significant 
quantity of literature devoted to the study of Islam as a factor within international 
politics. However, these resources view Islam, and religion in general, as a factor to be 
understood in the context of existing IR theories, not as an approach on its own. Islam is 
a non-Westphalian discourse in that it does not recognise multiple sovereigns or the 
division of the Muslim peoples. It is derived ontologically from extra-rational agency. 
Islamic concepts of international relations do not endeavour to understand the
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international through an investigation of observable or causal forces. The primary 
sources for inquiry within Islam have already been revealed through the Quran and the 
sayings and deeds of the Prophet {Sunnah)?^ The purpose of this chapter is to aid in the 
theoretical understanding of the research question in support of the hypothesis. It is 
suggested that Islam contains theories of international politics and is not simply a 
subject of study within the discipline of International Relations. This chapter will 
identify theoretical traditions within the Islamic paradigm and demonstrate how these 
manifest in contemporary organisations; the Muslim Brotherhood, the neo-Islamists and 
most relevant to this thesis al-Qaeda.
This framework for analysis better conceptualises theoretically how Salafi Jihadism 
functions within the study of International Relations and aids in alleviating some of the 
tensions and inadequacies that can be found in the study of Salafi Jihadism.
Significantly more work needs to be done on this, as there is a poverty of literature on 
the subject. The confines of this thesis, however, do not allow for a comprehensive 
observation of this subject that would be a valuable contribution to international 
theorising. However, what is produced here gives insights into these ideas and is a 
valuable tool for this research. It demonstrates how Islamic thinking on international 
politics has influenced the Salafi Jihadist world view and allowed them to form their 
own Islamic theory of international relations based on the Islamic tradition.
Section III (Chapters 5 and 6) works to engage with the second assumption: There has 
historically been a drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic political
35 M.H. Kamali, Principles o f  Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Text Society, 1991), 12.
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order based on the unity of the Muslim people governed by a religiously sanctioned 
leadership based on Islamic principles. This section emphasises the constant struggle for 
unity and religious legitimacy in the Islamic world from the time of Muhammad to the 
present, observing that this struggle has been continuous throughout Islamic history. 
Chapter 5 works from the origins of Islam to the end of Islamic political authority with 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the caliphate in 1924. It 
demonstrates that there is a long historical struggle for unity in the Middle East and that 
religion is an integral part of political order as it serves as a necessary legitimising 
agent. Salafi Jihadism in general is part of a long existing struggle to unify the Islamic 
world under a legitimate authority. Challengers for power have been the norm. This 
chapter will demonstrate that during the period of the caliphates there was no consensus 
on legitimate rule, however, religion always played a vital role in attempts to solidify 
legitimacy by the ruling elite. This supports the argument presented in this thesis that, 
contemporary answers bom of the realities of the 20* century only partially explain the 
current situation between Salafi Jihadists, the United States and the West in general.
The Salafi Jihadists are contemporary actors in a long historical narrative that cannot be 
conceptualised exclusively in terms of 20* century political realities.
Chapter 5 will start from the beginning of Islamic expansion and empires with 
Muhammad’s successors the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rashidun) to the Umayyad 
Dynasty, following through to the Abbasids and Ottomans, as well as consider some of 
the other proclaimed caliphates and imperial aspirants. It will be argued that there has 
always been a need to make claims for legitimacy in religious terms. An Islamic state 
leader was as much a practitioner of state politics as a proclaimed protector of a
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religious faith and tradition. The Salafi Jihadist narrative attempts to reassert this in the 
age of nation-states where legitimacy is increasingly moving in the opposite direction, 
away from religious legitimacy towards nationalist legitimacy.
Chapter 6 investigates the period following the end of Ottoman authority. It will be 
demonstrated that after the collapse of Ottoman authority and the ensuing creation of 
Middle Eastern nation-states there has been an increased escalation in the conflict over 
regional order in the form of unification and legitimacy. The first phase following the 
dissolution of the caliphate was defined by the various attempts at secular unity and 
legitimacy in the form of Pan-Arab movements. The failure of Pan-Arab aspirants to 
successfully unify the region has led to the general resignation of Arab political leaders 
to accept the status quo nation-state system. Al-Qaeda represents the current challenger 
for Middle Eastern order. Its ideology rejects the division of the Islamic, particularly 
Arab, world into separate political entities and thus rejects the current international 
order and seeks to challenge that order. Continued attempts at constructing some form 
of Middle Eastern political unity since the dissolution of the caliphate highlights the 
argument that the sovereign nation-state is problematic. The Pan-Arab period 
demonstrated that unification projects have been plagued by self interests, a reality that 
was evident during the period of caliphates as well. Yet, there remains a need for a 
discourse on unity and legitimacy that the Salafi Jihadists attempt to provide.
Section IV engages with the third and final key assumption: In the contemporary period 
it is the US, and to a lesser extent other great and emerging powers, that engage in 
preserving the status quo international system. In this the US is an obstacle to the unity
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and legitimacy aspirations in a profound and unique way. Aspirations that al-Qaeda and 
Salafi Jihadism in general seeks to actualise with its particular ideological 
understanding of Islam. Chapter 7 will define what the components of the al-Qaeda 
ideology are, chart its intellectual evolution by looking at Islamic scholars over time and 
analyse the evolution of the al-Qaeda ideology from the guiding doctrine of an 
organisation into an ideology in and of itself. What this demonstrates is that al-Qaeda is 
more than an international organisation, it is also an ideology. In this al-Qaeda is both 
agency and ideology. Just as there are Nazis (agents) and Nazism (ideology), al-Qaeda, 
equally, can sustain both roles as an organisation with observable agency and an 
ideological brand that inspires other jihadists. The second assertion is that this ideology 
is not simply a piece of propaganda created entirely by the contemporary ideologues, 
but a well thought out doctrine which draws upon a respected lineage of Islamic 
thinking. Al-Qaeda as an ideology provides foundations for those who wish to pursue 
the Salafi Jihadist project of creating the new ‘golden age’ in the form of a 
contemporary caliphate.
Chapter 7 is dedicated to the theoretical concept of al-Qaeda as an ideological umbrella 
under which other Salafi Jihadist organisations gather. Chapter 8 seeks to further 
support this argument with empirical evidence by investigating al-Qaeda’s constituents, 
those organisations which it has co-opted into the Global Jihad. While tending to local 
grievances these organisations can aid in altering the battlefield, eliminating the 
obstacle of the hegemon which will undermine the status quo international system. The 
concepts described by the al-Qaeda ideologues that seek to challenge the status quo of 
the international system are easily adopted by Salafi Jihadist groups in disparate parts of
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the world, as these are amenable to both local and global objectives. Al-Qaeda works to 
draw upon the disruptive power of local jihads and incorporate them into the broader 
Global Jihad in what is termed hegemonic disruption.^^
Chapter 8 will investigate al-Qaeda’s affiliates, allies and those it inspires, as well as its 
competitors. Its closest constituent organisations are its affiliates that have taken on the 
al-Qaeda name and have strong links with the central organisation, al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda in Iraq. It also looks 
at those organisations that have maintained their own specific identity but still cooperate 
with al-Qaeda central on the global and local stage under the brand of Salafi Jihadism. 
Finally, it deals with organisations that act as competitors but still maintain the 
objective of building a global caliphate and resistance to the West, particularly the 
United States.
The final chapter conceptualises the contemporary condition of the international system 
and how it is related to the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the United States. It 
will demonstrate the central argument of the thesis. The United States is an actor which 
maintains a hegemonic position that assists in keeping the international system 
characterised by nation-states in place, and this severely limits the possibility of the 
realisation of the unity and legitimacy project. It is the position that the United States 
maintains as a hegemonic actor that puts it into conflict with a force that envisions an 
alternative order. It will be further argued that it is not relevant which hegemonic power
The hegemonic disruption model asserts that it is not great powers that challenge US primacy but non­
state actors who seek to disrupt its influence. Actors that are fimdamentally dissatisfied with the status 
quo challenge the hegemon with alternative concepts of order. This will be given further attention in 
Chapter 2. William W. Newmann, “Hegemonic Disruption: The Asymmetric Challenge to US 
Leadership,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Fall, 2011): 68-69.
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helps to keep the status quo in place, as any actor that restricts the possibility of 
unification is an obstacle to the Salafi Jihadist goals. It will be concluded that the United 
States is at a cross point in history where long standing Islamic concepts regarding unity 
and legitimacy intersect with an international system that prevents this idealised order 
from emerging. The United States is instrumental in maintaining this system and is, 
therefore, a target of Salafi Jihadist violence.
It is less the values or specific policies that the US employs that creates the current 
situation, but rather its role in supporting a system which is incompatible with the Salafi 
Jihadist goal of bringing about Muslim unity and religiously sanctioned governance. 
Indeed, although issues such as globalisation, the Israeli state, poverty and regimes are 
problematic for the people of the region and the world at large, they do not explain the 
systemic issue that is at the core of this research question. It is argued that these 
concepts ignore trans-historical realities. However, neither are we witnessing the 
intensification of a clash of civilisations. It must be noted that the Salafi Jihadists 
represent only a portion of Islamists and an even less significant portion of Muslims. 
Though cleverly using each of these issues as a recruiting and propaganda tool, none of 
them can stand alone as causal factors. It is, rather, related to one vision of order and 
unity conflicting with the prevailing system that the dominant hegemonic power aims to 
preserve. There are competing notions within Islam as to what constitutes Muslim unity 
and religiously sanctioned governance. Not all of these notions are hostile to the 
contemporary international order. However, the Salafi Jihadist vision is defined by strict 
parameters that derive from a fundamentalist understanding of Islam. Where other 
Islamic notions of unity and legitimacy have managed to work within the international
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order, the Salafi Jihadist approach is incompatible. To reach their objectives Salafi 
Jihadist must undermine the international system. They attempt to do so, in part, by 
challenging the strongest state within that system.
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Section I
Debates on the Rise of the Global Jihad and Orthodox Theoretical Perspectives
This section looks at the key arguments that seek to explain the conflict between Salafi 
Jihadism and the US. As well it will set out the theoretical starting point of this thesis in 
terms of orthodox IR theory. Chapter 1 explores and challenges some of the key 
explanations that aim to conceptualise the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the US, 
arguing that these assumptions do warrant merit and are worthy of some consideration, 
however, they fail to conceptualise the phenomenon as a whole. It also challenges the 
notion of a clash of civilisations, noting that this concept suffers from deficiencies in 
regarding Islam and the West as monolithic. The rise of Salafi Jihadism and its war 
with the US is a product of both historical and contemporary realities. Both must be 
taken into consideration if  it is to be accurately understood.
Chapter 2 investigates realist IR approaches. While arguing that contemporary realist 
theories, to some extent, do not take sufficient account of the role of ideas and history, 
realism is still the most efficient starting point for investigating the primary research 
question this thesis engages with. Hegemonic disruption theory helps to incorporate the 
role of ideas into realist thinking and liberates realist theory from an exclusively state 
centric position. Although the state is still argued to be the key feature of international 
relations, the employment of hegemonic disruption theory along with looking to Islamic 
concepts of statehood and international theory in Section II, provides a theoretical 
framework that informs this thesis.
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Chapter 1: 
Contending Arguments for the Rise of Salafi Jihadism
In the years following 9/11, International Relations scholars, political scientists, Islamic 
and Middle East experts, the foreign policy community, governments and essentially 
every person in the Western world sought to understand the events that had taken place. 
This evolved into an inevitable attempt to explain the rationale of the Jihadists, or to 
discover as Lewis noted over a decade before, “the Roots of Muslim Rage.”^^  Copious 
volumes of literature began to emerge and grew exponentially in the ensuing months, 
with theories and proposals as to what the motivations for the strikes were and what the 
organisation believed to be responsible, al-Qaeda, was intent upon accomplishing. More 
simply, why had this group of Salafi Jihadists come to be in conflict with the United 
States. Discussions on Salafi Jihadism, particularly in the United States, had largely 
been marginalised outside of the realm of scholarship and intelligence agencies despite 
its consistent appearance in the form of ‘terrorist’ acts and publications. Post 9/11 
theories have ranged from ludicrous conspiratorial assertions of CIA and Jewish plots to 
beliefs concerning the wrath of divine judgment perpetuated by both Muslim and 
Christian fundamentalists. It was, however, a number of mainstream theories that took 
hold in the immediate aftermath of the event and have continued to affect the way 
scholars attempt to conceptualise Salafi Jihadism that are to be addressed here 
specifically.
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.’
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Fred Halliday argued in a large body of work including Islam and The Myth o f  
Confrontation’^  and Nation and Religion in The Middle East^^ that the emergence of 
Islamist movements which are hostile to the West and the United States are not the 
result of some trans-historic phenomenon which Islam is a part of. Rather, he insisted, it 
is the result of particular and contemporary social and economic conditions people face. 
However, Edward Said in Clash o f  Ignorance maintained that civilisations and 
identities cannot be removed from currents and counter currents of history.
Huntington perceived a trans-historic notion of civilisational identity as the cause of 
friction between the Islamic and Western worlds in his well known work The Clash o f  
Civilizations^^ and in 2002 declared an end to ideologies, proclaiming they had been 
replaced by ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistie loyalties."^  ^Other scholarship looks 
to more contemporary issues such as globalisation and the challenge of modernity. 
Lionel Stapely in Globalization and Terrorism: Death o f a Way ofLife claims that 
globalisation is indeed the root of suspicion and loathing of the West,"^  ^as do many 
others such as Foster,"^ "^  Hoffman"^  ^and Mughadden."^^ Eqbal Ahmed echoed these 
economic sociological claims in Profile o f the Religious Right, contending that
Halliday, Islam and the Myth o f Confrontation.
Fred Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000) 
Edward Said, “Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation (October 22, 2001)
Huntington, Clash o f  Civilizations.
Samuel Huntington, “Religion, Culture and International Conflict Post 9/11,” Ethics and Public Policy 
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Lionel Stapley, Globalization and Terrorism, Death o f  a Way o f  Life (London: Kamac Bods Publishers,
2006)
John Belhamy Foster, “US Pursuit of Global Dominance,” Monthly Review Press (New York: 2006) 
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religious/political movements in the Middle East are often the result of societies moving 
from traditional/agrarian to urban/capitalist in nature/^
In 1970 Ted Gurr, commentator on state theory, proposed in Why Men Rebel a theory of 
“relative depravation” that linked political uprisings to purely economic 
circumstances/^ Gurr’s work specifically focused on 19* century rebellions in the 
Western world, but arguably many of the conclusions he makes can also be offered as 
explanations for the rise of Islamist extremist violence in the 20* and early 21^ 
centuries. This notion has captured the minds of many scholars attempting to unravel 
the mystery of Salafi Jihadism. Muhammad Hafez rebukes Gurr’s claims in Why 
Muslims Rebel. H e  looks to causes beyond severe poverty and other suggestions 
derived from ideas based on conceptions of psychological alienation or unfulfilled 
modernity. He concludes that the Islamic world must be conceptualised as unique and 
grand narratives that may apply in other parts of the world are not sufficient in 
analysing the Muslim world. He argues that extremism is instead a reaction to iron 
fisted predatory state aggression from the ruling elites that force Islamists to react 
defensively.^®
Perceptions of American imperial ambitions and Western intrusion in the Middle East 
from the medieval Crusades to the present are commonly cited as a source of conflict, 
most notably in the discourse of the Islamists themselves. W.H. Thorton claims in New 
World Empire that there is a US directed globalisation that is reminiscent of a new
Ahmed, “Profiles of the Religious Right.”
Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970)
Muhammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel; Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2006)
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‘Manifest Destiny’ which emerges as a brutal hegemonic order. Jihad, Thorton 
surmises, is the only credible alternative to this globalist in justice.M ark  Hubbard 
complements these claims in Power Politics and Western Adventurism by stating that 
the failure to build a modem identity in the Middle East free from external influences is 
the source of friction.^^ G. John Ikenberry rebukes these imperial assertions in Why 
Export Democracy^^ dx\à Illusions o f Empire!’^  He describes rather an American liberal 
grand strategy that is not imperialism but instead an American led democratic order that 
has no historical precedent.^^ Anour Majid asserts that it is precisely this American 
insistence on a one size fits all notion of democracy that is in part what drives 
extremist’s actions.^^ In addition to these claims are notions of otherness and exclusion 
that Timothy Man* describes as Islamic Orientalism. This appears, according to Marr, to 
have discursive parallels with Islamism itself preventing understanding and interaction 
with the other.^^ This, Majid argues, causes Muslims to be caught in their own otherness 
and forced to devise strategies of resistance.
US support for Israel is often cited as a significant grievance with US policy. A 2005 
poll conducted by the Pew Institute found that 60% of those surveyed in Lebanon and 
Jordan believed that Israeli interests influence US policy. Respondents identified Israel
Thorton, New World Empire: Civil Islam.
Mark Hubbard, Brutal Truths, Fragile Myths: Power Politics and Western Adventurism in the Arab 
World (New York: Westview Press, 2004)
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and the US as the states which most severely threaten their security. 85% of respondents 
cited Israel as the chief external threat and 72% the United States.^® Shilby Telhami in 
What Arab Opinion Thinks o f You made the point that the Arab/ Israeli conflict has 
become the prism through which the Arab world conceptualises international events. In 
Telhami’s survey (conducted in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
UAE) respondents were asked which elements of al-Qaeda were they sympathetic to.
To this question 30% chose the answer stands up to the US, while only 20% chose the 
answer stands up for Muslim causes such as the Palestinians.^® This would appear to 
indicate that the Palestinian/ Israeli conflict may not be the only prism through which 
the Arab world conceptualises international affairs.
These attempts at providing rather limited answers to broad and complex questions are 
problematic. These examples limit the origins of Salafi Jihadism to a temporal 
geographical fixed position while ignoring the broad trans-historical and geographical 
tapestry of the question. Many of these explanations warrant merit but cannot stand 
alone. Where any number of these proposals may shed a certain light on the motivations 
of agents at the individual or even community level, it fails to paint a picture that can 
explain the problem in its entirety. As E.H. Carr notes, in attempting to establish 
causation it is necessary to “simplify the multiplicity of answers to subordinate one 
answer to another and to introduce some order and unity into the chaos of happenings 
and the chaos of specific causes.”^^  To engage with the research question presented in 
this thesis a broader perspective drawing upon the long rich and complex history of
“American Character Gets Mixed Reviews,” Pew Research Center, June 23, 2005, accessed March 18, 
2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/06/23/us-image-up-slightly-but-still-negative.
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Islam and the Middle East is required. Section III endeavours to do this. The Palestinian 
question and the Arab Israeli conflict may do well in explaining why Palestinians who 
sustain attacks from the Israeli Defence Force and live in the squalor of refugee camps 
sympathise with al-Qaeda’s message and join its ranks, but it still leaves lingering 
questions, such as why then does Hamas not join forces with al-Qaeda? Poverty and 
destitution in the slums of Cairo and the tough fisted long surviving regimes may add 
illumination to the same in a local context, but it does not explain why some of the 9/11 
hijackers despite being educated economically affluent men chose to give up their lives 
for al-Qaeda’s cause.
This chapter attempts to dispel many of the long standing assumptions regarding the 
nature of the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the US to aid in demonstrating the 
central argument of this thesis. This thesis contends that the conflict with the Salafi 
Jihadists is a result of the US maintaining a status quo hegemonic position that is 
instrumental in ensuring the survival of Middle Eastern nation-states be they theocratic, 
democratic or authoritarian. It is not debated that al-Qaeda’s war with the US from a 
tactical perspective is bom out of the political realities of the 20* century, related to US 
hegemony. However, it is argued that this is a continuation of a long mnning struggle 
that the US as a hegemonic power that helps to maintain the status quo order has 
become involved in. The previously mentioned assumptions assert that the issue is 
related to something intrinsic in the nature of the US in terms of values or policy or 
something that can be related to contemporary events and perspectives, imagined or 
real, of Western power in the last 100 years: the Israeli state, modernity, globalisation, 
poverty, conflicts over values or a clash of civilisations. It is argued throughout this
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thesis that this is not the case. Though each of these themes is a part of the wider 
conflict and do have roles to play on the rise of late 20* century international 
‘terrorism,’ none of these explanations on its own provides a satisfactory response. 
Walid Phares astutely assesses the post 9/11 Western understanding of Salafi Jihadism:
Even intelligence estimates five years after 9/11, still link the rise of Jihadism to 
poverty and global attitudes instead of seeing it as a result of mass mobilisation by 
jihadist ideologues and movements. Jihadists are mobilising radicalised Muslims not on 
the grounds of America’s image, but to follow the injunction of AllahP
The rise of Salafi Jihadism is rooted in a centuries old struggle for order and power in 
the Middle East of which al-Qaeda is only the most contemporary contender. Al-Qaeda 
uses its Salafi Jihadist ideology, which will be further explored in Chapter 7, to justify 
its cause and claims to legitimacy. Issues of poverty and global attitudes that Phares 
describes are only a part of the larger issue.
Globalisation, US foreign policy, support for despotic regimes, the state of Israel, 
economic hardship and differing cultural values and perceptions all have a role to play 
in regard to the issue of Salafi Jihadist ‘terrorism’ directed at the US. They provide 
pieces of the puzzle but cannot be observed in isolation. Understanding the roots of 
Salafi Jihadism requires, as Frank Louis Rusciano notes, “a global perspective without 
necessarily negating other explanations.”®^ This chapter will demonstrate that the 
previous explanations are insufficient and suggest an alternative explanation within 
which these ideas work. The contemporary crisis is related to an ongoing struggle for 
dominance in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda is the most recent contender for that power. 
The remainder of this chapter will analyse the various popular explanations for the rise
Walid Phares, The War o f  Ideas; Jihadism Against Democracy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
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of Salafi Jihadism and the conflict with the United States: globalisation and modernity, 
a clash of civilisations, US values, economic disenfranchisement, US support for 
tyrannical regimes and the Israeli state.
The 9/11 attacks have inspired two particular points of view as to the cause of events.®"^  
From one perspective it is a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West and is a 
backlash from a culture that feels marginalised in world affairs.®® From another 
perspective it is the product of misguided US policies and support for Israel that are the 
source of the conflict between Salafi Jihadists and the United States.®® Neither of these 
approaches represents anything new and constitutes attempts to eliminate Islam as a 
factor on the emergence of ‘terrorism’ in the 20* century by portraying regional affairs 
as no more than simply a by-product of world politics, disregarding the possibility that 
indigenous factors have a role to play. Halliday succinctly states that “the problem with 
much of the analysis of the modem world is not that it is false but the idea that it is 
novel.”®^ This thesis attempts to observe both contemporary and trans-historical factors, 
arguing that the origins of Salafi Jihadism are in part a result of indigenous Islamic 
power stmggles that following the collapse of the Ottoman imperial order has been 
thmst onto the world at large. With the failure of Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism to 
unite that Arab world and the following consolidation of sovereign nation-states in the 
20* century, the struggle for unity and legitimacy has been dealt a heavy blow.
^  Efraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 1. 
Ibid.
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Fred Halliday, The World at 2000 (Palgrave, 2001), 16.
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1.1 Globalisation and Modernity
Globalisation and the issue of contending with elements of modernity are thought by 
many scholars and analysts to be the root cause of Salafi Jihadist ‘terrorism’ in the later 
portion of the 20* and early 21®^ centuries. George Caffentzis adamantly states, 
“September 11 can be traced back to the economic and social crisis that has developed 
in North Afiica, the Middle East and West Asia in the aftermath of the Gulf War (1991) 
and prior to it the accelerating process of globalisation starting in the late 1970s.”®^ 
Hoffman,®^ along with Chase-Dunn and Boswell,^® also point to globalisation and 
modernity as significant factors, where Jurgensmeyer notes that Islamic ‘terrorism’ is a 
defensive reaction to the globalisation process that takes on a religious character.T illy  
suggests that parallels can be seen with 19* century European collective violence that 
was a reaction to increasing modernisation.^^ In view of the turmoil that engulfed the 
Middle East during the 1970s and early 80s this assertion appears plausible: the 
assassination of Anwar al-Sadat (1981), the Lebanese civil war (start 1975), the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution (1979), the Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia (1979) and the 
US Marine barracks bombing (1983).
This line of logic is not uncommon, linking the appearance of the sudden rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism and the subsequent anti-Americanism and targeting of the US by 
Islamist ‘terror’ groups. The fallacy here is both a logical and an historical one.
^  Caffentzis, Globalize Liberation, 98.
Hofftnan, Chaos and Violence, 104-115.
C. Chase-Dunn and T. Boswell, Transnational Social Movements and Democratic Socialist Parties in 
the Semi-Periphery (Riverside Ca: University of California Riverside, 2002)
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C. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978)
34
Globalisation may be accelerating human interaction at an unprecedented rate but it is 
not in any sense new, nor should it be understood as something which is inevitable/^ 
Cultures have been interacting, cross fertilising, trading, integrating, dominating and 
influencing each other for centuries in various forms under numerous hegemonic actors. 
The logical fallacy is, however, somewhat more problematic, working from the position 
of post hoc ergo propter hoc (if then, therefore, because of it). It assumes that because B 
(in this case Salafi Jihadist ‘terrorism’) follows A (increased speed of globalisation) that 
A must therefore be the cause of B. This line of logic disregards historical influences 
and imposes a Western centric concept of causation and international politics on the 
question in the sense that the assumption is made that events in the Orient are somehow 
the result of conditions in the Occident. Globalisation in the guise of the neo-liberal 
capitalist world order led by the US causes disenfranchisement, social unrest and 
cultural deterioration; It must then be at the root of “Muslim rage.” A deeper 
investigation into the historical political processes of the Middle East and Islam may, 
however, as this thesis argues, demonstrate otherwise. Globalisation is only one piece of 
the puzzle. This acceleration of political, social and economic interaction has been at 
work for centuries.
Benjamin Barber argues in his famous work V5. McWorld that Jihadists are those
who detest modernity and enlightenment virtues and reject democracy, tolerance and 
diversity.Barber describes jihad  as a response to the lack of spirituality and the 
trivialisation of values that accompany globalisation.^® Steger concurs, suggesting that
Henry M. Clement, “The Clash of Globalisations,” in International Relations o f  the Middle East, ed. 
Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 106.
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al-Qaeda’s ideology rejects globalism as it is secular and materialistic by nature, linked 
to the capitalist world order that marginalises spiritual values/® This is not entirely 
false, but it must also be observed from a position that takes account of the historical 
struggles for power in the Middle East. Viewing al-Qaeda as a political actor it must be 
the case that the institutionalisation oisharia to depose the condition of jahiliya 
(ignorance of God’s will),^^ is in practise part of a mechanism for taking and 
maintaining power that utilises the notion of God’s sovereignty to legitimise its claims. 
Al-Qaeda provides a discourse laden with a sentiment that rejects modernity but yet 
simultaneously international ‘terror’ networks have been facilitated by the very 
processes they claim to reject.^^Al-Qaeda spokesmen themselves have admitted that 
50% of their operational strategy is conducted through the m edia.C heap  international 
travel, media, instant communication and the internet, the very backbone of 
globalisation, are elements that have benefited the al-Qaeda network.^® Without the 
forces of globalisation al-Qaeda would have never been able to sufficiently 
communicate its message and gather constituents.
Salafi Jihadists challenge globalisation with an alluring anti-hegemonic discourse.^^ 
This counter discourse appeals to those who feel disenfranchised by the current state of
Manfred Steger, Globalism, Market Ideology Meets Terrorism (London: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005), 
111.
Jahaliya (also jahili) refers to a condition of ignorance of God’s will. Specifically in the Quran it 
describes the condition of the Arab people before God’s revelation to Muhammad. It was used by the 
medieval Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya to describe the society he lived in and was later employed by 20* 
century Salafists most notably Sayid Qutb and Maulana Maududi. This concept will be more significantly 
engaged with in Chapter 7 in regard to its use in Salafi Jihadist ideology.
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https://www.mi5 .gov.uk/output/the-intemational-terrorist-threat-to-the-uk-1 .html.
Michael Moynagh and Richard Worsley, Going Global, Key Questions fo r  the 2 Century (London: 
A.C. Black Publishers, 2008), 164.
Steger, Globalism, 126.
36
affairs in some parts of the Middle East and indeed the world. This does not, however, 
demonstrate that globalisation is the cause of international ‘terrorism’ and the 
emergence of Salafi Jihadism. It is, rather, a tool, both a material resource and an 
ideological one. McDonalds, high rise hotels. Western films and materialism in general 
are portrayed as corrupting the Muslim people, while al-Qaeda agents use the internet, 
air travel and the media, including their own As-Sahab group,^^ as indispensable 
resources. In this sense al-Qaeda has made dual use of the process itself, utilising the 
elements of modernity it finds beneficial and demonising other elements in its discourse 
to gamer support from those who are marginalised and do not benefit fi*om the 
contemporary world order. The problem arises in the fact that it is not only the Islamic 
or necessarily non-Westem world in which the neo-liberal world order has brought 
economic disenfranchisement and the erosion of traditional value systems. These 
problems exist globally. Therefore, as a single issue it cannot be determined to be the 
root cause of the rise of Salafi Jihadism. Al-Qaeda’s message is a broad narrative which 
attempts to find support by offering different messages to different audiences. Al- 
Qaeda’s anti globalisation rhetoric appeals to those who suffer spiritually or materially 
either from globalisation or conditions of modernity, but paradoxically this message is 
distributed through the technological advancements that globalisation has allowed to 
spread throughout the world. Globalisation, then, has been a facilitator of Salafi Jihadist 
‘t e r ro r i sm. I t  is not, however, a causal factor on its own.
As-Sahab (the clouds) produces video documentaries in support of Salafi Jihadism for the al-Qaeda 
organisation.
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalisation and International Terrorism,” International 
Security 27, no. 3 (Winter, 2002): 30.
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1.2 Clash of Civilisations
Huntington’s Clash o f Civilizations thesis is an important component regarding the 
issues that are central to this thesis. Huntington argued in 1993, “it is my hypothesis that 
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or 
primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source 
of conflict will be cultural.” '^^  Whether Huntington’s ideas accurately conceptualise the 
emerging trends in global politics, identifying the future potential fractures and points of 
conflict in the post Cold War order, remains highly debatable. Huntington received 
significant criticism from notable scholars portraying his work as a simplistic attempt to 
grapple with broad complex problems or nothing more than ramblings that were of 
limited academic value. However, despite the numerous critics of the work and the 
volumes that have been written since the article was first published in 1993 denouncing 
Huntington’s thesis, it remains an important piece of literature in the study of 
international politics and to scholars concerned with issues of religion and conflict.
It is argued here that Huntington’s concept of civilisations when first published did not 
necessarily represent anything novel. It was, however, sensationalist in suggesting that 
conflict between civilisations is inevitable in a future where ideology and materialism 
will no longer be the premier sources of conflicts. Phares argues that despite historical 
conflict between civilisations these conflicts are not as Huntington suggests inevitable, 
but rather subject to particular political realities.^® The culturalist approach is, as Olivier 
Roy argues, “pervasive” to many in the Western world. This approach, he continues, is
^  Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993): 22. 
Walid Phares, Pluralism in the World (Mount Jordan Lebanon: Kasleek University Press, 1979)
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“appealing to Orientalists, social scientists, politicians, newspapers, leaders, writers, 
strongly pro-Israeli academics and the person in the street.” ®^ This approach is also 
shared, he argues, by the Salafi Jihadists. Phares observed that the unexpected endorsers 
of the theory of civilisations have been the Jihadists themselves.
Osama Bin Laden when asked directly during an interview in 2001what his perspective 
on the Clash o f Civilizations thesis was affirmed it seemed to be a valid concept:
Interviewer: What is your comment on what Samuel Huntington and others say about 
the inevitability of the clash o f civilisations? Your repetition of the words Crusade and 
Crusades indicates that you support the inevitability of the clash of civilisations.
Bin Laden: I say there is no doubt about that. It is clearly established in the book and 
the Sunnah. No faithful Muslim can deny these facts. Whether it is said or not, what 
counts to us is what exists in the book and Sunnah of our Prophet may peace and 
blessings of God be upon him. But the Jews and the United States have come out with a 
fib to make simple Muslims believe it (Co-existing civilisations). Unfortunately, the 
rulers of the region and many others believed the call for peace and world peace. This is 
a baseless fib.*^
The Clash o f Civilizations argument, however, is based upon a questionable ontology. It 
is not in any sense inevitable, but rather is continually reified by both Orientalists and 
Occidentalists to serve particular political interests in a given period of t i m e . I n  
attempting to provide convincing proof that the clash between Islam and the West has 
always existed and is inevitable, the agents of the idea have managed to construct an 
historical conspiracy.^® Although Bin Laden may have claimed to perceive an inevitable 
clash of civilisations, it is more accurate to argue that he was an agent of creating such a 
phenomenon as opposed to simply an actor working within one. The end of the Cold
Roy, Globalised Islam, 9.
Walid Phares, The War o f  Ideas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11.
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War made evident a new division in the struggle for world order, the Jihadists who 
wanted to ignite a clash of civilisations and the Western democracies who did not/^ For 
the Islamists the teleological journey for Islam has not ended, hence, for there to be any 
“end of history” Islamic society must continue forward along the historical axis/^ The 
nation-state, therefore, a product of Western political organisation, is not the final form 
of political organisation for the Muslim world and must be challenged, as the caliphate 
is the appropriate form of Muslim political organisation. The clash of civilisations 
discourse is essential to both the Salafi Jihadists and the US political elite. It is laden 
with diametrically opposed concepts of ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ ‘us and them,’ and serves to 
articulate the views of both camps.®® This kind of absolute dichotomy has continued to 
gain momentum in the post 9/11 period and has helped to fuel the belief in an 
intensifying clash of civilisations. Even so, many political figures in the West have 
attempted to ensure that the ‘War on Terror’ is not about the West and Islam, but rather 
a dispute between the world order driven towards démocratisation and those who wish 
to obstruct or even obliterate the present world system. These concepts, however, allow 
for Salafi Jihadists to bolster their appeal and gain recruits.
George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech demonstrated the impermiability of the 
ideological fault lines between ‘good’ and ‘evil.’®"^ Additionally, Salafi Jihadist writings 
make similar statements, although using the Islamic concept of the Dar al-Harb and 
Dar al-Islam as the concrete dividing line between what is ‘good’ and what constitutes
Phares, The War o f  Ideas, xi.
^  Moghaddam, “A Short History,” 12.
Michael Dunn, “The Clash of Civilizations and the War on Terror,” Parallel 20 (Winter, 
2006/2007): 1, accessed March 22, 2010, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue20/Dunn.pdf.
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‘evil.’ Both the Jihadists and the West have employed a securitization discourse where 
the actors are able to enforce the idea upon their audience that something of value is 
under threat. The objects under threat can be abstract principles, such as freedom or a 
religion itself.®®
There is a subjective imaginary construct that influences the way in which the Western 
world and the Islamic world conceptualise the other. Salafi Jihadists use the imagery of 
the Crusades and past struggles in the Islamic world to illustrate the threatening nature 
of the Western other. It is a powerful tool for Salafi Jihadists as these images resonate in 
the contemporary with many Muslims. The creation of a tradition like that of an 
inevitable clash between competing cultures is a process of ritualising and formalising, 
using the past as a point of reference.®®
The US and the West are not ideologically monolithic and neither is Islam. ®^ Without 
discounting the notion that civilisations exist or denying historical or potential future 
conflicts that have a civilisational orientation, the idea that these clashes are either 
inevitable or capable of consuming entire cultures seems implausible. Thus, the idea 
that there is a natural tendency for civilisations to clash is played upon by those with 
strategies and interests that benefit from spreading such beliefs about the nature of 
civilisations in the international system. As Ali points out, “the world of Islam has not
Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Japp de Wilds, Review o f  Security: A New Frameworkfor Analysis 
(London; Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), 5.
^  Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention o f  Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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41
been monolithic for over a thousand years.”®^ The social and cultural differences 
between various parts of the Muslim world are significantly greater than the differences 
they may have with those who do not share their religion but are of the same 
nationality.®® In spite of there being a concept of a single Muslim community {ummd) 
Muslims from Turkey to the Arab world, Southeast and Central Asia have a different 
political culture.^ ®® This indicates that the idea of a civilisation acting in unison would 
be a difficult claim to make. Indeed, there is a danger that the persistent use of the term 
civilisation will only lead to the eventual underestimation of the variety that exists 
within this concept and the reality that great change has occurred and likely will 
continue to occur over time.^ ®^
Huntington’s thesis reduced the primacy of the role of ideas in post Cold War conflicts 
and privileged instead culture. Ideology, however, has not been cast aside. What the 
Salafi Jihadists have done, rather, is attempt to fuse ideology with a civilisational 
identity, using religion in such away as the Islamic world becomes synonymous with 
Salafi Jihadism and the al-Qaeda ideologues the spokespersons and vanguard of the 
Muslim people. Chapter 7 will unpack these issues in greater detail. The validity of 
Huntington’s concept lies less in an accurate prediction of future conflicts but rather as 
a self fulfilling prophecy in which the actors use these concepts and the images they 
conjure to justify their means and gamer support. There may have been no real Clash o f
Tariq Ali, The Clash o f  Fundamentalisms, Crusades Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002), 
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Civilizations in 1993, but there are those in the post Cold War era who are attempting to 
create one.
1.3 Culture and Values
On September 11, 2001 President George W. Bush issued the following statement in 
relation to the attacks of that day, “today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very 
freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.” ®^^ He 
further argued for this assessment in a speech to a joint session of Congress ten days 
later:
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what they see right here in this 
chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They 
hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote 
and assemble and disagree with each other.
Some scholars concurred with the President’s assessment. For Mangus Ranstorp Salafi 
Jihadists harbour a, “vehement rejection of Western Culture,” ®^^ and Barber notes that 
Jihadists detest “freedom, democracy and diversity.” ®^®
George W. Bush (speech given September 11, 2001) CNN, accessed November 4, 2011, 
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The import of Western culture and values into the Islamic world has been cited as a 
major source of inspiration for Salafi Jihadist rage against the West. The fear of cultural 
contamination is given credence as a driving force of the Salafi Jihadist movement and 
violent attacks against the West. As Roy observes, “the liberal perspective endorses the 
view that radical Islam is a reaction against Western political and cultural 
encroachments.” '®® The issue, however, is that of causation. The Islamic world is not 
the only sphere of humanity struggling with issues of identity and morality in the 
contemporary era. The effects of capitalism and modernity are nearly global. What then 
makes the Islamic world unique in the spread of global ‘terrorism’ and how can this be 
linked to culture and values? The decadence of the West that Salafi Jihadists speak of 
linked to homosexuality, pornography and sexual freedoms are common themes in most 
religions not specifically to Islam. Evangelical ministers in the West can be found to be 
preaching the same message. In this sense can culture be seen to be the cause of the rise 
of Salafi Jihadist violence against the West in the late 20* century? Sayid Qutb spoke of 
these same issues and was evidently appalled by certain aspects of the West, 
particularly loose sexual morals. Though Qutb was a primary contributor to what has 
become the Salafi Jihadist ideology, this issue alone does not explain the rise of the 
modem movement and is only a part of the larger puzzle.
Salafi Jihadism is in essence not a reaction to Western culture, but an attempt at 
de-culturalisation.'®^ The divide is between believers and non-believers whatever 
cultural background they come from.'®  ^Fundamentalism'®® is a mechanism by which to
Roy, Globalised Islam, 329. 
Ibid.
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engage in re-universalising a religion by disentangling the belief system from cultural 
identity, recasting the religion into a universal code of nonus."® In an effort to make the 
religion pure the fundamentalists have defined it as a closed absolute set of norms and 
values that can be separated from the surrounding culture that is seen as corrupt (jahili). 
This is the purging of jahiliya that will be defined in Chapter 5 as a major component of 
the al-Qaeda ideology. In the absence of the jahili society the Salafi Jihadists may 
reshape social order to suit their ends.
There are indeed those in the Islamic world and indeed around the world who are 
simply opposed to the culture and values of the West. However, it is not only the 
secularism, ‘loose morals’ and pluralism of the West that are problematic for the Salafi 
Jihadists, it is culture at all. The process of de-culturalisation as was seen under the 
Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan is a necessary step in the long term goal of creating the 
global caliphate. Religion can be used as a marker in times of de-culturalisation.'" The 
Salafi Jihadists determine what constitutes this religion and use it as a mechanism for 
taking power free from the challenges of culture itself.
Fundamentalism is understood here as a meta-narrative that seeks to explain all aspects of human life 
through divinely given sources. Jean-Francois Lyotard argued in 1979 that grand narratives had passed 
away. However, the Salafi Jihadists subscribe to a grand narrative that has significant implications for 
international relations. John-Francois Lyotard, The Post Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984)
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1.4 The Jewish State
“There will be no world without terrorism for as long as the Palestinian Israeli dispute is 
unresolved. It is by far the biggest trigger of rage against the US,” argues Ali Mazrui.^*^ 
This is a common sentiment among a number of academics, citizens of the Middle East 
and those who see the conflict between the West and Salafi Jihadism as founded on the 
long ongoing conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish state. The Zionist 
conspiracy to influence American policy towards Israel is seen by some as a driving 
force for US action in the Middle East and a primary concern in its ‘War on Terror,’ or 
as an issue that works within US domestic politics. As noted author Tariq Ali argues, 
the Bush Administration viewed the war in Iraq as an opportunity to “wean the pro- 
Zionist Jews away from the Democrats.”^
From the function of domestic policy and the work of the Jewish lobby to conspiracies 
to control the Middle East with the aid of the US, the Jews and the Israeli state are seen 
as the catalyst for Salafi Jihadist violence directed against the United States. Dilop Hiro 
adamantly asserts, “Israel continues to try to uproot Palestinians from their land through 
transfer, deportation, repression, economic siege and Jewish settlement. This is what 
fuels the fundamentalist ideology.”  ^ Dissatisfaction with the situation of the 
Palestinian people, a distrust and indeed hatred of Jewish people and an outright 
rejection of the legitimacy of the Israeli state among many in the Middle East cannot be 
denied. A cursory examination of jihadist rhetoric, particularly of al-Qaeda, would
Ali A. Mazrui, Islam Between Globalisation and Counter Terrorism (Eritrea: Africa World Press, 
2006), 105-106.
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reveal just such sentiments. Considering the volumes of literature dedicated to Israel by 
such ideologues as Ayman al-Zawahiri, one could observe that this is the central issue 
to the question this thesis is concerned with. However, as Phares observes:
No other conflict better served the long-term objectives of the Pan-Arabist-Salafist- 
Khumeinist trio than the multiple wars between Israel and the Arabs in general, and the 
Palestinians in particular. This half century’s ethnic and territorial dispute was used, 
abused and stretched by ideological agendas far beyond the question of the specific 
legal and political rights of the Palestinians.”
From the perspective that Phares presents, the existence of Israel and the condition of 
Palestine gives the Salafi Jihadists and other messianic aspirants a grievance to point to 
in aid of gaining support for their various agendas.
This thesis argues that the Palestine/ Israel issue is only part of the larger problem. 
Jihadist rhetoric directed at Israel, and the Jews in general, may be more of a recruiting 
tool than grounds to suggest that the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the United 
States can be explained in the simple terms of the Palestinian conflict. This is not to 
suggest that this is not a piece of the more complex puzzle. The rejection of the Israeli 
state by the Salafi Jihadists and the support Israel receives from the United States is not 
the sole catalyst for the conflict between the United States and Salafi Jihadists. It is just 
another piece of the larger question. As this thesis argues, one of the driving factors in 
this conflict is the American hegemonic position that ensures the status quo system of 
nation-states remains intact. The Israeli state is yet another obstacle to the establishment 
of an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. The US is seen as a maintainer of the status 
quo, in this case by guaranteeing the existence of Israel and aiding in maintaining its 
sovereignty. Thus, this particular issue is only a part of the problem not the cause of it.
115 Phares, Ideas, 123-124.
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It is not a hatred of the Jews per se that drives Salafi Jihadist anger, but the geo-political 
obstacle Israel presents. In addition, as previously discussed, it benefits the Salafi 
Jihadist ideologues to highlight this issue to bolster both their own credentials as the 
legitimate vanguard of Muslim grievances, but also to earn material and human support 
for the Salafi Jihadist project. Further, this follows neatly with the Salafi Jihadist appeal 
to history, the need to construct an historical narrative that legitimises their aspirations 
as well as galvanises and motivates their supporters. The appeal to history and a strong 
historical consciousness, as has been previously mentioned, is significant to the Middle 
East and thus central the strategies of the Salafi Jihadists. Additionally, the ability to 
create an enemy a trickster that is the cause for many ills is a powerful tool in the 
arsenal of the Salafi Jihadists.
It is worth noting, as Jonathan Fox points out, that the regional reaction to the 
establishment of the Jewish state was primarily an Arab concern rather than a Muslim 
one.^^  ^The struggle against the Jewish state “became the responsibility of the Arab 
states rather than the Muslim world.” This is just another case of the Salafi Jihadists 
picking up the torch from the Pan-Arabists who mobilised the rejection of Israel as a 
key legitimising agent for Nasserism and Ba 'athism. For the most part this is still veiy 
much the case. Though it is argued here that the Salafi Jihadist struggle is primarily 
about taking power in the Arab world, their attempt to obtain Islamic credentials and 
ally themselves with other Jihadists around the world requires them to paint the struggle 
not as an Arab Israeli struggle, but as a Muslim Jewish struggle. Unlike the Pan-
Jonathan Fox, Bringing Religion into International Relations (Gordonsville Virginia: Palgrave 
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Arabists the Salafi Jihadists adopt a strong historicist and theological attitude towards 
the creation of the Israeli state/
Many commentators and scholars such as Ali, and indeed the Salafi Jihadists 
themselves, have noted the American political process of successive support by US 
administrations for Israel. For these critics the relationship between Israel and the US is 
directly influenced, and at times controlled by, the Jewish Congressional L o b b y . U S  
policy towards Israel, argue Walt and Mearsheimer, is derived almost exclusively from 
domestic American politics and special interests. The idea here is that the connection 
between the two states is dictated by a powerful influence upon the US Congress that 
drives the US to protect and support Israel even when its actions directly contravene US 
interests. The US has allowed its ally a virtual free hand in its dealings with Palestine 
and ignored Israel’s proliferation of nuclear weapons.
These are but a few examples cited to demonstrate that the Jewish Lobby is effectively 
manipulating the US Congress in favour of Israel’s interests. A strong assumption 
regarding the US/ Israeli ‘special relationship’ is based on a common religious ancestry 
and a mutual commitment to democracy. This theme fits well within the clash of 
civilisations paradigm, pitting the West against Islam. The perpetuation of these beliefs 
is a powerful tool for Salafi Jihadist propaganda, but in terms of geo-politics it is a 
difficult claim to justify. As Pierre Guerlain asserts, “client states and their leaders
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always exploit their relationships with their powerful allies to achieve their own 
goals” ^^* This is not unusual in the case of US foreign policy and numerous examples 
can be noted of states that were permitted to act in a manner which would appear 
contrary to professed American values while still receiving generous aid, particularly in 
the Middle East. Ethnic and religious explanations for US foreign policy behaviour, or 
reasoning based on the influence of the powerful Israel lobby, are not sufficient to 
explain what Gurlain refers to as “the totality of US foreign policy in the Middle 
East.”^^^
If relations between the US and Israel can be explained in geo-political terms, then so to 
can the Salafi Jihadist obsession with Israel be conceptualised in this manner. For the 
Salafi Jihadists Israel is problematic in the sense that it is viewed to serve as an enforcer 
for the West, weakening and dividing the Arab s t a t e s . T h e  Salafi Jihadist stance on 
Palestine can also be explained in geo-political terms. As Phares argues, “to Islamists 
every land that was conquered during the Fatah under a legitimate authority cannot be 
reverted back to the infideh. Zionism is attempting to take back a land that has been 
duly Islamized.” ^^"^ This is sufficient cause in and of itself to reject the existence of the 
Jewish state. Israel, then, is an obstacle to the rebirth of the caliphate as not only does it 
occupy territorial space which the caliphate would claim, but also it poses a strategic 
problem as it serves as a Western agent that stifles regional efforts for unity. The Salafi
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Jihadist narrative argues that if a war of attrition can be waged against the United States 
then ultimately the collapse of Israel will be imminent/^^
Beyond the realities of geo-politics, however, there is another significant element 
surrounding the question of Palestine and Israel. The Palestinian cause has 
predominantly been a nationalist as opposed to a religious struggle. Where the Salafi 
Jihadist position is drenched in religious ideology, the Palestinian objectives are more 
tangible. This has resulted in a split between the Palestine resistance groups, notably 
Hamas, and the al-Qaeda leadership. Palestine is a coveted cause for the Salafi Jihadists 
as it provides a wealth of currency in terms of legitimacy. It has the potential to be a 
unifying factor among disenfranchised Muslims. The vanguard of this cause not only 
will be afforded significant public space and credence, but can link the broader Salafi 
Jihadist cause to the Palestinian national struggle. Arab nationalists, monarchists, 
secularists and Islamists have all attempted to employ the Palestinian issue in search of 
legitimacy. Al-Qaeda is no different and has adopted an historicist theological 
approach to justify its claim in an attempt to overshadow organisations like Hamas. Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi an al-Qaeda propagandist observes:
We remark that there is no prohibition on the existence of Hamas or whomever on the 
right path that seeks to elevate Allah'^ word. There is good in Palestine and elsewhere 
but our eritieism of the so called Hamas is because it has delayed the big Holy War in 
Palestine and distorted the fundamentals of the religion which can never be argued or 
renounced for political gains.
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Peace in Palestine would be a disastrous blow for al-Qaeda, depriving it of valuable 
propaganda, the opportunity to be the champions of a highly visible cause and 
deepening Muslim disenchantment with the West, which is crucial to the organisations 
continued relevance.
Al-Zawahiri has made clear that any movement by Hamas towards a peaceful 
settlement with Israel would greatly disappoint the al-Qaeda leadership. From this it 
is evident that al-Qaeda is positioning itself as an alternative to Hamas. Shishani points 
out, “when the Palestinian nation comes to the conclusion that neither Hamas nor 
Islamic Jihad have managed to improve the conditions, it will turn to the most radical of 
all, to al-Qaeda.”^^  ^This is precisely the strategy that al-Qaeda is employing. The 
assertion here is that the existence of Israel and the plight of the Palestinians is not in 
and of itself a catalyst for the Salafi Jihadist war with the United States, but only a piece 
of the larger issue regarding the obstacles that the state represents. Israel, then, is both 
an obstacle and an opportunity for the al-Qaeda cause.
1.5 United States Foreign Policy, Democracy and Authoritarian Regimes
Although US foreign policy and Israel are clearly linked there is a separate issue which 
has been often cited as a cause for the Salafi Jihadist conflict with the United States 
regarding US foreign policy. As American support for Middle Eastern regimes often 
threatens as much as maintains regional stability, American policy makers find
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themselves in a difficult position. On the one hand is the ever present need for regional 
stability. On the other there is America’s role as a self proclaimed ‘leader of the free 
world’ demanding democratic participation for all of humanity. These two imperatives 
are often in conflict with regard to US foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East, and 
indeed throughout the world.
Support for Saddam Hussein’s regime, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war, as well as 
support for Mubarak’s Egypt before 2011, Pahlavi’s Iran and grudging support for the 
al-Saud regime in Saudi Arabia, has without question undermined US credibility in the 
region as a benign hegemon and the vanguard of liberal democracy. The United States 
which was once cast in opposition to European imperialism and even admired by 
Islamists such as Sayid Qutb for its opposition to tyranny and colonialism, is now 
described as a tyrannical imperial power by the Salafi Jihadists. The realities of 
international politics, the need for a stable Middle East and the decline of European 
power in favour of the United States, leaves the US in the difficult position of 
attempting to maintain its values and simultaneously manage its interests and the status 
quo global order. From this, it can be argued, that the brief moment of admiration and 
credibility the US may have enjoyed amongst the general population of the Middle East 
has been in overall decline since the end of the Second World War. Muhammad Hafez 
claims in Why Muslims Rebel that the Islamic world must be conceptualised as unique 
and grand narratives that may apply in other parts of the world are not sufficient in 
analysing the Muslim world. He argues that extremism is a reaction to iron fisted 
predatory state aggression fi*om the ruling elites that force Islamists to react
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defensively/^® This may have some credibility, however, the Middle East is not the 
only region of the world governed by undemocratic regimes that subdue organisations 
which challenge the authority of the governing elite.
A 2010 Pew Institute Global Attitudes Survey reveals that the US is particularly 
unpopular in Middle Eastern countries, with only 17% of those surveyed in Egypt and 
Turkey and 21% in Jordan holding a favourable opinion of the US.^^  ^However, 50% of 
Lebanese hold a favourable opinion to the US which was similar to the 52% in Turkey 
in 2000, which was as low as 9% in 2007.^^^ In Egypt, conversely, in the same year it 
was found that 30% of those surveyed were favourable towards the US.^^  ^In Lebanon 
in 2010 25% of Shi’ites surveyed held a favourable opinion of America, which 
differentiated sharply with 64% of Sunnis. What this helps to demonstrate is that 
public opinion fluctuates significantly over relatively short periods of time, lending to 
the possibility that there are numerous factors which may affect public opinion at any 
given time. Hence, it is difficult to demonstrate that authoritarianism and US support for 
those in power can exclusively lay claim to the reason for anti Americanism in the 
Middle East, much less the emergence of the conflict between Salafi Jihadists and the 
US.
Al-Qaeda is involved in a conflict over power in the Middle East. For the al-Qaeda 
ideologues their struggle is to wrest power fi-om the ruling elite through violence, but as
Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.
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well by presenting themselves as worthy successors to the Prophet. As Michael Scott 
Doran observes, “the United States is also a participant in that war because whether it 
realises it or not its policies affect the fortunes of the various belligerents.” By 
attempting to polarise the umma against the regional regimes and the United States, 
casting the former as un-Islamic without legitimacy to rule and the later as its 
benefactor, the al-Qaeda ideologues are working to strategic ends.^ ^®
There are dissenting opinions from those who conceptualise the rise of ‘terrorism’ 
exclusively within the context of US support for authoritarian regimes, and it is not 
disputed here that in part the negative reputation that the US has earned in parts of the 
Middle East is due to this. Yet, this does not necessarily account for the rise of Salafi 
Jihadism. Rather, it is an issue that Salafi Jihadists can point to as a grievance and use to 
aid in the recruitment of al-Qaeda foot soldiers. Mathew Crosston may be correct in 
assuming that “hypocrisy of our own (American) professed foreign policy creates new 
generations of terrorists.”^^  ^However, it is not the cause of the conflict between Salafi 
Jihadists and the United States. Authoritarian regimes are indeed problematic for 
America’s image and drive some towards the Salafi Jihadist cause, but it cannot be 
understood in isolation. As this thesis argues, the re-establishment of the Islamic 
caliphate ruled by a legitimate religious authority is the central goal of al-Qaeda. The 
US and the global status quo order it has helped to sustain are where the US and Salafi 
Jihadism intersect. As al-Zawahiri adamantly states, “it is clear that the Jewish Crusader 
Alliance led by the United States will not allow any Islamic force to reach power in any
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of the Muslim countries, it will mobilise all of its power to hit and remove it from 
power.”^^  ^Bin Laden 'mdi Letter to the American People further explains, “the removal 
of these (Middle Eastern) governments is an obligation upon us and a necessary step to 
free the umma, to make sharia the supreme law and to regain Palestine, and our fight 
against these governments is not separate from you.”^^®
The language the al-Qaeda leaders employ is of significance. Bin Laden spoke of 
imposing sharia in these areas of concern, where al-Zawahiri observes that the infideh 
will not allow an Islamic government to take power. It is not the authoritarian regimes 
that the al-Qaeda ideologues object to, but rather the nation-state and any government 
which they deem to be un-Islamic and, therefore, not dedicated to unification of the 
Muslim peoples. Objections to US foreign policy in regard to its support for 
undemocratic regimes is not unique to the Muslim world, and can be observed to have 
occurred historically in various comers of the world at large, most notably in Latin 
America. Where al-Qaeda may try to wed Middle Eastern opposition to the regimes in 
Damascus, Cairo, Amman and elsewhere in the Middle East, its central concern is not 
the authoritarian regimes. Any regime, whether democratic or otherwise, which is not in 
line with their ideology is an obstacle. Therefore, challenging the US is not dependant 
on the existence of regimes but dependant on US support for any government that is not 
sufficiently Islamic or that strives to maintain the status quo regional order characterised 
by nation-states.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, cited in Joshua Y. Yates, “The Resurgence of Religious Populism,”
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Tariq Ramadan observes that “the intrinsic dynamics and the trends within political 
Islam are not known, so we put all the people in the same box. It’s just to justify the 
rhetoric of the dictators for years and accepted by the West that if  it’s not us the 
dictators then it is going to be them, the violent extremists.” '"^® Fear of political Islam 
has indeed been a factor historically in Western reluctance to upset the Middle Eastern 
order, even at the expense of its own espoused values. This message is turned on its 
head by the al-Qaeda ideologues, insisting that if it is not them the vanguard of Islam 
that rule the Middle East, then, it will be the dictatorships which are the instruments of 
the West. As the validity of these assertions begin to weaken due to uprisings in the 
region it is possible that violent Islamism will be dealt a heavy blow, not by the West 
but by the people of the Middle East themselves. Bruce Riedel insists “if there is a 
springtime freedom in the Arab and Islamic worlds one loser is Osama Bin Laden 
(deceased) and his gang.”'""
The Salafi Jihadists, however, have put their own interpretation on the fall of the Arab 
regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, attempting to portray this as the first step towards 
realising their aims. Despite the revolutions having no connection to Jihadism, this has 
not deterred the Salafi Jihadists from portraying events through the Salafi Jihadist lens 
for the consumption of their own constituents. The spring 2011 edition of Inspire 
entitled the Tsunami o f Change, a publication produced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, dedicated the bulk of its pages to current events in the Arab w o r l d . T h e
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publication argues that the most significant barrier to freeing al-Aqsa is the tyrannical 
rulers/"'^ Ibrahim insists that “now that the friends of America are being mopped out 
one after the other, our aspirations are great that the path between us and al-Aqsa is 
clearing up.”'"'"' They are quick to point out as well that the prospect of freedom in the 
region has no bearing on the fate of Salafi Jihadism: “The West believes that the revolts 
are bad for al-Qaeda. This is not the case.” '"'^  They portray the West as equally 
tyrannical as the Arab regimes, citing the banning of Salafi Jihadist books and internet 
sites asking, “why would the granting of freedoms be bad for al Qaeda?”'"'®
The al Qaeda ideologues are attempting to do as they have previously done, to portray 
themselves as not just the vanguard of a movement but the leaders of the Muslim world. 
Which form of political Islam comes to gain the strongest appeal in the future will 
depend in part on whether or not political Islam is afforded a legitimate place in the 
governments of the future. Al-Qaeda will no doubt continue its condemnation of the 
West as an imperial actor that is intent upon manipulating internal Muslim affairs 
whatever the result.
There is much to suggest that al-Qaeda will attempt to profit from the developing 
situation in the region. They were quick to praise the revolutionaries and make links 
between the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat and the deposing of Hosni Mubarak.'"'^
Al-Aqsa is the third holiest site in Sunni Islam, located in the old city of Jerusalem containing the al- 
Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
Yahlya Ibrahim, Inspire, no. 5 (Spring, 2011): 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Anwar al-Awlaki, “The Tsunami of Change,” Inspire, no. 5 (Spring, 2011): 50.
58
Al-Zawahiri would appear to be suggesting that al-Qaeda should be credited with 
creating the conditions that allowed the Arab Spring to take place:
If the Arab peoples are liberated from the chains of fear and horror, who has won and 
who has lost? The American-allied media claims that al-Qaeda’s methodology in 
confronting the [Arab] regimes has failed, but that media pretentiously forgets that Al- 
Qaeda and most of the jihadist current have continued their efforts for more than a 
decade and a half, mostly setting aside confronting these regimes, but focusing on 
attacking the head of international crime, and this methodology, and especially after the 
attack of September 11, has caused direct American orders to have lost grasp of these 
regimes on their people. That helped in causing a popular, cumulative movement and 
mobilization that led to the explosion of the popular volcano, which is the point that 
Shaykh Osama bin Laden, may Allah have mercy on him, used to assure. He used to 
assure that as much as we increase pressure on today’s madness, America that will lead 
to weakening it, and subsequently weakening its cooperatives. So whose policy has 
really won and whose has lost?''^^
They were also quick to chastise those who promote the middle way of Islam, like the
al-Wasat party in Egypt. Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Libi an al-Qaeda columnist sternly
warns against supporting parties like al-Wasat:
Among the greatest ways which they use to conceal their deviation and to propagate 
their error is their claim of affiliation to the middle way, moderation and balance. They 
have coined meanings for these words which they become content with. Their 
meaning’s source is their thoughts. Their meaning’s structure is fabrication and 
compromise. Its essence and pulp is gladdening the West with what pleases it.
They attempt to discredit moderate Islamist political aspirants like al-Wasat through a 
discourse which presents them as compromisers who have deviated from the true path 
of Islam that Salafi Jihadists claim to represent. In this, ‘moderate Islam’ is no more 
legitimate than the apostates they intend to replace.
Riedel observes that “the victory of the masses and civil disobedience strikes at the very 
heart of the al Qaeda narrative that proclaims change can only come to the Islamic
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world through violence and terror, through the Global Jihad.”'®® This may prove to be 
valid. However, the absence of authoritarian regimes supported by the US will not end 
the conflict between the US and Salafi Jihadism. The US is still an obstacle to Salafi 
Jihadist objectives as a maintainer of the status quo. Even an Islamic government in the 
Middle East that does not fit the strict parameters established by the al-Qaeda 
ideologues will still be promoted as the near enemy.
1.6 Economic Disenfranchisement
There have been numerous attempts to relate the emergence of Salafi Jihadism to poor 
economic conditions and the gross divide between rich and poor in the Middle East. It is 
not disputed that there are indeed individuals who join al-Qaeda’s ranks as a result of 
deep fi-ustration with their economic prospects and a feeling of blame towards the West 
for ensuring that the structural constraints that permit poverty to continue remain in 
place. Can this, however, be understood as sufficient cause for the emergence of Salafi 
Jihadism and its conflict with the United States?
Gurr argues in Why Men Rebel for a theory of relative deprivation. He notes that “men 
are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means 
prove inadequate, but slow to accept their limitations.” '®' This suggests that limits on 
upward social-economic mobility may be the cause of mass political violence. The 
‘rooted in poverty’ hypothesis demonstrates a conceptualisation of political violence as
Riedel, The Real Loser in Egypt’s Uprisings.
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driven by social-economic desperation.'®^ However, as the data presented in a 2006 
study conducted by James A. Piazza demonstrates, “contrary to popular opinion no 
significant relationship between any of the measures of economic development and 
terrorism can be determined.'®®
The World in Figures 2010 published by The Economist indicates that the countries 
with the poorest living standards are not major concerns in the ‘War on Terror.’ 
Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Guinea and Ethiopia have the lowest gross domestic product 
per individual in the world.'®"' The 9/11 hijackers were largely from affluent 
backgrounds living in comfortable conditions. At the individual level there are certainly 
those who feel economic deprivation, and this drives them to join Salafi Jihadist 
organisations. However, poverty on its own does not serve particularly well as an 
explanation for the cause of the current impasse. Saudi Arabia which has been a 
significant exporter of Salafi Jihadist ideas and is the country of origin for many who 
join the Salafi Jihadist cause, could not be considered to be a poor country. Bin Laden 
himself did not come from a condition of poverty, nor did most of al-Qaeda’s most 
influential figures. Salafi Jihadism must be understood in another way. A study by Alan 
Krueger and Jikata Maleckova finds no direct correlation between poverty and 
‘terrorism’ in general.'®® Additionally, as Von Hippel generalises, “if poverty really 
were the root cause of terrorism, more terrorists would come from sub-Saharan Africa
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and so far this is not the case.”'®® Esposito and Mogahed observe that 67% of those who 
claim to be radicalised have secondary or higher education, and that the politically 
radicalised tend to be more affluent than those who see themselves as moderate.'®^ 
Despite the rhetoric of the al-Qaeda ideologues indicating that the West has deprived 
the region of economic success, poverty and hardship are not exclusive to the Islamic 
world. However, instability and economic deprivation are dynamic components of the 
al-Qaeda narrative that places the current condition of the economically dis­
enfranchised concretely within the imperial narrative that characterises the West, and 
indeed the international order, as oppressive and anti-lslamic.
1.7 Why Not the Rest?
A significant question that must be asked is why do issues of globalisation, US foreign 
policy, cultural imperialism and poverty not incite the same kind of reactions in other 
parts of the world. Each of these issues has had adverse effects on the populations of 
Asia, Afiica and Latin America. Attempts to build unifying political blocs to resist the 
present world structure have been unsuccessful and pursued with very little fervour or 
violence directed at the hegemon. No Pan-African, Asian or Latin American trans­
national ‘terror’ networks of non-Islamic origin have emerged to challenge these issues 
at a global scale. In the quest to win allies Western policy makers have attempted to 
distance the ‘War on Terror’ from Islam itself. In addition, academic scholarship often
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treads lightly around these issues. But it must be acknowledged that Islam, whatever the 
poverty of the Salafi Jihadist interpretation may be in the eyes of Muslims and 
Westerners alike, is a significant factor. Beyond the spiritual aspects of the faith Islam 
provides a discourse for political organisation. The ability to construct an ideology that 
inspires global ‘terrorism’ out of a religious base to counter the prevailing world order 
is something unique to Islam and the Salafi Jihadists. It has been able to infectiously 
transcend boarders, ethnicity and class with its appeal to the unity of believers and the 
search for religiously sanctioned governance.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that many of the mainstream concepts which 
attempt to offer explanations for the emergence of Salafi Jihadism in the 20®^  century 
are somewhat narrow in scope. They are limited to events and conditions of the 
contemporary age. To the extent that they contain elements of truth, they are at best, 
only partial. Most are also ahistorical. Such ahistorical approaches limit the viability of 
the analysis. The Israeli state, modernity, globalisation, poverty, US foreign policy, 
values, and the concept of the Clash o f Civilisations, do have a role to play within the 
the conflict between Salafi Jihadists and the United States. In addition, they may well 
help to explain why some individuals join al-Qaeda’s cause, and they are significant in 
the rhetoric used by the Salafi Jihadist ideologues to exploit particular conditions, fears 
and resentment. It sends a message to individuals that will motivate them to support al- 
Qaeda and the objectives of the ideology. However, they are not in themselves
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sufficient explanations for the phenomenon which requires a longer historical vision and 
a critical look at the exclusively Western centric reading of international politics. The 
contemporary organising principles of the international system are an obstacle to the 
realisation of Salafi Jihadist objectives. Where all the issues touched upon in this 
chapter are of significance, they ignore the systemic issue of order and the historical 
realities.
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Chapter 2:
Theoretical Assumptions
The sentiment of the realist tradition of International Relations may well be summed up 
in the warning proclaimed by Niccolo Machiavelli in the 16®^ century: “Because how 
one lives is so different from how one ought to live, he who neglects what is done for 
what ought to be done sooner affects his ruin than preservation.” '®^ Or possibly in the 
adage of Carl von Clausewitz, “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” '®® 
The theoretical starting point of this thesis centres on realist understandings of power, 
human nature, interests and the state. As the central argument here focuses on the state 
and the challenges and problems it presents, realist assertions are a justifiable starting 
point for inquiry. Post-structuralists may argue against the primacy of the state, and 
indeed rightly point out that notions of the state, sovereignty and war deserve 
questioning. This thesis does this when looking at Islamic concepts in the next section.
It is argued in this thesis, however, that the contemporary nation-state is still the most 
powerful manifestation of sovereignty and characterises the contemporary international 
system. The state is still observed as the focal point of sovereignty by the United 
Nations, and international law is constructed around the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
The state is, however, challenged not just by international organisations, institutions and 
processes of globalisation, but also by alternative concepts of order and sovereignty 
rooted in religion, manifested in the actions of non-state actors. The realist framework 
serves as a starting point of inquiry for this thesis, as its understanding of the 
significance of the nation-state and its role in the contemporary international system
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warrant merit, and realist assertions best conceptualise the international order. It is, 
however, argued here that the realist framework must be expanded upon to deal with 
other concepts often disregarded as secondary by some strands of International 
Relations, the role of ideas and history that are indispensible to the arguments made 
here.
Religion cannot be separated from politics in regard to the Middle East, even if it is 
often used by the political elites as a tool. It is marshalled as a legitimising agent, or 
equally as a model of resistance to those elites. Nor can the nation-state be understood 
as the only concept of sovereignty and territoriality, as it exists alongside other 
competing concepts beyond national identity that are based in religion and ethnicity. In 
the Middle East the nation-state has been challenged since formal states came into 
creation after the disruption of the Ottoman imperial order. Maintaining this form of 
political organisation has and will continue to present challenges for the Middle East, 
the West and the world in general. The role of religion and ideas must not be understood 
in terms of limited importance, nor can events in the Middle East simply be understood 
as an extension of the politics of the West. Further to this, history must be taken 
seriously when investigating the research question this thesis proposes. Historical 
understandings will represent an integral and indispensable portion of this thesis, as it is 
argued that conceptualising the contemporary situation cannot be a project which 
ignores historical trends and perceptions, and the role these play in the creation of 
ideology. By looking to the hegemonic disruption model, which insists that non-state 
actors and ideology are significant elements of the international system and that this 
needs to be incorporated into contemporary realist thinking, the Salafi Jihadist
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phenomenon can be observed from the realist position.'®® This hegemonic disruption 
model and its relevance to the international system will be clarified in part 2 of this 
chapter.
This thesis will consider Islamic concepts of international politics, the state and 
sovereignty along with orthodox International Relations concepts, specifically realism. 
Islamic thought regarding the international will aid in dealing with religious and religio- 
ideological elements of the problem which are under investigation here, a task which 
will be more significantly undertaken in the next chapter. This is done in conjunction 
with classical realist concepts of power, human nature, interest seeking and the state, 
that help to position this question closer to the discipline of International Relations and 
deal with the realities of the 21®' century.
The aim of this thesis is to unpack the following question. Why have Salafi Jihadists 
sought to direct violence against the United States in later part of the 20* century and 
the early 21®' century? Some responses to this question have attached the problem to 
contemporary issues such as the unequal distribution of wealth among and within states, 
globalisation, modernity, despotic regimes. Western values. United States foreign policy 
and the Arab/Israeli conflict, or argue for a determinist conception of competing 
civilisations and cultures. However, much of this literature is deeply rooted within the 
fi-amework of Western centric thinking, ignoring how elements of the Muslim world 
view international politics. Chapter 4 will document how Islamic concepts of the 
international differ from classical Western narratives on international relations. This
160 Newmann, “Hegemonic Disruption,” 68-69.
67
thesis, while attempting to hold to realist assertions regarding power, the state of nature, 
interest seeking and the importance of the state, also engages with Islamic concepts of 
the international, sovereignty, war, territoriality and legitimacy. It will conclude that one 
of the most significant factors driving the Salafi Jihadist conflict with the United States 
and its allies lies in the implementation of the nation-state system in the Middle East, 
which prevents the realisation of the Salafi Jihadist goal of a supranational Islamic 
caliphate. The US, by helping to preserve the status quo system of nation-states, sets 
itself at odds with attempts to create a supranational caliphate. Salafi Jihadists work to 
challenge the contemporary order that is underwritten by the United States in what is 
termed hegemonic disruption.
The idea that Salafi Jihadists, and indeed many Islamists, seek to establish a supra­
national caliphate is not necessarily novel, nor is the notion that the United States as a 
result of its hegemonic position and proactive maintenance of the status quo in the 
international system puts itself in direct opposition to this goal. However, the discourse 
in which this is presented is often done exclusively in a manner which is detached from 
history and Islamic ideas. This thesis does not seek to dispense with contemporary 
theory or ignore contemporary issues, but rather to view them through a broader 
perspective incorporating Islamic thought on sovereignty, order and the international, as 
well as taking account of historical perspectives and the validity of ideas.
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2.1 The Realist Tradition
Critics of realism have argued that there is no single realist tradition, but rather a 
number of competing concepts weakened by contradictions and methods of evasion.'®' 
It is not disputed that realism is a diverse school of thought and there are in fact many 
variants of the realist tradition that have evolved over time. Indeed, it is rather an 
umbrella term for a particular view of the world, international politics and human 
nature. Robert Gilpin takes the view of realism as a kind of general philosophical 
tradition,'®^ and Rosenthal describes this in terms of a “loose framework.”'®® Realism as 
a divided approach features a number of positions that choose to privilege differing 
aspects of international politics. Structural or neo-realists view the system as the 
premier subject of study represented by scholars such as John Mersheimer, Stephen 
Gilpin, Stephen Walt and Kenneth Waltz. Classical realism focuses on the tendency 
towards conflict in human nature as found in the works of Carr and Hans Morgenthau. 
Liberal realists like Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Barry Buzan imagine a greater 
degree of cooperation in the international system. Offensive realists focus on the state as 
a power maximising actor and defensive realists focus on the efforts of states to 
maintain security. Neoclassical realists attempt to merge Waltz’s systemic perspective 
with Morganthau’s views of human nature. The broad taxonomy of realisms could 
scarcely be reviewed in depth within the confines of this thesis. This chapter will.
R.BJ. Walker, Inside/ Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 106.
Robert Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” in Realism and its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 304.
Joel H. Rosenthal, Righteous Realists, Political Realism, Responsible Power and American Culture in 
the Nuclear Age (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 7.
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however, summarise the key tenets of the realist approach as these help to frame the 
analysis that this thesis engages with.
Realism as a theoretical tradition within the discipline of International Relations has 
evolved from its classical origins from the time of the first Great Debate into a 
theoretical tradition of greater diversity and flexibility that is reflective to some extent 
of changes in the world itself. Theorists can successfully grapple with issues that 
challenge its core ontological assumptions regarding sovereignty, the state, power and 
order, in a science that is significantly more aware and engaged with the world than it 
was when Carr wrote The Twenty Years Crisis in 1939.'®"' With this in mind it is the 
basic elements of the theory that have remained in place throughout its evolution.
This thesis accepts as a starting point for analysis some of the core tenets of realism. 
Significant theoretical richness can be taken from realism, and this chapter will engage 
in the practise of taking from realism its relevant components, and thus falling no doubt 
under the suspicion of those who would criticise the realist tradition as a broad church 
with numerous denominations with its followers often moving the boundaries of their 
philosophical stance to serve scholastic needs. Theoretical traditions, however, are not 
handed down neatly transitioning from one era to the next, and it is more relevant to 
understand theories of International Relations as living experiments that can be altered 
over time and conceptualised in the context in which they emerge.'®®
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (London: Palgrave Publishers, 2001)
Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, The Globalization o f  World Politics, eds. John Baylis and Steve 
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 148.
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This next part of this chapter begins with a review of the realist tradition and its origins. 
It then looks at contemporary realist understandings of the international system. 
Additionally, it is an attempt to demonstrate the applicability of the core elements of 
realist thought to issues that would seem to be beyond the scope of its ontological 
perspective. In particular, challenges from non-state ‘terror’ organisations whose 
concepts of the state, sovereignty and order do not parallel traditional Western models 
which often fit rather neatly into the realist state centric outlook. It will also highlight 
weaknesses in the evolving tradition that require looking elsewhere to engage with the 
questions asked in this thesis.
As Michael Williams argues, “classical realism reveals a tradition of thinking that 
provides a subtle and sophisticated understanding of the role of ideas in international 
r e l a t i o n s . I t  is with this understanding of ideas and history along with the base 
observations of the realist tradition and as well un-orthodox Islamic perspectives that 
form the theoretical base of this thesis. In regard to 9/11 and the Global Jihad it has 
been argued by some that realism is ill equipped to grapple with questions regarding 
causes. Daniel Philpott asserts:
The greatest assault on the United States since the end of the Cold War, perhaps since 
it’s very founding, had little plausible origin in the dynamics of alliances and polarity in 
the rise and fall of great powers, in any state’s quest for security or even in actions of 
any state at all. For this reason it eludes the emphasis of realism, traditionally the 
dominant school in International Relations scholarship.*^^
This claim is not entirely without merit. Jihad is not a state activity, but this does not 
require the scuttling of the realist project. Its ontological assumptions regarding power
Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morganthau, Classical 
Realism and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,” International Organisation 58 (Fall, 2004): 633.
Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations,”
World Politics 55 (October, 2002): 66.
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and the state of nature and interest seeking remain unaltered. It is without question that 
the state and the international order are what the Salafi Jihadists are in fact challenging. 
Further, the efforts of the US and its allies to preserve this order makes them the agents 
that support the structure, and therefore targets of the Salafi Jihadist project.
That there are actors who challenge the validity of the state and the prevailing order 
does not discredit its existence. Phippott does, however, rightly point out that 
International Relations scholars have largely sidelined religion as a significant factor in 
international politics, observing that:
If International Relations scholars are to understand the violence of September 11, then 
they must come to understand how religious movements like radical Islamic revivalism, 
acting on their political theology challenge the Westphalian synthesis, the fundamental 
authority structure of the international order.
This task will be undertaken more thoroughly in Chapter 4. Realism is still a valid 
starting point for conceptualising the Global Jihad and Salafi Jihadism. The ontological 
foundations of realism are the tradition’s greatest contribution to understanding Salafi 
Jihadism and its conflict with the United States and its allies.
The foundations of realism as a theory of International Relations developed fi*om the 
writings of Thucydides on the Peloponnesian Wars, where he asserted through the 
dialogue of the Athenians and the people of Melos that the powerful act as they willed 
and the weak are forced to submit to the powerful as there is no higher morality or force 
to prevent it. The Athenians explain their position to the Melians:
168 Ibid, 92.
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Melians: We trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are 
standing for what is right against what is wrong, and as for what we lack in power we 
trust that it -will be made up for by our alliance with the Spartans, who are bound, if for 
no other reason than for honour’s sake and because we are their kinsmen to come to our 
help.
Athenians: So far as the favour of the gods is concerned we think we have as much 
right to that as you have. Our opinion of the god’s and our knowledge of men lead us to 
conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This 
is not the law that we ourselves made, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was 
made. We found it already in existence and we shall leave it to exist forever among 
those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance with it and we know that 
you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting upon it precisely the 
same way. And therefore, so far as the gods so far as the gods are concerned we see no 
good reason why we should fear to be at a disadvantage. But with regards to your views 
about Sparta and your confidence that she out of a sense of honour will come to your 
aid, we must say that we congratulate you on your simplicity but do not envy your 
folly. Of all people we know Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what 
they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just.
The dialogue paints a clear picture of the state of nature and the condition of self help, 
emphasising that the powerful act unchecked in their own interest and that self interest 
is primary to any code of morality.
The work of Niccolo Machiavelli in the 16* century on statecraft and the 17* century 
work of Thomas Hobbes on the anarchical state of nature further contribute to the 
foundations of the realist perspective.*^® Hobbes presents the human condition as one in 
which survival is always in question and security is rarely present. Hobbes solemnly 
observed:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to 
every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, 
than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them with all. In 
such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no 
account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear.
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Classics, 1954), 363- 365.
Jill Steins and Lloyd Pettiford with Thomas Diez, International Relations, Perspectives and Themes
(Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2005), 49-69.
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and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.
From the perspective presented by Hobbes, the classical foundations of realism observe 
an insecure world where the individual or the community are in a constant existential 
struggle for survival in which they are set in a condition of self help. Power, then, or the 
maximisation of power, is the method by which individuals and communities, and more 
relevant to the modem discipline states, seek to obtain security. It is from these basic 
assumptions that realism begins to develop as an important tradition in the discipline of 
International Relations.
Classical realists assume that the condition of the world is one of insecurity, that it is in 
the nature of the human being to struggle for power and to provide for its own security, 
and that morality is largely secondary to these assumptions. International politics, 
claims Hans Morganthau, is the stmggle for power, and this is in fact universal across 
time and space. Morganthau reinforces the point, “human nature, in which the laws of 
politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India 
and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws. Hence, novelty is not necessarily a 
virtue in political theory, nor is old age a defect.” *^"* Thompson concurs, “human nature 
has not changed since the days of classical a n t i q u i t y . C a r r ’s assessment is equally 
sceptical, “it is profitless to imagine a hypothetical world in which men no longer 
organise themselves in groups for the purpose of conflict.”*^® It is in the very nature of
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1651 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 82.
Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1954), 31.
Ibid, 17.
*^Ubid,4.
Kenneth W. Thompson, Moralism and Morality in Politics and Diplomacy (Lanham Maryland: 
University Press of America, 1985), 17.
Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 231.
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the human to struggle for power, be it at the individual, domestic or international 
l e v e l . A s  Morganthau observes:
Power may comprise anything that maintains and establishes power of man over man. 
Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end from physical violence 
to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers 
the domination of man over man both when it is disciplined by moral ends and 
controlled by constitutional safeguards as in Western democracies and when it is that 
untamed and barbaric force which finds its law in nothing but its own strength and its 
sole justification in its aggrandizement.*’^
Society, realists argue, is governed by a natural law that has its roots in human nature, 
which as Morganthau argued, is deeply entrenched in the drive for power in both subtle 
and overt ways. Waltz argues that conflict in general is rooted in human nature.*^® 
Neibhur confirms Waltz’s position by noting that “the ultimate source of conflicts and 
injustices are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men.” *^* Human beings, 
then, act to maximise power, seeking to exert power over others be it at the individual 
unitary or extra-unitary level.
Carr’s The Twenty Years Crisis written on the eve of the Second World War, as a 
response to liberal utopian thought which was prominent in international political 
theorising during the inter-war period, represents the beginning of realist thought in 
contemporary International Relations. The failure of the League of Nations to ensure 
world peace following the devastation of the First World War was evident with Japan’s 
occupation of Manchuria, threatening German re-militarisation in Europe and the
*”  Power for the purpose of this thesis is understood as a means and not an end of itself. It is both 
material and ideational and it is sought by actors to reach an objective.
*’  ^Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 39-40.
*’Ubid, 9.
**'* Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neo Realist Theory,” in The Evolution o f  Theory in 
International Relations, ed. Robert L. Rothstein (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 
35.
*** Reinhold Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study o f  Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), 23.
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reluctance of the United States to limit its sovereignty and commit to a vested interest in 
international affairs. The multilateral organisation committed to preserving peace that 
envisioned the possibility of an international cooperative society which could avoid 
major conflicts between great powers, failed to prevent the resurgence of another global 
conflict. Norman Angell attempted to demonstrate that war could never profit any state 
and that wars often arise as a result of misunderstandings among states as opposed to 
realist assertions regarding interests, power and the state of nature. AngelTs criticism 
of Carr went so far as to insist his work was merely a “sophisticated piece of moral 
nihilism,” and accused Carr of acting as “one of Hitler's intellectual allies in Britain.”
Carr’s work prompted the emergence of the modem realist school which challenged the 
liberal ontological position of the state of nature and the possibility of an international 
society, setting off the first Great Debate in International Relations theory. It has been 
argued by some such as Peter Wilson, however, that the first debate is in reality a myth, 
a constmction created by Carr himself.*^"* Carr, Wilson argues, created a liberal straw 
man which he could use as a tool to discredit concepts of utopian thought. In spite of 
this position and speculation of the existence of an actual intellectual debate, this 
moment is generally understood as the beginning of the contemporary discipline of 
International Relations.
Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: William Heinemann, 1914)
Norman Angell, Why Freedom Matters (London: Penguin, 1940)
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Carr asserts that purpose conditions thought/^® and in this “relativity of thought” 
theorising is relative to circumstance directed for the purpose of the one who is engaged 
in theorising. Robert Cox would later suggest that theorising is always for someone 
and for some particular purpose. Utopian thought, Carr insists, is intellectually 
primitive as it seeks not to uncover facts through scientific inquiry, but rather secure a 
desired end.*^  ^The utopian position holds, according to Carr, that ‘right’ thinking will 
lead to ‘right’ acting. Realism for Carr, therefore, is related to the study of facts and 
infused with the understanding that ‘facts’ cannot be altered, nor can they be influenced. 
He concedes, however, that both purpose and analysis have a place in the study of 
international politics, and through a process of mature thought it is conceivable to 
balance both. The vice of the utopian Carr asserts has been naivety, while that of the 
pure realist of the Machiavellian kind has been sterility.*^®
Where Carr’s work attempts to discredit liberal thinking it also seeks to emancipate 
realist thought from what Carr views as the static condition as ascribed by Machiavelli 
and Hobbes. Even so. International Relations theory during the first debate rests on rigid 
assumptions that only account sufficiently for the actors that fit into the paradigm 
created by the Utopians and the realists. It serves primarily to conceptualise the 
European and North American world. While attempting to draw upon the structural 
emphasis of classical realist thought regarding the human condition, states and power, it 
is necessary to avoid the trap of sterility that Carr warns of.
Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 5.
Ibid, 68.
Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ 
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The state was the most significant actor in international politics for realists in the time 
of Carr, and although realism as a tradition has evolved since that time the notion of the 
state as the most significant actor in international politics remains a key concept for 
realist thinkers in the contemporary era. They recognise that the state is not the only 
actor in international politics, but as it is the only actor that defines power capabilities in 
the international system, it is, therefore, the most significant actor.*®* Carr harbours 
significant doubts regarding notions of an international community on the basis that in 
the anarchical structure there is no equality among member states, and that the good of 
the whole being enacted in place of the good of the few is scarcely applied.*®^
Collective state morality, and therefore states possessing personality, is neither true nor 
untrue, but rather a necessary tool for the study of international politics.*®  ^International 
morality is the morality of the state and states are the base actors of the anarchical 
international system where the primal objectives are power and preservation.*®"*
By the 1950s liberal ideas began to rival realism based on methodological 
disagreements. Liberals claimed realism was in essence ideological and relied too 
heavily on the subjective.*®  ^What resulted was the second Great Debate in International 
Relations theory pitting the traditionalists against the behaviouralists. This new 
challenge had significant ramifications for realist thinkers who began to re-evaluate 
their stance and bring into creation new strands of realist thought.*®® Notable among 
these thinkers is Waltz, often referred to as the ‘father of neo-realism.’ Waltz advances
Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 93-97; John 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 17.
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arguments regarding levels of analysis, concluding that to develop competent theories 
of International Relations one must look to the systemic interaction of states.*®^
Classical realists regard flaws in human nature to be the primary cause for violence in 
the international system. However, Waltz supposes something rather different. In Man 
the State and War he insists that it is not really relevant whether or not the individual’s 
inherent nature is ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ but rather it is the system that exists in a state of 
perpetual anarchy, or that the system of states has no governing authority above the 
sovereign state, that creates the conditions from which wars arise. While arguing against 
the traditional realist arguments of war as driven by human nature he also attacks the 
liberal position by asserting that liberals have replaced reason with force. *®^ Waltz 
argues that “generalisations of one pattern of state and social structure will not bring 
peace as the liberals claim. Even if all states were perfect democracies or all states were 
perfectly socialist the condition of anarchy would still provide the proper conditions for 
war.”*®®
Waltz develops three images or levels of analysis. The first that of the man, the 
individual as constructed by Hobbes and Benedictus de Spinoza, the second of the 
sovereign state as developed by Kant, and the third of the state of war, all existing in a 
condition of anarchy as described by Rousseau. In the first image war is the result of the 
selfish nature of humans. Humans have inherent impulses towards aggression. This is 
the human condition as ascribed by Hobbes, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” ®^®
Ibid, 249-250.
Waltz, Man the State and War, 120. 
Ibid, 122.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.
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To eliminate war humanity must somehow be enlightened.^®* The second image focuses 
on the state and the defects within states that lead to war.^ ®^  The internal structure of the 
state determines the form and the application of its military. ^ ®^
Waltz’s third image is his contribution to neo-realism. He argues that the level of 
analysis in traditional realism is problematic. Rather than looking exclusively at the 
nature of humans or the structure of states, social scientists should include the condition 
in which states exist, that of anarchy. Anarchy is described by Waltz as a condition in 
which there is no restraint on state actions, no higher authority. Therefore, war is 
inevitable because, as Rousseau argued, “there is nothing to prevent it.” ®^"* States pursue 
their own interests through means of force because there is no other reliable method to 
reconcile differences in the anarchical condition.^®® Waltz insists that “with many 
sovereign states, with no system of law enforcement among them, with each state 
judging its grievances and ambitions according to dictates of its own reason or desire, 
conflict sometimes leading to war is bound to occur.” ®^® State conflict is as much a 
symptom of the system as it may be of human or state structural flaws. Unity of the 
nation-state is fed not only by indigenous factors, but as well by antagonisms that occur 
in international politics, such as war and suspicion.^®  ^In anarchy. Waltz concludes, 
there is no harmony among sovereign states, war is inevitable.^®^
Waltz, Man the State and War, 16.
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Waltz’s contribution of the level of analysis argument is a significant development in 
realist thinking that began to splinter into various directions and become more diverse 
from its classical form after World War Two. Where Waltz’s theories were originally 
formed during the second debate his work would also be instrumental in bringing about 
the third inter-paradigm debate between neo-liberals and neo-realists.^®® Neo-realists 
accept Morgenthau’s basic assumptions but find the arch-realists have not produced a 
convincing all encompassing theory in light of developments of globalisation and other 
significant challenges to state power. Where the neo-realists are reluctant to concede the 
absolute sovereignty of the state, they recognise the need for new approaches to the 
realist tradition.^*®
The sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War that realists failed to predict, resulted 
in the collapse of the bi-polar order and ushered in an American uni-polar moment that 
Waltz and other realists such as John Mearsheimer and Christopher Layne predicted 
would not continue indefinitely.^* * Working fi*om the traditional balance of power 
assumptions realists argued that rival states would quickly move to counterbalance 
American hegemony.^*^ However, nearly 20 years later this seems not to have occurred. 
How then can international anarchy be described?
The English School, along with constructivist theorists, have attempted to take greater 
account of the role of ideas in international politics that seem of ever greater
Knutsen, A History o f  International Relations, 255.
Krish Bhansali, “Review of Neo Realism and its Critics,” Journal o f  Politics 49, no, 2 (Cambridge: 
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significance in regard to understanding asymmetrical challenges to states in the 
contemporary post Cold War period. Notably, Martin Wight whose lectures of the 
1950s were eventually published in 1991 m International Theory: The Three 
T r a d i t io n s attempts to aid in conceptualising the political spectrum of a world 
coming to terms with the decay of colonialism and the emergence of resistance 
movements in the developing world. Hedley Bull was significantly influenced by the 
work of Wight and both were instrumental in laying the foundations of thought that 
would emerge as the English School of International Relations.^*"* Along with others, 
such as Charles Manning and John Vincent, the English School emerged in the 1980s at 
the London School of Economics and consisted primarily of UK based contributors.^*®
The English School supposes that there is actually a greater degree of order in the 
international system of sovereign states than realists imagine, and they take a greater 
account of the role of ideas and how this affects the creation of norms through common 
values, rules and institutions.^*® In The Anarchical Society Bull argues that it is possible 
for order to exist within the condition of anarchy among states. That is to say that order 
is achievable without concrete rules from higher authorities, as it is within the nature of 
the state to act in a particular manner as the result of habit and conditioning.^*^ Order is 
actualised in the form of the international system and the international society of
Martin Wight, International Theory the Three Traditions, eds. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977)
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states/*^ The international system is a structure in which states have informal 
exchanges. An international society, however, is a more interconnected arrangement as 
it is a condition in which states share common norms, values and rules. Where Bull 
accepts the sovereignty and primacy of the state as the principle actor in international 
politics, he also asserts that cooperation between states contributes to a form of order 
through the mutual building of norms based on achieving the maximisation of collective 
interests. The Hobbesian state of nature remains ever present, thus, the threat of conflict 
and disruption in the international society also remains a persistent possibility, but order 
is maintained through international law, which Bull claims is observed as a matter of 
precedent and conditioning.^*®
Constructivists take this somewhat further, seeking to explain state interests in terms of 
the manner in which an international society can socialise states,^^® national identity^^* 
and the preferred social order of powerful states.^^^ Alexander Wendt in Social Theory 
o f International Politics^^^ builds upon his previously stated thesis in Anarchy is what 
States Make o f  it^ '^  ^by challenging the assumption that anarchy is a given and possesses 
some kind of intrinsic logic. Rather, it is “what states make of it,” as it is constructed 
over time by the behaviour of the states themselves and their interaction through ideas
Bull, Martin Wight and the Theory o f  International Relations, iv-xxxiii.
 ^Bull, Anarchical Society, 9-13.
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over time?^® Wendt challenges Waltz’s concept of international anarchy building upon 
the thoughts of Bull.^^® He argues that Waltz’s conception of anarchy is flawed as 
anarchy is not necessarily based on the concept of self help but has no intrinsic logic 
and can emerge as Hobbesian (self help), Lockean (cooperation) or Kantian 
( f r i e n d s h i p ) B o t h  the English School and the constructivists have attempted to 
reconcile the Hobbesian international system with the Croatian international society.
The current anarchy is situated somewhere in between the Hobbesian state of nature and 
the Kantian model of international society, more in line with the Lockean model of 
rivalled cooperation.^^® The international anarchy that Waltz describes is giving way to 
greater cooperation, particularly among powerful states, more reflective of what Bull 
understands as a kind of international society where states may choose to make the 
anarchic structure less hazardous as Wendt observed. However, this may be somewhat 
optimistic and states are likely more self interested than either suggest. The integrity of 
states and the international system, however, is undoubtedly challenged from numerous 
actors, yet the state remains the most powerful manifestation of sovereignty. The 
international system as it is today is not as it has always been, and further, it is debatable 
that it will remain static in its present condition. Yet, as states choose to cooperate they 
also choose to keep in place the mechanisms that preserve the status quo, i.e. the 
international system defined by the sovereignty of the state. Great powers, as classical
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realists and neo-realists observe, seek to either alter or niaintain the international 
system/®® In the present time it appears they work to maintain the status quo.
Challenges to the current order and the states that define it come not only from the 
processes of globalisation, increasingly porous borders and actors that are not 
geographically bound, but equally from those who fundamentally are opposed to the 
very order that defines the modem world. International order and the maintenance of the 
status quo system is an objective of the states that benefit from the contemporary order. 
The desire to maintain the status quo is not necessarily a universal objective, but rather 
an established norm. Internationalism and the maintenance of the status quo are both 
cloaked in a hegemonic imperialism which will be unlikely to appeal to all.^ ®*
2.2 Realism, Hegemony and the Salafi Jihadists
This international system managed by a hegemonic power does not appeal to all, and its 
stmcture, order and foundations are challenged by those who envision a different order. 
States, while still the most powerful actors in the international system, are not exclusive, 
and the concept of the state itself and its legitimacy is questioned by the Salafi Jihadists. 
In agreement with Bull, there has, particularly since the end of the Cold War, been an 
emerging international society in which states have chosen to temper the dangers of 
anarchy as understood by Waltz. Great powers have a vested interest in maintaining the 
present neo-liberal order. Contemporary realism provides an adequate analysis of the
Newmann, “Hegemonic Disruption,” 76. 
Carr, Twenty Years Crisis, 81.
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world as it presently is from the structural level, a world where there is greater 
cooperation among states than has previously been possible. Contemporary realism, 
however, could be observed to be deficient in dealing with ideological and non-state 
challenges to the status quo system. Stephen Walt concedes this point, “it seems to me a 
realist would have to concede that the phenomenon of al-Qaeda is not really a realist 
phenomenon. It’s not a state.” ®^^ John Mearsheimer when asked what realism has to say 
regarding ‘terrorism’ concurred with Walt’s assessment: “The answer is not a whole 
heck of a lot. Realism, as I said before, is really all about the relations among states, 
especially among great powers. In fact, al-Qaeda is not a state, it’s a non-state actor, 
which is sometimes called a trans-national actor. My theory and virtually all realist 
theories don’t [do not] have much to say about trans-national actors.” ®^®
So what then could be said to be the value of realism at all in understanding the conflict 
between the United States and Salafi Jihadism? Ideological goals are secondary in 
traditional realist thinking, as ideology is either ignored or positioned as a factor within 
great power struggles.^®"* Taking from the ideas of the constructivists and the English 
school the hegemonic disruption model attempts to account for non-state actors who 
oppose the power of the hegemon and are willing to use violence to challenge that 
hegemony.^®® However, before a further discussion on the proposed utility of the 
hegemonic disruption module to questions asked in this thesis can be had, an account of 
what constitutes hegemony is required.
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It is conceded that hegemony is an imprecise concept/®® and there is no single historical 
model for hegemony. Rather, hegemony has emerged differently in various historical 
settings.^®  ^Yet, we need not dispense with the concept. P.J. Taylor gives the following 
account:
Hegemony can be traced back to the classical Greek term hegemonia. This was used in 
two distinctive ways. First, it could mean the dominance and supremacy of one political 
group over others and so was little different from the idea o f empire. A second, more 
subtle usage, identified the hegemon as leader in the sense of a guide, the political 
group ‘who does things first and, therefore, shows the way for others. The latter implies 
much more than coercive political power and has led to the widespread modem use of 
the term.238
Antonio Gramsci took the concept of hegemony as coercion somewhat further. For 
Gramsci, hegemony was not simply domination by force but by consent given to the 
political and ideological leadership.^®® Robert Cox argued that “hegemony is a structure 
of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of 
states and non-state entities.” "^*® Bruce Cronin observes that it is the dominant role of a 
systemic leader that is one of the main institutions of the international system.^ "** 
Hegemony requires the material power of the hegemon, but as well requires that other 
actors see this as the natural order of things. Other states are willing to consent to the 
hegemon’s status as long as they view it as serving the cause of international stability, 
which benefits the individual interests of the subordinate s t a t e s .T h e  United States 
exhibits its hegemonic status by maintaining a particular liberal world order through
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both hard and soft power mechanisms, employed both unilaterally and multi laterally 
through institutions and allies. A defining feature of this order is the nation-state system 
and the concept of sovereignty for states. It seems clear, however, that the hegemony 
the US exhibits cannot be understood absolutely in material terms.
Hegemony in this case, however, is not simply primacy based upon a material 
advantage, as it is attached to some kind of social legitimacy. "^*® Therefore, it is as Clark 
asserts “an institutionalised practise of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a 
state with the resources to lead.” "^*"* Hence, the US is a hegemon in the sense that it helps 
to maintain the status quo world order. A definitive part of this hegemony is the 
territorial sovereignty of nation-states, even if the US is at times willing to disregard 
these norms itself.
The hegemonic disruption model asserts that non-state actors and ideology must be 
taken into greater account in realist thinking. '^*® This model, while still a realist theory, 
relaxes the assumption that the state is the only significant actor in global politics.^ "*® 
This primacy of the state has become a contentious notion following the Cold War, 
where asymmetrical threats have increased and rivalry between great powers has 
decreased.^"*  ^The hegemonic disruption model allows scholars to engage with actors 
such as al-Qaeda without scuttling the realist paradigm.
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u s  hegemony can be challenged not only by its peer competitors great power states, but 
additionally by non-state actors. Trans-national actors can seek to create instability at 
the national or sub-national level, undermining US hegemony and pulling these areas 
out of the “hegemonic orbit. Non-state actors engaged in an ideological conflict 
have a role to play in the power relationships of the international system.^ "*®
Neo-realists assume that states will seek to balance uni-polarity. However, following the 
Cold War this failed to occur, causing realists to adapt their position. Offensive realists 
suggest that balancing will at some point begin against concentrations of power, though 
this may not be immediate as a result of the overwhelming US advantage, but would 
nonetheless inevitably occur. Christopher Layne observed, “I argue that the uni-polar 
moment is just that, a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multi-polarity between 
2000 and 2010.” ®^® Hass concurs, “it must be said at the outset that American economic 
and military advantages while great, are neither unqualified nor permanent.” ®^* 
Defensive realists assert that states will seek a kind of soft balancing, preserving their 
own interests without either bandwagoning or challenging the hegemon directly.^®  ^
Others suggest that, at least for some period of time, uni-polarity would remain stable. 
Hegemonic realists argue that it is not in the interest of powerftil states to challenge the 
status quo. Realists may disagree as to when and how uni-polarity will dissolve, but all 
seem to agree that it will be a state which will challenge the US position of primacy.^®®
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The US, to some extent, has successfully managed to remain free from powerful state 
challenges. It is engaged in the dual task of protecting its own interests and a project of 
order building that invites powerful states to work within the status quo.^ ®"* The 
hegemonic disruption model argues that, at least in the short term, it is in fact not great 
powers that challenge US dominance, but non-state actors who seek to disrupt its 
hegemony. Actors that are frmdamentally dissatisfied with the status quo and the 
constraints it presents to their general objectives may attempt to challenge the hegemon 
with an alternative concept of order derived from a particular ideological position that 
contrasts to the neo-liberal world order. Further attention will be given to hegemonic 
disruption in Chapter 9.
2.3 The Relevance of History and Ideas
An understanding of history and the role of ideas is indispensible in the context of the 
research question presented here. This thesis seeks to understand why Salafi Jihadism 
has come into conflict with the United States in the later part of the 20* and early 2U* 
centuries. The assertion this thesis seeks to demonstrate is that the primary reason for 
the current impasse is the result of the institution of nation-states in the Middle East in 
the post Ottoman era, a status quo with which the United States as a dominant 
hegemonic actor seeks to maintain.
Ibid, 76.
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Huizinga insisted that “historical thinking is always teleological.” ®^® This is no doubt 
the case in regard to the al-Qaeda ideologues. History is important in this context not 
least of all because it is indeed important to Islam and, additionally, as it is employed by 
the Salafi Jihadists to proclaim the legitimacy of their ideology and to justify their 
objectives. Islam is a teleological concept that seeks to establish a just order on earth 
through the blueprint provided in the Quran and Sunnah. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, a 
leading contemporary Islamic scholar, asserts that the “building up of a proper 
community life on earth is a supreme religious imperative.” ®^® This suggests that Islam 
is purpose driven. Islamic history, then, is marked by consistent attempts at establishing 
God’s order, creating the ‘just’ and ‘good’ society.^®  ^The desire to build an idealised 
society is not exclusive to the Muslim tradition, nor is it something which is the creation 
of the Salafi Jihadists within Islam. As Imam Rauf notes, “at a collective level, all 
Muslims have a dream they will someday live in a society that governs itself like the 
Prophet’s did in Medina fi*om 622 to his death in 632. This is the Muslim’s equivalent 
of the Biblical kingdom of God and Muslims have always had a strong desire to find 
ways to re-establish the basis of such a society.” ®^^ There have clearly been varying 
interpretations as to in what manner this is to be done.
The al-Qaeda ideology is deeply rooted in historical Islamic thought, most significantly 
since the rise of Salafism in the 19* century. David Mclellan suggests that “ideology is 
the most elusive concept in all of social science.” ®^® Indeed, it is difficult to formulate
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an agreed upon definition as to what exactly ideology is. Michael Freeden, a highly 
regarded theorist on the subject, regards the study of ideology as “most profitably 
recognised as the study of political thought.” ®^® Meaning that ideologies are all around 
us and individuals are constantly engaged with them. In which case, they are not 
necessarily laden with negative conations. In the broadest terms an ideology may or 
may not be illusionary obscuring truth, as some Marxists suggest. Ideologies may not 
necessarily represent anything outside of the ideology itself.^ ®* In the first instance this 
is not altogether important if we want to understand what political thinking an ideology 
represents.^®  ^Sargent provides a useful definition of ideology as a “system of values 
and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes of society.” ®^® The Oxford 
Dictionary o f Philosophy defines ideology as “any wide ranging system of beliefs, ways 
of thought and categories that provide the foundations of programmes of political and 
social actions.” ®^"* Hence, ideology is, as Freeden observed, essentially all things 
political attached to specific values, norms, beliefs, symbols and institutions.
Marxists view ideologies to provide a singular account of the political world.^ ®® Those 
who construct them are engaged in the manufacturing of history and claim universal 
validity^ ®® that arise out of the need for a simplified marketable account of reality and 
the desire for control and power over others.^®  ^Where these claims could arguably be 
applied to the Salafi Jihadist ideology, the problem is that from the Marxist perspective 
ideologies are secular and obscure reality that once dispensed with will reveal truth.
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Salafi Jihadism is derived not from secular concepts, but rather fi*om notions of extra 
rational agency that move beyond the material and are claimed to possess a cosmic 
origin. Salafi Jihadism is further complicated by the fact that Islam in general has 
difficulty in permitting a distinction between the secular and spiritual spheres of life.. 
Both Salafi Jihadism and Islam share the same starting point of knowledge, the Quran 
and Sunnah. Religions and ideologies are, however, analytically separable. Where 
religion seeks to increase the value of the individual through group participation, 
ideology seeks to increase group benefit through individual participation.^®^ Even so, as 
the Salafi Jihadist ideology is distinct firom Islam, it also differs fi*om ordinary political 
ideologies.^®® However, as in this case, religion and political ideology have been 
intertwined, such that Salafi Jihadism contains both elements of religion and a political 
ideology. Yet, a political ideology can be counterpart to a religious belief system.^^® 
Salafi Jihadists use religious words, symbols and values that distinctly political 
ideologies tend to avoid. Enemies are described by the Salafi Jihadists in religious 
terms. The strategy and the goals are described through religious means, and acts of 
violence are legitimised through an interpretation of religious texts.^^* Salafi Jihadism 
is, then, best termed a religio-political ideology. This is how it is understood in this 
thesis.
The Salafi Jihadist objective is that of building a particular kind of idealised 
community, which in their vision, the modem nation-state, the international system and
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the hegemon are obstacles to. Historical interpretation is indispensable in the formation 
of this ideology and, therefore, necessary for al-Qaeda’s cause. It is argued here that this 
goal for al-Qaeda is primarily, if understood in realist terms, a quest for obtaining power 
to pursue specific ends. An understanding of the history of Islamic thought and the 
Middle East itself are, therefore, vital components in conceptualising the research 
question which has been presented here.
Ibn Khaldun asserted over seven centuries ago that history could be likened to a 
philosophy, noting that “the inner meaning of history involves speculation and an 
attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanations of the cause of existing things, and deep 
knowledge of the how and why of events.”^^  ^This highlights the importance of history 
in understanding contemporary questions and how understandings of history influence 
the way in which particular groups and actors view the contemporary world. For Hegel 
history was brought to an end in the contemporary, as opposed to projecting it into the 
future, in much the way Francis Fukuyama prematurely declared the evolution of 
human society complete and challenges to liberal democratic capitalism exhausted 
nearly two centuries later.^ ^® Hegel understood a process of ongoing evolution in the 
past and yet denied such to the future.^^ "* The al-Qaeda ideologues have turned this on 
its head insisting that the end of history, human evolution towards the ‘good’ and ‘just’ 
society, has already in fact been achieved centuries ago, and since that time has been in 
a continual decline into the jahili society. The future must be modelled on the past to 
turn the course of history in reverse towards the idealised society. For this vast
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undertaking it is necessary for the Salafi Jihadists not to know history or to understand 
it, but rather to own it.
Carr argued that in the relativist understanding of historical experience one 
understanding is as good as the other, or that every interpretation is truth in its own 
particular time and place. It is the sense of progress on its own that allows for us to 
order and interpret the events of the past.^^ ® The Salafi Jihadists would agree, positing 
their interpretation as the only divinely sanctioned version. For Carr history moves 
forward, for the Salafi Jihadists it must move backward. Reform happens in one of two 
opposing ways in regard to history, constructively or critically, where learning from the 
past is either incorporated or discarded.^^® The Salafi Jihadists it will be argued take a 
middle approach, which is to employ history for their own ideological purposes using it 
to legitimise the ideology they promote.
This thesis seeks to engage the central question through two prisms, taking account of 
the contemporary and the trans-historical. The contemporary is the Western perspective 
of international politics and the classical realist concepts of international affairs based 
on power, insecurity and interests. The historical is the lineage of Islamic thought and 
the indispensible need to conceptualise the importance of non-Westem understandings 
of history, how this is employed by the Salafi Jihadists and how it may be understood in 
the Islamic world. In this we must at times engage the Islamic understandings of the 
international on its own as opposed to exclusively Western terms, to engage with both 
without discarding either. Chapter 3 seeks to further this.
Ibid, 161.
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2.4 Conclusion
Realism has evolved and expanded as a theory of International Relations since Carr first 
published The Twenty Years Crisis in 1939, and it has maintained a prominent position 
in the discipline of International Relations. Some theorists, however, have sought to 
broaden realist thinking while attempting to remain close to realism’s epistemological 
and ontological position, by taking greater account of ecological, gender, ideational, 
human rights and security concerns within the study of International Relations. They 
attempt to account for a world that can reconcile the Hobbesian state of nature and an 
international order of cooperation. Problematically, however, realism has advanced 
within the confines of the debates of International Relations, a discipline that to some 
extent is a Western driven project. It accounts well for the international system and 
makes clear viable assumptions regarding state behaviour, interests and the prevailing 
international order. The international order and the system of sovereign nation-states 
that realism conceptualises is a reality of the contemporary world. Salafi Jihadism, 
however, attempts to act as an existential threat to this order.
Realist concepts of the international have developed in the period following World War 
Two to explain the structure of the international system and its nature. States, though 
the prime actors in international politics, are human constructs as Wendt suggests, and 
as Bull illustrates there is a prevailing international order of cooperation that defines the 
contemporary system. Though to return to a realist position, this is in part maintained by 
hegemonic power both soft and hard. The validity of the contemporary organising 
political principles are challenged ideologically by the Salafi Jihadists. The world
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system, as maintained by self interested hegemonic powers, is an obstacle to alternative 
systemic structures. Power and human nature based on realist understandings are valid 
for this research, and realist understandings of the existing order are equally relevant. 
However, for a deeper investigation into Salafi Jihadism we must couple this with 
Islamic understandings of the international, without losing sight of orthodox IR.
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Section II
Islamic Theory of the State and the International
In the introduction three key assumptions were presented. 1) There are distinctly Islamic 
concepts of order, legitimacy and the state that differ from Western concepts which 
characterise the contemporary international system. 2) There has historically been a 
drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic political order based on the 
unity of the Muslim people governed by a religiously sanctioned leadership rooted in 
these Islamic principles. 3) In the contemporary period it is the US, and to a lesser 
extent other great and emerging powers, that engage in preserving the status quo 
international system. In this, the US is, in a profound and unique way, an obstacle to the 
unity and legitimacy aspirations that al-Qaeda, and Salafi Jihadism in general, seek to 
actualise. This section deals with the first of these assumptions. Chapter 3 details 
Islamic concepts of the state and sovereignty comparing them to Western ideas. It 
shows how historically sovereignty, law and territoriality have worked within Islamic 
governments in the form of the caliphate, sharia and the umma. Chapter 4 investigates 
Islamic concepts of the international, looking at the three key classifications of Islamic 
theory and demonstrating how they can be compared to International Relations theories. 
It further shows how each of these theories can be seen at work in contemporary 
institutions. It can, therefore, be observed that there are distinctly Islamic concepts of 
the state and international relations.
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Chapter 3 
The Islamic State
Max Weber argued that “only the Occident knows the state in the modem sense, with a 
constitution, specialised officialdom and the concept of citizenship. Beginnings of this 
in antiquity and in the Orient were never able to fully develop.”^^  ^Weber’s perception 
of the non Western pre-modem world suggests a lack of sophistication in forms of 
political organisation prior to the development of nation-states. However, this may not 
be an entirely valid assumption. The nation-state exists as the most contemporary and 
powerful manifestation of the concept of sovereignty and political order. It is not, 
however, unchallenged. Historians suspect that the first ‘states’ began to form in 
Mesopotamia around 3500 BCE, created by the Sumerian civilisation. Despite the 
structure of these states looking dramatically different from the modem state, this still 
suggests the beginnings of a political order.^^  ^Indeed, as Bemard Lewis observes, “the 
bureaucratic state is probably older in the Middle East than anywhere else in the 
world.”^^  ^Ideas regarding sovereignty, the state and legitimacy are intimately linked. 
They are relevant in attempting to conceptualise both the contemporary intemational 
system, which has its basis in the Westem tradition, and as well the Salafi Jihadist 
notion of order based on the Islamic tradition.
In the contemporary intemational system the concept of sovereignty is a source of 
significant debate. It is difficult, as Hideaki Shinoda contends, “to find a political notion
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more controversial than sovereignty.”^^  ^It is a perplexing task, as Brian Nelson 
observes, to comprehend in one definition the actual variety of states that have emerged 
over historical time. At the same time it is impossible to discuss the state without some 
understanding of its major characteristics.^^^ Kenneth Waltz observed that sovereignty 
is a “bothersome concept.”^^  ^It is indeed the case that modem scholars of politics have 
stmggled to define the notion in the manner in which Hobbes, Bodin and Rousseau 
professed to confidently do in their own time. It is nonetheless of significant concem to 
intemational relations.^^^
For the purpose of this thesis the idea of the state is tied to a concept of sovereignty and 
legitimacy. However, how far sovereignty extends in both a social and geographical 
sense, and to whom legitimacy is given, is the cmx of the debate between those who 
advocate the intemational system characterised by nation-states and those who adhere to 
Islamic concepts of political organisation. The next chapter engages with concepts of 
Islamic intemational politics, locating where the similarities and differences between 
Islamic intemational theorising and orthodox Intemational Relations exists. This 
chapter focuses on concepts of the state, looking at Islamic ideas regarding legitimacy, 
sovereignty and territoriality, making connections with Westem notions and further 
observing where they intersect and where they differ. Just as it is necessary to 
understand Islamic concepts of the intemational, it is equally important to conceptualise 
Islamic views on what the state is, what constitutes sovereignty and from where 
legitimacy is derived. Chapter 5 will demonstrate how legitimacy, sovereignty and
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statehood were applied in Islamic lands from its origins to the end of the imperial age, 
when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. Chapter 6 will further demonstrate the struggle to 
come to terms with these notions in the 20* century, and how political Islam and Pan- 
Arabism failed to recapture legitimacy in the Middle East that was divided into nation­
state units in line with the notions of sovereignty, legitimacy and statehood that define 
the contemporary intemational system. This ultimately informs the Salafi Jihadist 
position on these issues that is reflected in its ideology. This is further discussed in 
Chapter 7.
Stephen Krasner provides four meanings of the term sovereignty. 1) Westphalian, 
referring to the exclusion of other actors fi*om the intemal affairs of the state. 2) 
Interdependent sovereignty, the ability to control cross border movements. 3) 
Intemational legal sovereignty, recognition by other states of a state’s domestic 
sovereignty. 4) Intemal sovereignty, the ability for intemal authorities to maintain 
control.^ "^  ^However, these considerations give rise to questions that are relevant to the 
analysis presented here: 1) Is the state as it is understood in the early 21^ century the 
only applicable notion of the concept of sovereignty? 2) Has the teleological Westem 
driven process from tribal organisation to nation-state organisation been completed with 
no challenge from previously established ideas of political organisation?
The idea of sovereignty has come to be rather confused in the discourse of intemational 
politics, particularly in relation to the Middle East in the 20* century.^^^ Challenges to 
the integrity and sustainability of the contemporary state are often discussed in the
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context of globalisation, technological advances, weak and failing states, and the reality 
of porous borders. However, in the Middle East the nation-state since its inception has 
also been challenged on ideological grounds. In the Muslim Middle East observes 
Trudy Jacobsen, “two understandings of the term sovereignty have developed in parallel 
with each o t h e r . O n e  based on the nation-state model of sovereign states, and the 
other rooted in Islamic concepts of political order. The European example was imported 
under colonial rule and replaced Islamic empires that had existed in various forms since 
the 7* century. There has been significant confusion in the 20* and 21^ centuries that 
has arisen Jfrom differences in the Westem meaning of sovereignty and the state and the 
complex Islamic understanding of the phenomenon. This has, as this thesis argues, had 
an impact on the rise of Salafi Jihadism and its conflict with the United States and the 
West.
Since the beginning of the wars of religion in Europe during the 16* and 17* centuries, 
the process of nation-state building has continued to be distributed throughout the 
world. It is, indeed, deeply problematic, as conceptualisations of sovereignty are 
normative as opposed to empirical.^^^ As Chapter 4 will further demonstrate, what is 
needed is an Islamic understanding of the intemational to grapple with the complexities 
of Salafi Jihadism. This analysis, however, will also require a detailed engagement with 
Islamic ideas of sovereignty and statehood, as there are significant differences between 
Islamic and Westem concepts of political order, legitimacy, sovereignty and statehood. 
However, in both Islamic and Westem thinking on the subject similar questions have 
been presented. Any discussion on sovereignty, and thereby the state and legitimacy.
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requires grappling with such concerns such as: 1) Are there practical and normative 
limits to sovereignty? 2) Where is it located? 3) What is the relationship between state 
sovereignty and civil society?^^^
Jacobsen insists that Islamic intemational ‘terrorists’ are not seeking to obtain 
sovereignty for themselves, but rather they are “seeking the destmction of 
sovereignty .A dditionally , as Andreas Pickel argues, “a world system composed of 
sovereign nation-states is itself the source of many problems of order.”^^  ^Both 
assertions warrant merit. However, it is not necessarily the destruction of sovereignty 
that Salafi Jihadists seek, but rather an altemate concept that pre-dates the contemporary 
intemational system. Although sovereign nation-states are indeed problematic in the 
Middle East and elsewhere in the world, it is the maintenance of the status quo world 
system by the United States that has brought it into conflict with Salafi Jihadism and its 
most powerful manifestation al-Qaeda. Sovereignty, then, is not simply an abstract 
concept but a manner of speaking about the world and acting in it.^ ^^  It is both theory 
and practise, a method of establishing clarity and order in an incoherent world.^^^ This 
chapter will compare Islamic concepts of sovereignty, legitimacy and the state with the 
Westem model of political organisation, demonstrating that there is a long tradition 
within the Islamic sphere that contrasts with, but is not in all aspects entirely alien to, 
Westem concepts, as both are rooted in some concept of legitimacy. Al-Qaeda’s quest 
for a trans-national caliphate is based in this historical Islamic thinking. The current
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intemational order is an obstacle to this realisation. Al-Qaeda’s ideology is a 
mechanism for taking power, and it draws upon an Islamic concept of the state as the 
idealised form of political order in the Middle East and Muslim world, as Chapter 7 will 
further demonstrate.
3.1 Sovereignty in the West
The Westem understanding of sovereignty, that is the basis for an intemational system 
defined by nation-states, has its origins in the work of the English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes and French thinker Jean Bodin.Historians may disagree as to when exactly 
sovereignty, as understood in the West, came to be an established part of political life 
but it is closely related to the economic and social experiences of the 16* and 17* 
centuries.^^"  ^Bodin defines sovereignty in Republique, one of the earliest Westem works 
on the subject, as the “absolute and perpetual power of the co m m o n w e a l th .F o r  
Bodin there is no contradiction between absolute secular power and divine and natural 
law. God’s authority, then, lies not outside a theory of sovereignty but at the very centre 
of it. For centuries European kings were understood to be the embodiment of God’s will 
on earth, or as Bodin writes, “his lieutenants for commanding men on earth.”^^  ^
Contempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt towards God of whom the king is the 
earthly representative.^^^
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For Hobbes sovereignty is absolute and embodied in a single individual, as the failings 
of the sovereignty of one person is less than the shortcomings of the few or the many, as 
in democratic or aristocratic forms of govemment.^^^ Individuals have inherent impulses 
towards aggression and self interest. The human condition, as ascribed by Hobbes, is 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”^^  ^Thus, security for Hobbes is the greatest 
concem for society and absolute sovereignty under any circumstance is preferable to 
civil war and disorder. Humanity lives in the ‘state of nature,’ a war of all against all, 
where “everyone has a right to everything, even one another’s bodies.”^^® The function 
of sovereignty and the state is to control the most basic instincts of humans, creating a 
condition of security, as no individual can be tmsted to respect the security of others. In 
the state of nature a Leviathan is required to ensure stability and enforce peace, thereby 
controlling the state of nature. From this condition of the state of nature, characterised 
by uncertainty and danger, there must arise the condition of govemment through the 
form of a compact. In this, the individual cedes their sovereignty available to them in 
the state of nature to another power in the interest of peace and security for all.^^  ^The 
model Hobbes establishes is scientific, observing that the world is in fact chaotic. 
Humans have base animalistic tendencies and seek to maximise their power in their own 
interests at the expense of others. In the state of nature security is impossible because 
contracts between individuals cannot be guaranteed in the absence of an absolute 
sovereign.
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Rousseau, Montesquieu and Spinoza argue, in contrast to Hobbes, that the state of 
nature is a fiction constructed from an assumption that individuals in nature posses all 
of the characteristics and habits that they acquire through social interaction, but without 
any kind of societal constraints. As they would encounter each other seldom in the state 
of nature, possessing neither pride, envy nor greed obtained through social interaction, 
no one would attack another without provocation for fear of weakness.^®  ^As 
Montesquieu observed, “when man enters society he ceases to fear and war 
commences.”^^  ^However, even in disputing Hobbes’ assumptions similar conclusions 
regarding the causes of war can still be reached. As Rousseau suggests, war occurs 
because “there is nothing to prevent it.”^^ '^  Some form of governing must exist to control 
the human drive towards power. However, if the sovereignty of the king is derived fi*om 
natural law and God, what is the legitimacy of a sovereign who fails to comply with 
these imperatives?^®^ For John Locke sovereignty is brought into question in this case. 
Locke notes, “it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any 
commonwealth can do what it will to dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily or 
take any part of them at pleasure.” ®^® The state, then, is charged with protecting life, 
liberty and estates in a context that limits are imposed on its legitimate authority. 
Through this Locke has restored the natural law that Hobbes has disregarded.^®^
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The Westem nation-state and concepts of governing derive from these early works of 
Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke and Kant. They are based on rationalist scientific reasoning, 
ultimately detaching the human fi*om the divine, giving sovereignty an earthly rather 
than cosmic dimension. Legitimacy to mle is based on a social contract derived from 
this kind of rationalist observation. In the feudal European world the church and 
Christian community were fixed eternal entities. Earthy kingdoms were temporal and 
subject to change.^®  ^Hence, there were no discernible boundaries between inside and 
outside.^ ®® Rather, there was a cosmopolitan patchwork of authorities which 
overlapped.^ ^® Here are the beginnings of the idea of a nation-state and a detachment 
fi-om cosmic and earthly manifestations of legitimacy. The sovereign now was held to 
account by a different form of legitimacy based on arrangements between the governed 
and the governing, as opposed to absolute appeals to divinity. But equally, these 
concepts contested the overlapping authorities of the medieval era. Despite the obvious 
return or acceleration of overlapping sovereignty in the modem period through the 
processes of globalisation, sovereignty, the state and legitimacy in the West still poses 
an historical logic that emerges fi"om this time.^^  ^The history of sovereignty, as 
Camilleri and Falk observe, parallels the evolution of the modem nation-state and is 
reflective of the evolving relationship between state and civil society, political authority 
and community.^
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Sovereignty, argues Hinsley, “is not a fact,” but rather a claim regarding how political 
power is or should be exercised/Hoffinan, however, argues that sovereignty is an 
observable phenomenon and attempts to ignore it are akin to “attempting to ignore the 
state.”^^"^  There is no consensus as to what constitutes sovereignty in the contemporary 
intemational system, and theories of sovereignty suffer from “unresolved 
ambiguities.”  ^ Not least of these is where does sovereignty lie? Is its locus singular or 
multiple?^ E.H. Carr predicted in the Twenty Years Crisis that sovereignty would 
become blurred and more indistinct in the future.^ Indeed, this appears to be the case.
It may be, as Hoffinan argues, that sovereignty is contentious because the state is 
contentious.^This may well also be the case. Robert Cooper contends that there are in 
fact three kinds of states, and hence, three notions of sovereignty presently at work in 
the intemational system.^The first, modem states that desire to maintain a status quo 
and avoid limitations to state sovereignty, for example India, China and Brazil.^^® Next, 
the post modem state which is less concemed with the sovereignty of individual states 
and seeks greater integration, such as in the case of the European U nion .F ina l ly ,  
there are pre-modem states that lack a definable central authority. Modem and post 
modem states seek not to interact with pre-modem states, but rather to contain them.^^^ 
This thesis argues that above this is a hegemonic power, the US, that seeks to maintain 
balances with states be they modem or post modem, and contain the chaos that pre-
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modem states potentially represent. This characterises the contemporary intemational 
system.
The state is, at the present time, still the most powerful manifestation of sovereignty in 
the intemational system, even in the face of the processes of globalisation and positive 
attempts to pool sovereignty by some states. A defining feature of the intemational 
system is that the world is divided into sovereign units, even though there are 
overlapping sovereigns and allegiances. The state is tied directly to some notion of 
legitimacy. Equally, so too is hegemony. This legitimacy is derived from Westem 
notions of sovereignty and contrasts ontologically with Islamic concepts. Hence, the 
legitimacy on which the status quo intemational system rests, the states that define it 
and the hegemonic power that seeks to maintain it, remain illegitimate for the Salafi 
Jihadists.
3.2 Islamic Sovereignty
There has been a great deal of discussion on the decline of the nation-state and the 
subject of sovereignty in general, particularly in the post Cold War period. Shinoda 
observes that “despite the polemic about whether sovereignty is becoming obsolete or 
not, the fact is that viewed from one angle sovereignty seems to be eroding, from 
another it is still standing.”^^  ^Copious volumes of literature have been dedicated to 
predicting the ultimate demise of the nation-state and speculation on what it is that will
Shinoda, Re-Examining Sovereignty, 2.
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replace it, most notably the literature dedicated to cosmopolitan ideas of world 
govemment that would eliminate borders, quell conflicts and deal with the complex 
problems of the 21®^ century/^"^ However, predicting the decline of the state is still in 
essence a Westem oriented project, ignoring previous existing and still competing 
notions of sovereignty and political organisation that are not derived from the Westem 
experience.
Historically, for most civilisations, as Camilleri and Falk argue, sovereignty has not 
been a defining feature of political life, but rather political order emerged in the form of 
tribalism or city states or in a flexible radiant nature like that of China.^^^ This may lend 
credence to Weber’s assumption that the state is a concept historically unknown outside 
of the Westem world. However, if  the basis of the state relies upon concepts of 
sovereignty, legal stmctures and notions of territoriality, then it would seem that Islam 
does contain a viable idea about what the state is. Islamic concepts of the state are not 
universal, neither are Islamic concepts of engaging with the intemational, as the next 
chapter will further clarify. However, Islam does contain notions of sovereignty 
(caliphate), law {sharia) and territoriality {umma), though the nature of these is a point 
of dispute for Islamic thinkers.
The concept of a political order based on just social organisation, as prescribed by 
Islamic norms, has been the goal of various Muslim communities since the origins of
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Islam itself/^® Prescriptions for how this order is to function can be found in both the 
Quran and Sunnah, with the first manifestation of an Islamic state developing during 
the time of Muhammad and instituted through the Constitution of Medina in 622. This 
document established a political order to supersede that of the tribal authorities of 
Medina and begin the establishment of a larger community, the umma. This Medinan 
period, a time when revelation and political power first became intertwined in Islam, 
served as the model for future attempts to bring about the desired Islamic society and 
build a supra-tribal, now supranational, political o r d e r . I t  could be argued that any 
sustainable Islamic political order that unified the Muslim people never fully developed 
after this Medinan period, there have, however, been continuous efforts to do so from 
that time to the contemporary era.
Islam is as much a guide for living the righteous life as it is a guide for the creation of a 
just society. It is a call for a unified political order on earth based upon God’s 
sovereignty. However, despite the universalist message of Islam and the call for 
political unity, concepts of how to bring about this political order and precisely what 
form it should take have not been without variation and debate among Islamic scholars. 
Such debates have been ongoing since the formation of the Medinan state and the time 
of the Prophet. The historical evidence would suggest that there is not one single 
accepted model for state and religious institutions in Islam, but instead several 
competing ones.^^^
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Just as there are competing concepts of how Islam is to engage the intemational, so too 
are there differing methods in which the Islamic political order is to be created. Islamic 
thinkers have dealt with similar themes that Westem philosophers and state builders 
have, attempting to provide a blueprint for political order. Most pressingly, who is to 
mle, over what they shall mle, and what mechanisms are to be employed in solidifying 
that mle. There may well be no viable compromise between those who argue for an 
absolutist variety of secular nation-state sovereignty that demands the separation of 
religious institutions from politics and those who insist upon an Islamic sovereignty, but 
similar key questions are still being asked by both. For Islam sovereignty lies in God. It 
is God’s sovereignty and not the privy of earthly beings to assert. Thus, legitimacy is 
framed in a religious context. Ontologically sovereignty in Islam is derived from above, 
therefore, the law is indivisible from the extra-rational. The basis of Islamic sovereignty 
rests upon the core Islamic premise of tawhid (the unity of God), from which all other 
Islamic ideas regarding the state must be derived.^^® This concept is given greater 
attention in the next chapter.
The Constitution of Medina, despite the primacy of religious assumptions regarding the 
state informing its framework, did not establish an authoritarian regime, and could be 
likened to a social contract between the mler and the mled not dramatically different 
from the concepts offered by Westem philosophers. However, this worked within the 
framework of belief and the law as established by God through Muhammad, such that 
sovereignty emanates from the divine as opposed to natural law. The Prophet, as 
Muqtedar Khan explains, “demonstrated a democratic spirit quite unlike the
329 Jacobsen, Re-envisioning Sovereignty, 77.
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authoritarian tendencies of those who claim to imitate him today.”^^® Freely given 
consent was unproblematic in the early Muslim state, however, the purely secular was 
inconceivable. The final authority rests with God and political decisions were required 
to be based on the holy texts.
The Constitution of Medina opens with, “In the name of God the Compassionate and 
the Merciful. This document is from Muhammad to the Prophet, governing relations 
between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed 
them and joined them and laboured with them.”^^  ^This would indicate that joining the 
community and being subject to its laws was in fact a choice rather than an act of pure 
conquest. The other monotheists, specifically the Jews, are offered similar standing with 
the Muslims. As the Constitution states, “To the Jew who follows us belongs help and 
equality. He shall not be wronged nor shall his enemies be aided.” However, there is a 
clear distinction in class between those who believe in one God and the pagans: “No 
polytheist shall take the property of a person of Quraysh under his protection, nor shall 
he intervene against a believer.”^^  ^Equality, therefore, bears a price of admission.
The state, according to Nelson, requires three basic structural characteristics, 
sovereignty embodied in a centralised govemment, coercive law and territoriality.^^^
The Islamic concept of the state clearly demonstrates these, although ontologically
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diverse from the nation-state concept. Sovereignty is cosmic, derived from God and 
held by some earthly authority such as a caliph. The govemment is centralised in the 
beginning in the form of the Prophet and later in the corpus of the caliphs. Law emerges 
from the Quran and Sunnah in the form o f sharia. Territoriality is, however, somewhat 
more problematic, as the following pages further explain.
3.2.1 Specialised Officialdom: The Caliphate
The Quran obliges the community to obey the mle of a legitimate authority. It requires 
that a mler’s authority be derived from God and a govemment that is imbued in 
righteousness must be regarded to maintain order.^ "^^  The Quran states:
Oh ye who believe, obey Allah and obey the messenger and those charged with 
authority among you. If ye differ anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and his 
messenger. If ye do believe in Allah and the last day, that is the best way and best in 
result."^
The caliphate, as the organising principle of Islamic political order, existed in many 
forms since the time of the Prophet, most notably under the leadership of the 
Umayyads, Abbasids and Ottomans. The Islamic state or caliphate is embodied within 
the person of the caliph, deriving their authority to mle from the sovereignty of God, 
acting as a successor to the Prophet.
Following the death of the Prophet his close associate Abu Bakr took responsibility for 
the leadership of the Muslim community. Following Abu Bakr in order of succession
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were Umar ibn al-Kittab, Uthman ibn Affan and All ibn All Talib. Collectively in Sunni 
Islam they are known as the Rightly Guided Caliphs, all having been companions of the 
Prophet and his family. It is this ‘golden age’ that Salafists refer to as the moment of 
true Islam. Since this time period the leadership of the Islamic world has been highly 
contestable. Yet, for over 1300 years the caliphate was in existence, though fractured by 
competing claims over the rightful leadership of the community.
Two polar types of leadership have followed since Islam’s origins. The first is a totality 
model based on the Prophet during the Medinan period, where political and religious 
leadership was embodied in a single person. The opposing model has been that of the 
complete separation of religious and political authority.^^^ In reality, most regimes were 
ruled from a position between these polar extremes, failing to achieve the complete 
convergence of the Medinan model yet still striving to achieve Islamic legitimacy.
The caliphs managed to preserve their self constructed image as servants of God and 
custodians of Sunni Islam, but in reality were rarely more than political rulers in 
practise.^^^ Following the assassination of the last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs Ali, 
the prospects of maintaining complete religious and political authority in one individual 
became untenable.However,  the Umayyads who followed still worked diligently to 
maintain that their authority was an extension of that of the Prophet, despite acting 
largely as the caliphs that would follow them, as monarchical in function.^^®
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The convergence model based on the ideals of the Prophet was never successfully 
achieved, nor has it been feasible to do so, as no other individual could enjoy the 
religious and political authority of Muhammad/"^ ^ Hence, every caliph and political 
leader since this time has been required to negotiate and mediate the constant tension 
between religion and politics, as no ruler has been afforded the support of the entire 
community in the way the Prophet and the early caliphs were able to achieve. Fierce 
competition for this role and competing claims have been a common theme throughout 
Islamic history. The central questions have been asked for centuries. Paul Heck 
observes:
Who was worthy to lead the Islamic community, speak with authority in its name and 
determine its religious constitution? On what grounds was this leadership to be 
considered legitimate, the moral stature of the leader, his membership in a particular 
branch of the family of the Prophet, the alleged testimony of the Prophet in his favour, 
the efforts and resources he devoted to the Islamic cause?'"^'
Therefore, the position of caliph was never safe or uncontested since the time of the 
Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs that followed Muhammad.^"^  ^Al-Naim 
confirms this claim:
The permanent paradox of the Umayyad and all subsequent regimes that ruled over 
Muslims is that they sought to satisfy their need for genuine religious legitimacy by 
making the impossible claim of replicating the model of the Prophet or at least the first 
four caliphs of Medina. Ironically that problem was often exacerbated by the rulers 
drive to consolidate their control over the population which undermined their Islamic 
legitimacy.''^'’
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The ruling caliphs were incapable of functioning without the consent of their subjects, 
which rested in large part on upholding Islamic orthodoxy as defined by the Ulema?^^
In turn, the religious elite of the Ulema could not survive without protection from 
foreign forces, the insurance of domestic tranquillity and the endowments provided by 
the c a l i p h s It is the maintenance of this relationship, even though at times severely 
strained, between the political and religious leadership which helped to ensure the long 
standing institution of the caliphate. This relationship can as well be observed in 
modem times, particularly in the relationship between the former mlers of Egypt and 
the Ulema of al-Azhar.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following World War One, when the 
caliphate was abolished, the office of the caliph was left as little more than a spiritual 
post having lost any authority over territory or Muslim populations.^^^ For Islamic 
thinkers like Rashid Rida this was unproblematic, as the office of the caliph could be 
easily transitioned from a position of power to one of spiritual leadership headed by 
someone of strong moral and scholarly creden tia ls .T h is  effective secularisation of 
the former Ottoman territories and the end of over 1300 years of Islamic imperialism, 
however, was of significant concem to many in the Islamic world, and as this thesis 
argues, is an integral part of the modem conflict between the West and Salafi Jihadism.
Contrary to Weber the caliphate does represent a specialised officialdom and was a core 
part of Islamic political organisation for over 1300 years. Although the authority of the
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caliphs was consistently contested and it failed to meet with the high standards set by 
the example of the Medinan period, its termination was a traumatic convulsive moment 
for Islamic civilisation at the beginning of the 20* century. This was made less 
unpalatable as its termination was often perceived as a Westem plot. Whatever the 
idealised myth of the early days of Islam and the romantic view of the caliphate as the 
only legitimate form of govemance for the Islamic people, its imagery is a valuable tool 
in the al-Qaeda ideological arsenal. By claiming to endeavour not only to restore such 
an institution but to appeal, as Salafists have historically done, to the pristine Medinan 
period, al-Qaeda has tapped into a very real and effective idea of Islamic state 
organisation.
3.2.2 Coercive Law: Sharia
The Quran does not provide a comprehensive set of easily definable legal codes. Like 
other religious traditions law has been adapted from the sacred texts, and in the case of 
Islam, law is based on the Quran and as well the words and deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad {Sunnah). Sharia can simply be understood as God’s will for humanity, an 
Islamic law derived fi*om the Quran and Sunnah and developed through the long history 
of Islamic jurispmdence. It is God’s divine plan for humanity that should guide the 
community of believers. '^^® Like other legal systems sharia deals with what is 
mandatory, forbidden and permitted for the community.^^® Covering areas that are
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spiritual, commercial, social and political, sharia defines what the righteous life is and 
what obligations (uqud) are required of the community. This is summed up briefly in 
the words of the Quran, “O ye who believe fulfil all obligations.”^^  ^ The Quran is a 
prescription for how to please God containing only a few specific commands, for 
example regarding marriage and the distribution of property. Primarily, it is an 
expression of general principles and guidance on how humans should treat each 
other.^^  ^Reflection by the early Muslim community produced the five pillars of Islam:
1) The Shahada or oral testimony of faith, “there is no God hvX Allah and Muhammad is 
his Prophet.” 2) Ritual prayers five times per day. 3) Charity, the giving of alms. 4) 
Performing the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca once during one’s lifetime. 5) Observance 
of fast during the daylight hours in the month of Ramadan. In addition to this is the 
performing of jihad, the struggle in the path of God, which has various and contentious 
interpretations. Some Salafi Jihadists have referred to this as the sixth pillar of Islam 
derived fi-om the work of the influential medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya.^^^
For the literalists the Quran and Sunnah contain all the guidance that is required for 
human existence without further interpretation, however, for the Umayyad caliphs, who 
were forced to deal with a great number of practical legal issues that were not 
specifically mentioned in the Quran, and as well justify their legitimacy to rule in 
Islamic terms, legal scholars were needed to interpret the Quran and Sunnah for the 
state.^ "^^  During this period legal interpretations differed according to geographical 
location as influenced by particular local interpretations and the influence of indigenous
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norms. This resulted in scholars holding no unified view on the interpretation of law.^^  ^
However, with the ascent of the Abbasid Caliphate came a more centralised and 
bureaucratic state authority in need of a religious authority to codify law, in part to 
entrench their rule over the Islamic Empire.
Classical sharia is the corpus of Islamic rules, principles and judicial cases which were 
compiled during Islam’s formative years in the first two centuries following the 
Prophet.^^^ Sharia is derived from the Quran and Sunnah as the premier textual sources. 
Later, qiyas, a method of analogical reasoning to deal with matters not specifically 
detailed by the Quran and Sunnah, was incorporated. Additionally, ijma, the consensus 
of the Islamic community on a point of the law was included.^^^ Scholars continued to 
develop Islamic law until the 10* century when the Ulema declared the doors of ijtihad 
(personal endeavour) to be closed, insisting that sharia had been finalised and that 
interpretation was no longer necessary or indeed possible.^^^ This, however, in practise 
did not occur, as scholars have continued into the present to challenge the authority of 
the Ulema be it from a moderate, secular or the Salafi Jihadist position.
Sharia, like Islam itself, has not been historically monolithic. It has been interpreted 
over time and implemented in various fashions to suit particular conditions in specific 
times and geographical locations. In this sense there is not one sharia but rather 
many.^^® In practicality sharia has never existed as a normative legal system on its own.
Ibid, 66.
"^Ibid, 67.
Otto, Sharia and Natural Law, 9.
Noor, “Principles of Islamic Contract Law,” 115, 
Ibid, 125.
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but has instead been a part of a pluralistic legal structure in which it is has been attached 
to other normative systems of law and govemance.^^^ Sharia, then, is adapted to fit the 
geographical and temporal space in which it is employed. All forms of sharia, however, 
are derived from the classical sharia. In practise this is largely unproblematic, as the 
concept of siyasa (policy) allows rulers to apply the law as they see fit as long as this 
does not violate the fundamental sharia itself.^^^ Thus, sharia is the basis for the 
creation of law as opposed a set of legal codes in and of itself.
Historically, this has allowed a great deal of flexibility in the interpretation and 
application of law in the Islamic world. Where the classical sharia must serve as the 
basis for law, it is distinctly varied and contains an evolutionary element, allowing for a 
broad spectrum of differing applications. As Nelson suggests, “pre-state societies 
regulate themselves through gens, clans or other kin structures of social articulation."^^^ 
This would indeed be the case for pre-Islamic Arabia, a reality that still has significant 
implications for the contemporary Middle East divided into nation-states.^^"^ One of the 
challenges faced by the early Muslims was bridging the divide between the competing 
and often warring tribes of Arabia. Islam, as a religious faith and a foundation for 
political order, provided a discourse which could transcend tribal, ethnic and cultural 
loyalties. Sharia, therefore, provides the system of law that regulates the community in 
the broadest sense, binds it together and provides a mechanism for legitimate rule 
through its application.
362
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There are a variety of competing views of how sharia should be applied, and it can 
emerge as something quite different depending upon where and when it is applied. In 
the contemporary sharia varies depending on the state that is employing it.^^  ^State 
officials have often attempted to shape Islamic law in their own image for their own 
ends. The long history of the caliphate would suggest that this is not a new 
phenomenon. Observing the differing applications of sharia between staunch 
traditionalist countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran compared with more moderate 
applications like that of Jordan, demonstrates that there cannot be said to be one sharia, 
but rather varying sharias. Just as political leaders during the age of the caliphates, as 
well as modem leaders of Middle Eastern nation-states, mobilise their vision of sharia 
for political ends, so to do Salafi Jihadists who have constructed a vision of history 
which supports their chosen conceptualisation of Islamic law that portrays them as the 
vanguard of tme Islam. This lends to them religious legitimacy that has been sought by 
political leaders since the time of Rightly Guided Caliphs.
3.2.3 Islamic Territoriality and the JJmma
The Islamic state framework clearly demonstrates a concept of coercive law in the form 
of sharia and provides for a mechanism of leadership in the form of the caliph. Neither 
of these concepts are dramatically different from the forms of Western political 
hierarchy and law that have developed in the years following the Peace of Westphalia. 
The possible exception to this is that Islamic concepts of legitimate leadership and law
365 Otto, Sharia and Natural Law, 7.
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are developed from an alternative ontology that privileges cosmic sources rather than 
rationalist ideas. However, in regard to territoriality, that being what geographical space 
shall the state occupy and where are the boundaries between it and other sovereign 
authorities, is rather more problematic. It demonstrates where the Islamic ideal of the 
state becomes disconnected from nation-state model leading ultimately to an 
incompatibility between the Islamic notion of territory and that based on the sovereignty 
of nation-states.
The umma is understood as a brotherhood where words such as race, nation, community 
and people do not quite articulate the meaning which is intended. The Quran makes 
several references to this including:
Verily this is a Brotherhood; of yours is a single brotherhood. 366
Verily this Brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood and I am your Lord and 
cherisher therefore fear me and no other. 367
The believers are but a single brotherhood so make peace and reconciliation between 
your two brothers and fear Allah that we may receive mercy.^^^
From this description individuals of varying temperament, virtues and of differing 
language, race, geographical location, time and history are united in the service of 
God.^^  ^The Islamic conceptualisation of territorial space is intimately connected to the 
long standing tradition of the umma, and divorcing it from this notion is difficult. 
Traditionalist Islamic thinkers regard the umma philosophically as a distinction between 
believers and non-believers. Practically, however, it was as well a political term 
distinguishing between the borders of the Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, demarcating
366 Quran, 21:92.
36^  Ibid, 23:53.
36»lbid, 49:10.
36® All, Meaning, 815.
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the geographical extent of Muslim rule and where it encountered distinctly foreign 
powers.^^® The rule of the caliph was always flexible, as the direct control of the office 
over extended territories was never total. Hence, there were often overlapping 
sovereignties paying homage to the caliph as a leader of the community of believers in a 
spiritual if not always political sense. Thus, the umma united in absolute political 
cohesion was never the case following Ali and the swift expansion of the Islamic 
Empire.
The umma, however, as moderate thinkers suggest, is not political at all, but rather a 
trans-national spiritual concept operating aloof to power politics and nation-states. It is a 
sense of community and belonging without political ambition. Hence, the divide, as 
described in the Chapter 3, between those who separate matters of personal faith from 
politics and those who understand these two as inseparable. Abu Sulayman chastises 
both contemporary Islamic and Western understandings on the subject:
Muslim writers down to the present have associated power and growth with a central 
political structure of the Muslim umma. Their thinking is marked partly by their lack of 
understanding of the complex issue of power in the world of politics and the complex 
model of the Prophet and his traditions concerning rebellion and belligerency. Most 
writers following Western theory also seem unable to conceive of a position between 
anarchy and central political authority,^^*
This notion of flexible sovereignty does not sit well within the discourse of 
contemporary International Relations scholars, nor does it resonate with the Salafi 
Jihadists and their model of state control which imitates the complete political and 
religious authority of Muhammad and the Righty Guided Caliphs. Where the position
3^ 6 Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory o f  International Relations: New Directions 
fo r Methodology and Thought (Herndon Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987), 
51.
3^ ' Ibid, 52-53.
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between anarchy and political authority was certainly conceivable during the long 
period of caliphates, it is no longer a reality in the 21®‘ century. The umma has been 
separated into self interested nation-states from Morocco to Pakistan and Indonesia. 
From this position there exists only two prospects for the umma. The first being the 
complete convergence model of the Islamic world ruled under a single caliphate, which 
would in course require world subjugation to Islam. Alternatively, the umma can be 
understood as a spiritual concept of unity, a community in the service of God devoid of 
ambitions of political unity.
3.3 Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
The words of Bin Laden would indicate that the construction of an Islamic order is 
primary among the objectives of Salafi Jihadist organisations. It is as well clear that the 
United States is viewed as a distinct obstacle to this aim. The following statements from 
Bin Laden in 1998 and 2001 illustrate this argument:
If the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic, the aim is also to 
serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and 
murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the 
strongest neighbouring Arab state, and their endeavour to fragment all the states of the 
region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan into paper state-lets and through 
their disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the 
brutal crusade occupation of the Peninsula.
Today every member of the Muslim world agrees that all the Muslim countries of the 
world having geographical boundaries on the basis of nationality, geography, religious 
discord, colour and race should be merged into one Muslim state where men do not 
rule. There should be one caliph for the whole of those whose capital should be Mecca.
372 Osama Bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement,” Federation o f  
American Scientists, February, 23 1998, accessed November 15, 2009, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
125
There should be one currency and defence for this state and the Holy Quran should be 
its constitution. The name that is proposed for this vast state is Global Muslim State.^’^
It is this idealised vision of Islamic governance that the Salafi Jihadists claim to aspire 
to. By taking Islam back to its ‘golden age’ the mistakes made since that time can be 
washed away, and a new Islamic and eventually world order can emerge governed by 
the Salafi Jihadist interpretation of sharia. It should be administered by a caliph in the 
territory that once encompassed the height of Islamic expansion across the Middle East 
and North Afi*ica from Andalusia to India, and in time beyond. The current world order, 
therefore, is an obstacle to this realisation, and the United States as a powerful actor that 
helps to ensure the status quo system of nation-states is the enemy of those who intend 
to establish the lost caliphate.
Salafi Jihadists understand sovereignty within the context of power and authority, which 
is not disconnected from religious imperatives and legitimacy within a borderless 
domain of the community of believers.^^"  ^Jihadists advocate the application of sharia in 
its most basic sense, ignoring the evolution of ideas regarding Islamic law and the 
regional and cultural spins that have contributed to the application of sharia over time. 
Despite an ontological position in contrast to Western concepts of law, sharia is still not 
entirely alien to law as applied in much of the West. In this sense it is not dramatically 
different from the influence of the Judeo Christian moral tradition on Western law. The 
caliph in the role of a leader, both religious and political, was only achieved by 
Muhammad. However, the claim of the caliphs to legitimacy is still not terribly 
indistinct from the rule of kings in the not very distant Western past, those who claimed
3^ 3 Osama bin Laden, Rawalpindi Nawa i Waqt, Jan 7, 2001. 
3^"^ Jacobsen, Re-envisioning Sovereignty, 78.
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their authority to be derived from God. It could even be suggested that a European king 
sat above the law in a manner that the caliphs never could.
The notion of a community which transcends territory, race, culture and all other forms 
of identity as a political element, is a significantly contrasting notion to that of the 
nation-state, and puts the idea of an Islamic state as understood by Salafi Jihadists in 
stark opposition to the contemporary world order. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran claim 
to be Islamic states. However, they seek to realise Islamic order in contrast to their 
medieval predecessors.^^^ They are, therefore, still understood by the Salafi Jihadists as 
illegitimate, as they have largely accepted the status quo of territorial boundaries and 
denied the puritanical understanding of the umma. Islam, in the Salafi Jihadist vision, is 
opposed to territorial divisions in the form of geo-political units or nation-states, the 
only boundary is that of faith.
3.4 Conclusion
The idea of the state fi*om Islamic sources has existed since the time of the Prophet and 
the drafting of the Constitution of Medina. There are similarities between the notions 
that characterise the Western nation-state and those which provide the framework for 
Islamic ideas of the state. Some Islamists would argue that the nation-state and Islam 
are not necessarily incompatible and there exists a clear distinction between an Islamic 
state and a religious state. It is possible for a secular government to exist in conjunction
3^ 6 Waardenburg, Islam, 347.
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with Islam. The state in the modem sense is the development of a lengthy political 
process, an historical evolution from diverse, unequal and overlapping sovereignties 
that has in reality only recently been resolved. In the Islamic world the collapse of 
Ottoman authority brought rapid change in the political organising principles of the 
region. As long as there existed an Islamic caliphate these issues could to some degree 
be reconciled. However, in the absence of a potential legitimate unifying actor this 
becomes more difficult. Salafi Jihadists draw on particular concepts of Islamic thinking 
regarding the state, its legitimacy, legal stmctures and territoriality that are in conflict 
with the standing international order. To conceptualise Salafi Jihadism and the current 
impasse with the United States and the West it is necessary to understand Islamic 
concepts regarding the complex issues of the state, sovereignty and legitimacy. It is 
possible for Islam and the nation-state to co-exist as can be observed from non- 
traditional liberal Islamic thinkers that will be discussed in the next chapter. However, 
the Salafi Jihadist concept of political organisation is in opposition to this structure, and 
works within the traditional model of the state, sovereignty and legitimacy of the early 
period of Islam during the time of Muhammad and the Rashidun, seeking to restore an 
imagined ‘golden age.’
The state, in the Western or Islamic sense, is based on notions of legitimacy, 
sovereignty and territoriality. However, the ideas that inform the international system 
differ starkly from the Islamic interpretation presented by the Salafi Jihadists. The 
dividing up of the umma among various sovereigns is problematic, and sovereignty that 
derives its legitimacy from anything other than religious sources cannot be viewed as 
legitimate. This chapter has presented the concepts that underpin Islamic notions of
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political organisation; the state, sovereignty, law and territoriality. This is necessary to 
investigate how Islamic theorists view international relations, which the next chapter 
will engage with. Further, both Islamic concepts of the state and the international are 
integral in understanding al-Qaeda’s ideology and how the Salafi Jihadist notion of 
political organisation comes into conflict with the contemporary international system, 
that the US as a hegemonic power helps to maintain.
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Chapter 4 
An Islamic Paradigm of International Relations
In 1966 J. Harris Proctor argued in Islam and International Relations^^^ that the notion 
that there is a connection between Islam and the conduct of international relations is 
invalid. Like many scholars in the field of International Relations Proctor was working 
exclusively from within the confines of Western-centric thought, giving limited space to 
the study of religion as a significant factor in international affairs. Working within these 
confines it is difficult to consider Islam as a concept useftil to the field of International 
Relations. This has been the case despite scholars of Islam speaking of the existence of 
an al-siyasi al-Islami, i.e. an Islamic political order, that is, the notion that the world 
exists in a state of natural disorder that must be managed by means of a culture of 
order.^^^ This also ignores the fact that concepts relevant to international affairs are 
contained within Islam, as evidenced in the Quran and Sunnah, and that scholars of 
Islam have constructed their own theories of international relations. Add to this that 
questions surrounding Islam are afforded significant space in contemporary discussions 
on international affairs, which suggests that Islam is a factor relevant to international 
relations.
This chapter seeks to uncover how an Islamic paradigm can be articulated within the 
field of International Relations. By comparing Islamic and Western thought on the 
international this chapter contributes to the primary argument made in this thesis, that 
the contemporary era is witnessing a period of competing universalisms where one
3^ 6 J. Harris Proctor, Islam andIR  (New York; Praeger, 1966)
3^ ’ Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), 91.
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form of international order differs distinctly from another concept of what should 
constitute the structure of the international system. By looking to Islamic concepts of 
the international it is possible to conceptualise the Salafi Jihadist understanding of 
international politics that informs Salafi Jihadist organisations like al-Qaeda and its 
constituents.
There is, in fact, a wealth of literature devoted to the study of Islam within International 
Relations, a field that has grown exponentially since 2001. The bulk of these resources 
view Islam as a factor to be understood in relation to existing paradigms of International 
Relations, thereby neglecting its specificity. Perhaps because of its Western-centric 
focus the importance of religion in international affairs has largely been marginalised by 
scholars of International Relations, who have tended to reduce religion to simply 
playing a monolithic role that is at best merely a part of power politics, or a tool of 
persuasion. Fawcett argued that religion must be taken into account in International 
Relations theorising without rejecting previous theories or disregarding research 
methods developed in the 20^ century.^^^ Following this assertion, this chapter argues 
that it is possible for alternative non-Western-centric concepts of international relations 
to exist, as has been discussed most prominently in the collaborative work by Buzan and 
Acharya, Non-Western International Relations Theory
This chapter will first demonstrate that Islamic concepts of the international contain 
unique features by looking at the ontological foundations that are ubiquitous in Islamic 
international theories. Indeed, this particular ontological position from the Islamic
3^  ^Louise Fawcett, “Alliances Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East,” in International 
Relations o f the Middle East, ed. Louise Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 189.
3’® Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory (Routledge, 2009)
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perspective is what makes it distinct and in need of investigation. Secondly, the varying 
schools within the Islamic tradition will be identified and it will be demonstrated how 
they in many ways mirror classical orthodox theories. Finally, it will be demonstrated 
how contemporary actors are informed by the three major schools if Islamic 
international theories; classical (Muslim Brotherhood), reformist (Neo-Islamists), 
revolutionary (al-Qaeda). As these actors are all in competition at the present time to 
determine how the Islamic realm and the West should interact, they are relevant to the 
questions asked in this thesis.
The events of international politics have helped to shape how IR theory has developed. 
This has also been the case with Islamic concepts of the international. The great shift 
that began to take place in the 19^  ^century with the Salafist challenge to the traditional 
religious elite has developed in the later portion of the 20^ century into Salafi Jihadism, 
a religious political ideology that serves as the intellectual foundations for al-Qaeda and 
its constituents. Chapter 7 will detail this ideology and its evolution. This chapter will 
serve to support this understanding by investigating Islamic thought on international 
affairs building upon the concepts discussed in the previous chapter.
4.1 Towards and Islamic Paradigm of International Relations
Sulayman opened the door for an exclusively Islamic concept of the international in his 
book. Towards an Islamic Theory o f International R e l a t i o n s Conceding that even
3^ 6 Sulayman, Towards and Islamic Theory.
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among contemporary Islamic scholars significant work on international relations has 
been limited, Sulayman convincingly lays down the framework for an Islamic theory of 
international relations. This chapter will move the argument one step further by 
identifying various schools within Islamic international thinking, demonstrating their 
parallels with orthodox International Relations thought and discussing the evolution of 
Islamic theories through the great Islamic debates. It is not possible here to account for 
the entire arena of Islamic international political thought. However, there are distinctly 
Islamic concepts of the international, and this has relevance to the rise of Salafi 
Jihadism and its challenge to the international system.
Islamic theories of international relations are concepts not of how states interact with 
each other, but rather concepts of world order that focus on the relations between the 
Muslim and the non-Muslim spheres. The idea that Islam possesses a theory of 
international relations may be intellectually uncomfortable, as it speaks to abstract 
concepts such as the umma (the Muslim community as a whole irrespective of national 
borders, ethnic identity or linguistic differences) or assabiya (the concept of the feeling 
of kinship held by the inhabitants of the Middle East) relying upon a conviction of 
belief in extra-rational agency. However, these are the primary components that 
constitute Islamic concepts of world order, and they give it a unique perspective. 
Muslim states, it is argued, behave much like non-Muslim states in the international 
system, on the basis of self-help and self-interest. The Middle East sub-state system is 
in many ways just another example of realpolitik at work.^^  ^ The difference is that 
Islam can potentially be a universal system of values and thereby form the basis for a
3** Mohammed Hariff Hassan, War Peace or Neutrality: An overview o f Islamic Polity’s Basis o f  Inter- 
State Relations (Rajarastan: School of International Studies, 2007), 18.
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common identity. Differences that exist between states and governments in the Islamic 
world, therefore, become secondary for Islamic theorists.^^^ The diminished value of 
the concept of the nation-state allows for an alternative Islamic concept of order, and 
for an alternative model of what represents the boundaries of the inside {Dar al-Islam) 
and the outside {Dar al-Harb). This dichotomy represents the division of the world into 
two opposing halves, which according to traditionalist Islamic thinkers are in perpetual 
conflict. From this perspective laws governing society are primarily normative as 
opposed to prescriptive. Where the concept of law governing nations from a Western 
understanding consists of a body of rules, Islamic law is designed for both moral 
education and legal enforcement. Thus far Islam, however, has been ineffective in 
building a unified political bloc, particularly since the disbanding of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1924.^ "^^
The utility of arguing for Islamic theories of international relations is that it is necessary 
to understand the Islamic world on its own terms, and not always as an extension of 
Western politics. Indeed, a purely Western centric reading of international affairs in 
relation to the Islamic world is impoverished. An Islamic theory of international 
relations is needed alongside orthodox concepts to understand the role Islam plays in 
international affairs.
3^ 3 Albert Hourani, Islam and Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawsiha (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 178.
3^ 3 Sulayman, Towards and Islamic Theory, 128.
3^ Hourani, Islam and Foreign Policy, 179.
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4.2 Three Approaches: Classical (Traditional), Reformist (Non-Traditional), 
Revolutionary (Salafi Jihadist)
The various schools of Islamic international relations share an agreed ontology based 
on the belief in one God. They differ, however, in regard to issues of methodology. 
Interestingly, Islamic theories in many ways resemble their Western theoretical cousins, 
realism and liberalism, but also include a third school of thought that is revolutionary in 
character and conceivably could be conceptualised as post-modern as it is 
transformative in nature. Islamic thought regarding the international has been forged in 
reaction to particular historical periods, which Rajaee calls “phases” or “debates.”^^  ^
Orthodox International Relations theory has produced a series of debates where the 
ontological and epistemological foundations held by one tradition are challenged by 
other traditions, as well as by those working within a tradition. This often forces a 
conscious re-examination of an approach to reassert or create an entirely new position. 
Islamic debates, however, work from a single ontological position. The most basic 
principle of the Islamic framework is Tawhid, the oneness of God.^^  ^This has produced 
debates which are a consistent rehashing of the ideas of the two opposing traditional 
and reformist points of view, with the third position developing from elements of the 
traditionalists and the early reformists. This has resulted in the creation of theories that 
although new, remain close to their original form.
Three distinct theoretical approaches to international politics can be identified when 
investigating Islamic thought. The first is a traditional or classical school, which in
3^ 3 Farhang Rajaee, “Paradigm Shift in Muslim International Relations Discourse Studies,” Contemporary 
Islam 1, no. 1 (1999)
386 Sulayman, Towards and Islamic Theory, 117.
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many ways mirrors classical realist concepts regarding power, anarchy, war and the 
state of nature.^^^ The second, a reformist or non-traditional school, that contains less 
rigid concepts of cooperation and security, engages with modernity, accepts the 
temporal existence of nation-states in Islamic lands and provides a discourse for a 
durable peace with non-Muslims.^^^ Finally, a revolutionary school termed Salafi 
Jihadist, which serves to underscore the ideology of international organisations engaged 
in ‘terrorism.’ This is a product of both the classical and reformist schools, taking on 
the classical school’s Hobbesian concept of the state of nature and the reformist 
school’s approach to ijtihad.
Three key concepts are present in all Islamic international theory and warrant 
discussion. First, is the concept of the state and sovereignty. From the Islamic 
perspective states do not work within a system of sovereigns, but rather constitute one 
indivisible Muslim umma bound by assabiya. Second, the Islamic theoretical world 
view contains a conception of inside/outside. Inside is the domain of Islam {Dar al- 
Islam) and the outside is the realm of the other {Dar al-Harb). Finally, all Islamic 
approaches have a shared ontology, the belief in the one God. The starting point for 
knowledge is derived from the divine sources of the Quran and the example of the 
Prophet in the Sunnah.
While these competing theoretical approaches may disagree as to where the boundaries 
of the inside and outside are, how they are to be engaged, and whether they are in 
perpetual conflict, all agree that there is a concept of the Islamic and non-Islamic space
3®’ Mohammed Abo-Kazleh, “Rethinking IR Theory in Islam: Towards a More Adequate Approach/ 
Turkish Journal o f  International Relations 5, no. 4 (Winter, 2006): 41.
3«»Ibid.
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that defines the boundary between what is the domestic and where the international 
begins.^^^ The Quran and Sunnah are the only sources from which any foundational 
knowledge can be obtained. Here again the approaches differ on method in regard to the 
practise of ijtihad, but all agree that the ontological foundation of all Islamic theories of 
international relations is derived from these sources.^^® These three concepts are the 
defining components of Islamic international relations theories. Though they are in 
some ways similar to classical International Relations theories, they cannot be 
comfortably pigeonholed into existing spaces as their ontological foundations are alien 
to IR thought. As this is the case, Islam must be regarded not just as a subject to be 
examined exclusively through the lens of existing IR theories, but as a paradigm of 
international theory in its own right.
4.3 The Classical Approach
As noted, there are three theoretical concepts prevalent in all Islamic international 
relations thought; the non-Westphalian approach to sovereignty, the inside/outside 
approach of the Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb in defining the domestic and 
international respectively, and the reliance on the Quran and Sunnah for foundational 
knowledge. However, despite these basic concepts seeming to be in stark opposition to 
orthodox International Relations theory, traditionalism takes on elements of Hobbesian 
realism. The Hobbesian notion of realism perceives a world defined by insecurity, a 
condition that results in a persistent existential struggle. Only a temporary peace can
3*® Abo-Kazleh, “Rethinking IR Theory in Islam,” 42-46. 
3®° Rajaee, “Paradigm Shift,” 2.
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exist, as each actor is consistently seeking to maximise its power over the other. Islamic 
traditionalists arrive at rather similar conclusions. Classical theories of Islamic 
international relations were formed during what Rajaee terms the first debate.^^^ The 
first debate emerged during Islam’s formative years. This was a period defined by 
conquest and defence where Muslims perceived themselves as threatened by at first 
fellow Arabs and then by the powers of Persia and Rome and later Byzantium and 
Ethiopia. This time of regular conflict with neighbouring actors gave a particular 
Hobbesian essence to the thinking of Islamic scholars. According to their view the 
world exists in a state of jahiliya, which is ignorance of God’s will. There can be no 
permanent peace or human security until the whole of humanity is subject to Islam. 
Chapter 7 further explores this idea as a defining feature of the al-Qaeda ideology.
Jihad is a defining concept of the classical school. Note that the concept of jihad  is 
complex and disputed, therefore, it cannot be covered in its entirety within this chapter, 
but will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 7. Jihad can take on a variety of 
meanings and interpretations. It is defined as a struggle, which can either be the greater 
jihad  to better one’s community and self or the lesser jihad  of holy war.^^  ^As noted, the 
world is divided into two contrasting realms for traditionalists, the external Dar al-Harb 
(the realm of war) and the internal Dar al-Islam (the realm of Islam). Here a very 
distinct concept of foreign relations as defined by the constant struggle for survival is 
evident. The Dar al-Islam comprises the geographical space under Islamic control 
where the rights of Muslims are observed. The world beyond this domain is the Dar al- 
Harb. This is the space under the dominion of the infidels. This domain is not just
3®’ Ibid.
3®3 David Cook, “Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an 
Ideology of Terrorism,” Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10, no. 2 (June, 2009)
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considered a threat to the security of the community, in much the manner a classical 
realist theorist might conceptualise the condition of anarchy to be a threat to states in 
the international system, but it is considered a space which can be justifiably conquered 
in the name of spreading the religion under the appropriate c o n d i t i o n s .F o r  a 
considerable period of time this concept of the outside and inside defined Islamic 
foreign relations, and in some cases still does today.^ "^^
Classical Islamic thinking on the international is based on the Quran and Sunnah, and 
as with all Islamic political thought this is the starting point of inquiry. The Quran is the 
word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and the Sunnah is the words and 
deeds of the Prophet. Time is irrelevant and interpretation of these texts to adapt to 
conditions of modernity is perceived as heretical. As some proponents claim, Islam is a 
complete guide to economic, social, political and, as is argued here, international 
matters. The Quran and Sunnah are perfect guides to the proper understanding of all 
realms of social life. Further, the need for human interference in what has been divinely 
given is unnecessary. Islamic international relations theories are non-Western 
discourses and thereby contain concepts of sovereignty and the state that differ from 
classical IR theories, as was discussed in the previous chapter. For traditionalists the 
umma, or the community of believers, is indivisibly bound by the all-encompassing 
assabiya. Muslims must not be ruled by non-Muslims, nor is more than one sovereign 
permissible. Sovereignty is God’s and manifests itself in earthly form in one who is 
divinely chosen. The concept of the umma, of course, did not eliminate tribal authority, 
but overruled it with the belief in God and sovereignty on Earth vested in a new
3®3 Abo-Kazleh, “Rethinking IR Theory in Islam,” 43. 
3^  ^Rajaee, “Paradigm Shift,” 2.
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Leviathan/^^ Order began with the caliph and diffiised into smaller parochial units. The 
state may be the most powerful manifestation of sovereignty in the contemporary 
international system, however, in the Islamic world it has never attained the absolute 
claims of the Western style nation-state.^^^
The nation-state has historically required individuals to identify themselves as part of a 
national cultural group in a defined territory. Islam emphasises a dynastic concept of 
what sovereignty is, as the Islamic world was never united under one absolute 
sovereign. Islamic civilisations had always been fragmented into minor states or 
managed by mercenary armies loyal to patrimonial d y n a s t i e s .T h i s  allows for a 
somewhat more fluid, hierarchical and ambiguous concept of sovereignty than that 
which defines many nation-states in the contemporary international system. Claims of 
world order and the image of the caliphate have yet to be removed from the inter­
subjectivity of Islam. The state, though the focus of power, is in fact an intermediary 
between the telos of the Islamic peoples and a unified Islamic community.^^^ 
Traditionalists have been criticised for clinging to static outdated concepts of foreign 
affairs, yet, they remain influential in modem Islamic thought.^^^ Classical thought is 
often caught in a particular time period, binding it to a particular position that is 
difficult to alter. This makes the cornerstone of traditional Islamic international theory
3®3 p j .  Vatikiotis, Islam and the State (New York: Routledge, 1987), 36.
3®6 Robert Cox, “Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections of the 
Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,” m Approaches to World Order, eds. Robert Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 165-166.
3®^ Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London: Routledge, 1974)
3®3 Cox, “Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization,” 166.
3®^ Abo-Kazleh, “Rethinking IR Theory in Islam,” 52.
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the concept of jihad  as the starting point for all foreign relations in a Hobbesian world 
of aggressive forces that present a persistent existential threat to the umma.^^^
4.3.1 The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt represents a 
traditionalist interpretation of Islamic political and international thought. Sayid Qutb, an 
influential member of the Brotherhood, demonstrates the traditionalist realist position of 
the organisation by calling for the restoration of sharia through “physical power and 
jihadf^^^ According to al-Banna the group’s stance can be defined as, ""Allah is our 
objective, the Quran is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, is our way.”"^®^ 
For the Brotherhood the Quran and Sunnah in themselves constitute a complete and 
perfect direction for social and political organisation, divinely inspired and in no need 
of further amendment. Islamic governments must be based on these strict assumptions 
in order to claim legitimacy to rule.^^  ^ Despite a strict traditionalist understanding of 
Islamic thought, the Brotherhood has been actively engaged in matters of politics. The 
organisation officially rejects violence as a means to political change, however, some 
critics note that this may, at least historically, have been more of a tactical political 
manoeuvre than reflective of reality. This, they argue, is just a part of their objective to 
secure the complete Islamicization of society.'^ ®'^
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The concept of the international for the Muslim Brotherhood centres on traditional 
concepts regarding the umma as a physical concrete territory rather than an abstract 
idea. The unification of this territorial space under Islamic rule is the long term 
objective of Islam. The legitimacy of the current system of nation-states is questionable, 
despite the attempts of the Brotherhood to work within it. During the 2012 elections in 
Egypt, following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Brotherhood has claimed a significant 
portion of seats in the Egyptian parliament. The Democratic Alliance for Egypt led by 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party took the largest share of the vote 
at nearly 45%."^ ®^  The organisation has taken a more moderate approach to international 
relations than it did in the earlier portion of the 20*^  century. Now charged with the 
prospect of actually governing, the Brotherhood is forced to compromise its position to 
maintain power in an emerging democratic system. Party leaders have attempted to 
demonstrate that they will not infringe upon personal freedoms^^^ or unilaterally break 
the peace treaty with Israel, but rather seek to reform its cond i t ions .W here  the 
classical approach to international relations will likely guide the thought of the 
organisation, this demonstrates a moment where a debate may emerge within the 
classical school that could have future implications for Islamic theories of international 
relations.
Jasmine Coleman, “Egypt Election Results Show Firm Win for Islamists,” The Guardian, January 21, 
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4.4 The Reformists
Reformist theories of Islamic international relations are a relatively new addition to 
Islamic political thought. They are products of the second Islamic debate beginning in 
the late 19th century. The reformists are influenced by Salafism. The term SalafxQÎQVs 
to righteous predecessors, specifically the four immediate successors to the Prophet 
Muhammad, the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Salafism advocates looking to the early 
period of Islam for guidance on how to approach modernity and to re-establish the 
prominent role of Islam. It is the product of pioneering thinkers such as Jamal al-din al- 
Afghani (1838-1897), who in the second debate asserted an intermediate position 
between the zealot wing of the rejectionist position that sought to shun modernity and 
the West, and the modernists who sought to fully incorporate Western ideals.
Traditional and non-traditional Islamic international relations theories can be perceived 
of as visions of world order. The former takes a Hobbesian account of the state of 
nature and the latter conceives of a Lockean order which, although still conscious of a 
world defined by insecurity, allows for potential co-operation and peaceful coexistence 
between the Islamic and non-Islamic spheres. The Islamic world, as the reformists 
understand it, is no longer capable of supporting both universalism and trans- 
nationalism."^®  ^ This concession means there must be an acute revision of the 
traditionalist concepts of Dar al-Harh and Dar al-Islam. The reformists envision the 
possibility of alternate inter-subjective worlds coexisting without one asserting its
Christopher Henzel, “The Origins of the A1 Qaeda Ideology: Implications for U.S. Strategy,’ 
Parameters (Spring, 2005): 72.
Farhang Rajaee, “Paradigm Shift,” 5.
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hegemony upon the other through a superior assabiya.^^^ Reformists argue that the 
classical concept of the divided world and the perpetual jihad  is a product of a 
particular time in history/^ ^  They assert that this concept is incompatible with the 
contemporary and insist that there can no longer be an absolute division of the world. 
They argue for a third way, the concept of the Dar al-Ahd (realm of treaties), a principle 
regarding the possibility of peace with the non-Muslim world."^ ^^
Reformists are more accommodating in their acceptance of the existence of nation­
states. The umma for them is not just a physical entity but as well a metaphysical 
concept. They claim, however, that this does not mean surrendering Muslim principles. 
It is not, therefore, a betrayal of the faith to be both modem and Muslim. What emerges 
is a double-faceted concept of sovereignty. They concede that they must accept the 
raison d ’état, but also insist that the state must adhere to Islamic principles and hold to 
an eternal consciousness of assabiya. The condition of the Islamic world divided into 
nation-states is, for the reformists at least, temporarily acceptable and does not require a 
scuttling of the system by means of jihad. Rather, the Muslim peoples can work within 
the system to unify the umma over time by non-violent means."^^^
Non-traditionalists differ most distinctly from traditionalists in their methodological 
approach. Where both agree that the Quran and Sunnah are the basis for all societal 
structure and regard these as divinely inspired, they differ on issues regarding 
interpretation. Personal judgement, for the traditionalists, without the consent of the
Cox, “Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualization,” 167. 
Hassan, War Peace or Neutrality, 6.
Abo-Kazleh, “Rethinking IR Theory in Islam,” 45.
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Ulema is heretical. Conversely, for reformists, ijtihad is an idea of legitimate religions 
endeavour in employing personal judgement to deal with matters not specifically 
detailed in the Quran and Sunnah, while using these sources as guidance.^In the 11* 
century the so called ‘gates of ijtihad’ were closed by the Ulema, supposedly ending the 
practise. However, it was revived first by ibn Taymiyya in the 14* century and later by 
the Salafist reformers. It represents the cornerstone of non-traditionalist theory. 
Traditionalists reject this, but the reformists assert it is necessary to contend with the 
conditions of the modem world.
Non-traditionalists who make these arguments are careful not to be seen as 
marginalising Islam. They believe that engagement with modemity is necessary and yet 
the Islamic world is not suited for Westem style modemity. What they suggest is 
needed is an Islamic modemity that is capable of taking from the West what is seen to 
be valid without permitting the Islamic world to mirror or to be subjugated by the West, 
in such a manner as to weaken or eliminate Islamic identity.
4.4.1 The Neo-Islamists
The neo-Islamists became prominent in Egypt in the late 1970s, seeking to establish 
themselves as a school of thought as opposed to a political party, thereby entering into 
the public arena in a way that would not invite repression in the manner in which the 
Muslim Brotherhood had. They are representative of contemporary non-traditionalist
414 Ibid.
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thought. Among the most noted of the contemporary neo-Islamists are Yusuf al- 
Qaradawi and Tariq al-Bishri. Influenced in particular by the work of Jamal al-din al- 
Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), their approach to 
international politics is centred on the concept of wasatiya (middle way)."^ ^^  Al-Afghani, 
writing at the end of the 19* century, sought a way to mediate between those who 
desired the absolute rejection of all things Western and those who would adopt Western 
values at the expense of all that is Islamic. Abduh aimed to bring about reform in the 
Muslim world through interpretation of texts by means of reason and restore the role of 
Islamic civilization through a message of universal peace."^^  ^ The contribution of al- 
Afghani to Salafism and the divergent path his followers took to in time create the al- 
Qaeda ideology will be more fully discussed in Chapter 7.
The neo-Islamist ‘middle way’ approach argues for the establishment of a new fiqh 
(jurisprudence) that can welcome change as well as preserve the traditional culture."^^  ^It 
is, in essence, a way of reconciling Islam with modernity and staving off any clash of 
universalisms by offering a concept not of competing universalisms but rather 
coexisting ones.'^^  ^It is the idea that ijtihad can be applicable and amenable to deal with 
the global age.^^  ^The neo-Islamists should not be confused as being pro-Western. They 
advocate the defence of their peoples in the face of what they perceive as neo­
imperialist aspirations of the West, particularly the United States, and argue for the
Raymond William Baker, “Building the World in the Global Age,” in Religion, Social Practice and 
Contested Hegemons: Reconstructing the Public Sphere in Muslim Majority Societies, eds. Armando 
Salvadore and Mark Levine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 110-114,
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right of Muslim peoples to shape their future within the higher purpose of Islam/^^ The 
neo-Islamists contribution to Islamic international theory is a rejection of the 
traditionalist Hobbesian approach to the Dar al-Harh and Dar al-Islam. The notion that 
these must be set in violent opposition does not for the new-Islamists necessarily hold 
true in the contemporary age. The possibility and indeed necessity for cooperation 
between the Muslim and non-Muslim world must be conceivable if order is to be 
achieved and maintained
4.5 The Third and Fourth Debates and the Emergence of the Salafi Jihadist School
IR theories have evolved through challenges presented through debates that have 
resulted in reconstructed or novel theoretical perspectives as new ontological and 
epistemological challenges emerge. This has often been dependent upon the changing 
nature of world politics. Islamic international relations theories have also evolved in 
response to the changing conditions of international politics. The evolution of orthodox 
International Relations was subject to international political determinants beginning 
with the First World War and continuing through the Second World War, Cold War and 
finally the contemporary period characterised by US hegemony, globalisation and post- 
9/11 international politics. Islamic theorising with regard to the international has 
developed in a somewhat similar manner. As was discussed in previous sections, the 
first Islamic debate was a product of Islam’s formative years characterised by persistent 
conflict, first defensive and later offensive. As the followers of the new religion faced
"""Ibid, 117.
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an existential struggle for survival that later became a period of expansion, particular 
attitudes were entrenched in the minds of Islamic scholars. Religion was intimately 
connected to war and survival. Much like Hobbes, who observed an insecure world 
laden with violence and an eternal existential struggle which defines the human 
experience, so too did the classical thinkers who influenced the traditionalist school of 
Islamic international relations understand the world in this manner.
The second Islamic debate began in the middle of the 19th century as European power, 
culture and ideas increasingly encroached upon the Islamic world. Scholars challenged 
the long sustained traditionalist approach by asserting that the Islamic world was no 
longer capable of maintaining a position of trans-nationalism and universalism. That is, 
engaging fully with European influence while still arguing that Islam was an absolute 
guide to life. They advocated the re-opening of the ‘gates of ijtihad' to find a method 
for preserving and advancing Islam during a period of rapid change. The experience of 
colonialism and the increasing influence of Western thought and culture, however, 
spurred a split amongst the reformists. Armed with the tool of ijtihad and free from the 
limitations imposed upon Islam by the Ulema, 20* century thinkers, most notably Sayid 
Qutb, Hassan Al-Banna and Maulana Maududi, engaged in Islam’s third debate. This 
manifested itself as the theoretical foundation for revolutionary organisations such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s. As was previously asserted, concepts of the 
international developed by Islamic theorists are products of the world in which they 
live. The first traditionalist theories were forged in Islam’s Hobbesian origins, the 
second debate and the rise of non-traditional thinking was the product of a crisis of 
identity resulting from encounters with Europe and a feeling of stagnation in the Islamic
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world. The third debate represented a split in the reformist school with contrasting 
notions of the manner in which to employ ijtihad to deal with the complexities of 
humiliation through the colonial experience and the erosion of identity in the post- 
Ottoman period. How, then, is the contemporary period of the early 21st century to be 
understood? The late 20* century marked the beginnings of the fourth debate that may 
speak more to a struggle for the Muslim world to define itself than for the Islamic world 
to verify its role in the international system.
Salafists envision an idealised Islamic world and seek to model the contemporary world 
by looking to the time of the Prophet and seeking out an authentic Islam."^ ^^  Salafists 
contend that Islam was perfect in its origins, but that it has been corrupted over the 
centuries by foreign influences. Therefore, they seek to rediscover the original Islam 
through the Quran and Sunnah, and by looking to the time of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs. The two major strands within the Islamic international relations paradigm of 
classicism and reformism can be compared to orthodox International Relations theories, 
realism and liberalism respectively. Salafi Jihadism is a revolutionary political theory. It 
is a utopian conception infused with an Islamic hyper-realism and universalism that is 
in stark opposition to the neo-liberal Western order. It is a product of Salafi and 
reformist thought mixed with classical concepts of world order and jihad. At its core are 
the tenets of traditionalism with millennial and confi*ontational beliefs regarding 
international relations. A key tenet of Salafi Jihadism is ijtihad. However, it is the 
method of its use that divides the non-traditionalists between the reformist and Salafi 
Jihadist camps throughout the third debate. Ijtihad, for the Salafi Jihadists, is a tool for
Bruce Livesey, “The Salafist Movement.” PBS, accessed December 12, 2009, 
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bypassing the authority of the Ulema of the classical school. For the reformists it is a 
method of engaging with modernity and the West without being consumed by them. 
For the Salafi Jihadists it is a means by which to take Islam back to a blank slate and 
start anew to build an idealised Islamic state, Msing jihad  as a tool. In this they can undo 
the damage done to Islamic society fi*om foreign influence and internal corruption that 
has occurred over the last 14 centuries.
Salafi Jihadists draw on the arguments of Sayid Qutb to assert that Muslims have lost 
their way, and Islam has been altered to the point of only existing in the minds of the 
revolutionaries."^^^ As there are no perfect sharia governed states, there are no true 
M u s l i m s W h e n  Kemal Ataturk made the decision to dissolve the caliphate and tend 
to the business of building a nation-state in Turkey in 1924, the question of how to live 
as proper Muslims in the absence of the caliph for leadership was thrust upon the 
Ulema. Meeting at al-Azhar in 1926 the Ulema came to the conclusion that re­
establishing the caliphate was not possible under the current conditions. Thus, it was no 
longer possible for a Muslim to live correctly. For the Salafi Jihadists sovereignty is 
absolute and universal. Conflict, then, is not just a matter of survival, but the only tool 
for achieving peace. There can be no peace without a global Islamic political order {al- 
siyasi al-Islami), as brought about through the re-establishment of the caliphate, 
governed through monarchy in the form of a caliph.
Barry Cooper, New Political Religions or an Analysis o f Modern Terrorism (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 2004), 127.
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The classical assertion of the world as a dichotomy engaged in a constant struggle is a 
vital component of the Salafi Jihadist doctrine. Reformists argue that the notion of the 
divided world was constructed by the Hanafi School"^ ^^  of Islamic jurisprudence.^^^ 
They assert that there is no textual support in the Quran or Sunnah to justify this 
position of a world divided. Rather, the world is a singular entity, and this concept is 
only descriptive of the condition of the world in times of c o n f l i c t . F r o m  the 
reformists the Salafi Jihadists have adopted the practise of ijtihad, but their world view 
is more in line with the classical perception of the divided world where jihad  is a 
necessity. Salafi Jihadists seek to underscore Islamic universalism, free from external 
influences.Dialogue and compromise are not tools they employ. Neither can they 
accept the division of the Islamic world. Islamic states and nationalist movements are 
incompatible with their universalistic philosophy. When the first Salafi Jihadist 
organisations began to form in the 1920s it was with these principles in mind. Hassan 
al-Banna, founder of the Muslim brotherhood, rejected any notion of a Muslim nation­
state like Turkey.^^^ The movement was to be total and uncompromising. In the 
contemporary world this kind of thinking is demonstrated through the works of the al- 
Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, where he chastised the Palestinian Hamas for 
engaging in a nationalist struggle as opposed to the Global Jihad."^ ^^
The Hanafi is one of the four primary schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. Named after the 8‘*^ 
Century Iraqi scholar Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man, it is the oldest of the Sunni disciplines.
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The changes that occurred in the years following the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 
1981 mark the beginnings of the fourth debate that once again split the Salafist non- 
traditional wing of Islamic international relations. The crackdown by al-Sadat’s 
successor Hosni Mubarak forced the most radical Islamists to flee, leaving their 
comrades the choice to flee, be destroyed or join the fold of the political status quo. 
Some have been willing to work within the existing system to bring about change. In 
this, they are a political entity. They speak of social justice or economics, and thereby 
engage in a dialogue with the people and the existing powers to bring about the kind of 
change they advocate. For the Salafi Jihadist School these are Western activities that 
have no place in the Islamic political order, and will in no way be successful in re­
establishing the caliphate. Organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood are seen in 
essence to be insufficiently radical, and to have compromised the traditional 
fundamentalist position. For the Salafi Jihadists there is no dialogue or compromise. 
Additionally, there is no need to speak of social justice or economic concerns, as these 
are matters that are unrelated to the primary duty of Muslims in a world not ruled by 
true Muslims. From this perspective, human rule over humanity and the employment of 
Western concepts of order are at the source of all Islamic ills."^ ^^
The Salafi Jihadists are engaged in a zero sum game tied to perceptions of competing 
universalisms, Islam and Western liberalism. Perhaps what we have instead of a Clash 
o f Civilizations is a clash of universalisms, as perceived through the lens of the Salafi 
Jihadist ideologues. Here is a clear departure from the discourse of the Islamic inter­
paradigm debate engaged upon by the traditionalists and the non-traditionalists. The
Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, 60.
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objective is absolute and non-negotiable, even at the expense of the ideology or Islam 
itself. It is, then, quite basic in its assertions. It is a utopian vision set against a 
Hobbesian state of nature, which allows for no compromise with those who would 
challenge its divine universalism, even at a cost to its own survival."^^^
4.5.1 Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is the very embodiment of the Salafi Jihadist School of international 
relations. Both al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood are influenced by the works of 
Sayid Qutb. However, al-Qaeda is the extreme application of Qutb’s thinking. The 
theorists who serve as the ideological mentors to the organisation have their origins 
within the Muslim Brotherhood, most notably al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam. These 
figures regard the Muslim Brotherhood as not sufficiently radicalised to bring about the 
objectives of traditionalist Islamic thinking. Al-Qaeda is a by-product of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Arab fighters migrated to fight a holy war against the Soviet 
Union on behalf of Afghanistan and Islam, and were given the now popularised identity 
as the Mujahedeen. From their successes in expelling the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan they drew grandiose, somewhat delusional, conclusions regarding the 
abilities of a small group of lightly armed fighters to challenge powerful states and 
change the existing world order. It is here that the organisation begins to take shape 
under the guidance of Azzam and Bin Laden.
Svante E. Cornell, Islam and Foreign Policy (Boston: MIT Press, 2006), 263.
153
Al-Qaeda and its ideological masters are the keystone for the Salafi Jihadist brand of 
international political theory. They serve as the organisation that has actualised this 
school of Islamic international relations thinking into practise. They demonstrate the 
fearless nature of this kind of thought, as well as their global agenda and ensuing belief 
that they can affect change in world politics. Where they have undoubtedly changed, to 
some extent, the current political order, they have failed to make significant progress 
towards their ultimate goal of establishing a new caliphate. This, however, is unlikely to 
be the focal point of their legacy or their greatest contribution to the Salafi Jihadist 
School. Al-Qaeda as the greatest practitioners of Salafi Jihadism to date have had a 
powerful influence in spreading this ideology, and will continue to influence how this 
brand of international political theory develops and is practised in the years to come.
4.6 Conclusion
Proctor’s assertion that Islam is irrelevant as a subject of inquiry within the study of 
international politics has clearly been demonstrated to be incorrect in light of events 
over the course of the last half century. Islam, as a relevant political concept, may be 
novel for the relatively young discipline of International Relations, but it has long been 
influential as a catalyst of political thought within, and more recently outside of, the 
Islamic sphere. In fact, Islam can be understood as more than just a subject of study for 
scholars of International Relations, it is as much a theory of the international on its own. 
Western centric discourses on the study of international politics are only one type of 
tool of analysis. While an ontological position believed to be divinely inspired may be
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out of place in the traditional understandings of orthodox political theory, it does not 
render such an approach invalid. To grapple fully with many of the most perplexing 
questions regarding global ‘terrorism,’ theorists need an understanding of how 
international relations are perceived from the perspective of Islamic scholars.
Islamic theories, like classical IR theories, have been affected by the events of 
international politics. The convulsive events of the 20* century have significant 
ramifications for both. In this, parallel theories have developed, Islamic and Western, in 
reaction to unfolding events. Demonstrating the importance of Islamic theories of the 
international is not a project of constructing an ‘other.’ Nor is it an attempt to 
demonstrate Islam’s ‘otherness.’ Rather, it is recognition that there exist alternative 
concepts of the international that inform action, in the case of this thesis the actions of 
Salafi Jihadist organisations. Whether Islamic theories are representative of truth is to 
some extent irrelevant, as arguing within the confines of the Islamic ontology is the only 
position from which debate can occur. Islamic theories of international relations cannot 
be wholesale imported into IR. They can, however, serve as a useful tool in attempting 
to understand Islamic actors whose motivations, strategies and perceptions, are often not 
neatly encapsulated by orthodox IR theories. This thesis is an investigation at two 
levels. On the one side the international system, as it is observed from a realist position, 
on the other, the long process of Islamic history and the drive towards unification and 
legitimacy. It is an observation of the intersection of these competing universalisms in a 
particular historical period, the contemporary era. To engage with the questions this 
thesis asks, and to ultimately understand why Salafi Jihadism has come into conflict
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with the West and the US in particular, an understanding of Islamic concepts of the 
international is indispensable.
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Section III
Islamic Order: The Historical Search for Legitimacy and Unity
This section engages with the second key assumption proposed in this thesis: 
Historically, there has been a drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic 
political order based on the unity of the Muslim people, governed by a religiously 
sanctioned leadership rooted in Islamic principles. The previous section demonstrated 
that Islam does in fact contain concepts of the state, sovereignty and the international. 
This section seeks to uncover the ongoing search for legitimacy and unity within Islam. 
Chapter 5 looks at the period of Islam’s origins to the end of Islamic empires with the 
collapse of Ottoman authority in 1924. During this time there were various claims to 
leadership in the Islamic world, competing to unify the community and demonstrate 
legitimate right to rule based on religious credentials. Chapter 6 demonstrates how the 
search for legitimacy, particularly in the Middle East, was sought after the end of the 
caliphate. This section looks at secular Pan-Arabism and then political Islam, noting the 
failure of both movements to achieve either legitimacy or unity. It concludes that there 
is indeed a long going historical search in the Islamic world, particularly the Middle 
East, for some kind of unity and government legitimised by religion. It is not argued 
that this is sought by every Muslim, yet, the discourse on unity and legitimacy remains 
significant, and those who seek to achieve this have an audience.
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Chapter 5
The Struggle for Legitimacy and Unity in the Islamic Realm from the Rashidun to
the Ottomans
This thesis argues that to conceptualise the current tensions between the Salafi Jihadists 
and the West requires a long view into the historical processes of the Islamic, 
particularly Arab, world. There has been a consistent struggle to unify the various parts 
of the Islamic lands using religion as a legitimising agent, and a struggle for who should 
control that realm since Islamic empires began to expand rapidly after the time of the 
Prophet. As Authur Goldschmidt observes in relation to the Islamic imperial period:
A leader emerges with a mission, probably related somehow to Islam that inspires his 
followers and enables them to motivate others like themselves to overcome rival states. 
As the empire expands it builds up a large army and bureaucracy that it must then 
support, increasing the burdens on its subjects. The quality of leadership declines. 
Finally, the empire breaks up and the cycle repeats itself."""
From the Islamic imperial caliphates and the various other self proclaimed caliphates to 
the contemporary jihadists, there has been a struggle for dominance in the Islamic world 
by institutions that seek to fuse politics and religion together in the corpus of a 
governing elite. Even the ‘secular’ Pan-Arabists made appeals to religious faith, 
symbols and rhetoric. In this, there has been a cyclical process where one aspirant to 
power challenges the legitimacy of another seeking to replace it.
Albert Hourani, appealing to Ibn Khaldun’s concept of assabiya, observes that this 
continues into the Ottoman period. He notes, “in a sense the formation of the Ottoman 
style was one more example of the process which had taken place many times in the
""" Authur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History o f the Middle East (Cairo: American University Press,
1983), 134.
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history of the Muslim peoples, the challenge to established dynasties by military force 
from the nomadic peoples.”'^ '^^  What is evident is a consistent attempt at some form of 
unification and a struggle over who can and who legitimately should oversee the 
leadership of the community, which is presented within the context of religion. The 
nation-state is firmly in place throughout the region and is, as this thesis argues, a 
significant stumbling block for those who continue to appeal to a unified Islamic, and 
particularly Arab, order. The drive for unification continues as a long existing historical 
struggle that is an integral component of the questions raised by this thesis.
In support of the hypothesis presented in this thesis, this chapter seeks to demonstrate 
that there is a long historical struggle for unity in the Middle East, and the employment 
of religion as a legitimising agent for those who seek to act as successful unifiers. Salafi 
Jihadism in general is part of a long existing struggle to unify the Islamic world. 
Challengers for power have been the norm. The current structure of nation-states, 
created in the aftermath of the collapse of Ottoman authority and the failure of regional 
Pan-Arabism, have brought this indigenous struggle into the international arena with the 
emergence of Salafi Jihadist organisations. This chapter will demonstrate that even 
during the period of the caliphates there was no consensus on who should rule, but 
religion always played a role in attempts to solidify legitimacy by the ruling elite. 
Therefore, contemporary answers bom of the realities of the 20* century only partially 
explain the current impasse between the Salafi Jihadists and the United States. The 
Salafi Jihadists are only the most contemporary players in a long historical experience 
that cannot be explained in terms of exclusively 20* century realities.
Hourani, History, 215.
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Salafi Jihadism and its most powerful manifestation al-Qaeda are just the current trend 
in a struggle that has been ongoing for over thirteen centuries. In relation to al-Qaeda, 
its former figure head Bin Laden and chief ideologue al-Zawahiri and their quest for 
power, it is noted by Gerges that “they are not the first and will not be the last.”"^ ^^ 
Chapter 7 on al-Qaeda’s ideology will further demonstrate the appeal to history in 
creating a coherent marketable ideology. This is necessary for manufacturing legitimacy 
to rule, or in this case, to be the vanguard of a movement that intends to rule. The 
objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, to demonstrate that this has always been the 
case. The need to justify the leadership of any particular power has been historically 
based, at least cosmetically, on religion and appeals to Islamic symbols and rhetoric as 
well as enlisting elements of the religious elite. Second, there has been a consistent 
struggle for order and unity throughout Arab history with formal institutions of 
unification coming to an end in 1924 with the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate. This is 
understood throughout this thesis to be a watershed moment where those who struggle 
for Arab/ Islamic unity began to focus outward as well as inward. This chapter offers an 
observation of the Islamic imperial period in support of the above contentions.
This chapter will work from the beginning of Islamic expansion and empires with the 
Rashidun and Umayyads, following through to the Abbasids and Ottomans, as well as 
taking account of the other proclaimed caliphates and imperial aspirants. The imperial 
caliphs were at all times in need of religious justification for legitimacy to rule. As an 
imperial leader an individual was as much a practitioner of state bureaucracy as a 
protector of a religious faith and tradition. As has been previously noted, no individual
Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 273.
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after the Prophet was able to adequately fill this dual role based on the model of 
complete convergence. Nonetheless, this was a reality of historical Islamic imperial rule 
and is evoked in the discourse of the Salafi Jihadists today. As no one could claim the 
legitimacy held by Muhammad himself, appeals to emulate him and his companions 
have been a necessary part of governing in the Islamic world. The Salafi Jihadist 
discourse attempts to reassert this in the age of nation-states, where legitimacy is 
moving away fi*om religious legitimacy towards a nationalist based legitimacy. It is al- 
Qaeda’s quest to reverse this trend that has been on the ascent in the last nine decades, 
and in particular in the post Pan-Arab period.
Who should be afforded political authority, how should this be exercised and in what 
manner should whoever is to rule be chosen? If they rule unjustly can they be deposed? 
In essence, who is to be the leader of the umma both spiritually and politically? These 
questions began to arise as a result of the dissensions and conflicts that arose during the 
first century of Islam, questions that were answered in light of the events of that 
period."^^  ^Religious authority did not end with the death of the Prophet Muhammad, 
rather, it was transferred to the caliph as God’s representative authority on earth."^ ^^  
Whoever was to rule politically was in need of religious authority as well as material 
power capabilities. In this, the interaction between learned religious scholars and the 
caliphs became, during the Middle Ages until the end of the Ottoman Empire, of 
significant importance in defining who could legitimately claim lawful leadership.
Hourani, History, 60-61.
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The early period of the Abbasid dynasty witnessed the rise to prominence of a religions 
scholarly elite known as the Ulema. Some scholars have argued that during this period 
the relationship between religious scholars and the caliphs became increasingly 
formalised, in essence, determining how politics and religion would intersect. As 
Akbarzadeh and Saeed observe, “the separation of din (religion) and darwa 
(government) began in the early Abbasid period and was formalised under subsequent 
caliphs, but this effective separation was by no means absolute.”'^ ^^
Salafi Jihadists who aspire to rule in the contemporary differ from their predecessors the 
Islamic caliphs. They do not seek to employ the services of the Ulema. Salafi Jihadists 
are able to move around this stumbling block and claim that the right to rule is based not 
on the credentials given by the Islamic intellectual elite, but rather by emulation of the 
Prophet and the example set by the early Muslims. This is seen by Akbarazdeh and 
Saeed as something rather novel. They assert that “the challenge of political Islam (as 
the guiding principle even the blueprint for government which may also be called 
Islamism) to secular models of government and the legitimacy of irreligious rule is 
essentially a new phenomenon, although it is presented by its exponents as a 
continuation of a long tradition in Islamic political thought.”"^ ^^ However, politics and 
religion, it is argued here, have always been interconnected, and religion has always 
been a powerful and necessary tool for legitimacy. What could be said to be novel, in 
regard to Salafi Jihadism, is an attempt to unify earthly and extra-rational sovereignty, 
which has not existed in the corpus of one individual since the time of the Prophet. To 
argue that there is not a long tradition of basing legitimacy on religion lacks merit. State
Sharam Akbarazadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2003),
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and religious authorities have always been intimately connected, something that 
contemporary leaders find difficult to achieve. To suggest that Islam and politics are not 
in some sense co-dependent, and that this is not a significant element of the tradition of 
the Islamic world, would seem without merit as well. The Salafi Jihadists through their 
own ijtihad have attempted to discredit the Ulema as a legitimate religious authority, 
and portray their endorsement of any political leader as illegitimate.
5.1 The Emergence of Empire
Religion has consistently been a tool for legitimising and maintaining the existing order 
in the Islamic world. As Halim Baraka asserts, “rulers throughout Arab history have 
used religion to discourage rebellion and dissent on behalf of the unity of the umma and 
safeguard against external th rea ts .Conf l ic t ing  claims to legitimacy have been 
consistent in Islamic history as Islam has been often treated not just as a religious faith, 
but as an ideology used to achieve and maintain power. As Humphreys observes, in 
relation to Islamic history, “whenever the established order is threatened internally or 
externally the spokesman for this order must explain why things are. Equally, dissidents 
must say what is wrong and how to change it.”"^"^  ^ Immediately following Muhammad 
competing aspirants for the leadership of the Islamic community began to emerge; For 
example, the Abbasid, Shi’ite, Carmathian, Fatamid, Almoravid, Almohad, Safavid 
etc.^ "^  ^The spread of Islam among the subject peoples did not result in greater religious
Halim Baraka, The Arab World (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 128.
R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework fo r Inquiry (London: LB. Tauris, 1991), 148. 
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unity, and the stronger Islam itself grew the more difficult it was for rulers to a:chieve 
unity/"^ ^
Following the death of the Prophet four caliphs ruled the Islamic realm until 750; Abu 
Bakr, Umar ibn al-Kittab, Uthman ibn Allan, Ali ibn Abi Talib. Known as the 
Rashidun, or Rightly Guided Caliphs, their legitimacy to govern was based on their 
association with the Prophet himself. This ‘golden age’ is viewed by Salafi Jihadists as 
Islam’s pristine moment, and it is argued that since that time Islam has been 
increasingly corrupted. Hence, it is necessary to attempt to emulate this brief period to 
restore Islam to its place of prominence. The death of Muhammad resulted in a revolt. 
Where the Arab tribes were willing to accept the legitimacy to rule of a divine Prophet, 
the rule of a caliph as a mortal king was far less palatable. The revolt prompted Abu 
Bakr to launch a series of military campaigns to suppress the revolt known as the Ridda 
Wars or the Wars o f Apostasy. During the Wars o f Apostasy, however, religion was still 
a defining factor. Of the six major centres of the revolt four of the leaders of the 
movement offered competing claims to being prophets themselves.' '^ '^^
The Umayyad dynasty that followed the Rightly Guided Caliphs changed the nature of 
the Islamic political process from one based on electoral consensus to a caliphate 
governed by dynastic rule.'^ '^  ^The Umayyads inherited Islam’s early and rapid 
expansion out of Arabia into the greater Middle East, which forced the dynasty to face
H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Brown, Islamic Society and the West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1957), 71.
P.M. Holt et al.. The Cambridge History o f Islam vol. lA (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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issues of administration not previously dealt with by the Rashidun. The rapid expansion 
of the empire worked against the ability of the Umayyad’s to claim legitimacy. The 
territory over which they ruled contained a majority population that was neither Muslim 
nor Arab. They further chose to move their capitol to Damascus, which had a pre­
existing Islamic identity and indigenous institutions of political structure. This was not 
the case in regard to the Islamic strongholds further east.'^ '^  ^As a result, the Umayyad 
caliphs were never able to establish their legitimacy to rule in religious terms,"^ "^  ^leaving 
them vulnerable to competing challengers for power.
The Umayyad caliphs that followed the Rashidun no longer felt obligated to consult the 
companions, as those who had actually known the Prophet had begun to die off. 
Previously, it had been necessary to do so or risk dissent and a crisis of legitimacy from 
those who would side with the opinion of the companions. Additionally, the Ulema had 
yet to be formed, which in the future would serve as an institutionalised form of 
religious legitimacy." "^^  ^The result was a dynasty that was vulnerable to constant 
challenges on religious grounds that it had little means to fend off, even though they 
still continued in practise to uphold religious law and traditions.Critics, however, 
maintained that the Umayyad’s ruled over a kingdom, as opposed to a caliphate that 
could be understood to be sanctioned by Islam."^ ^^
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5.2 The Abbasid Dynasty
The Abbasids that followed the Umayyads were better able to articulate the relationship 
between political power and religious legitimacy, aided by the development of sharia 
and religious scholars. Their prestige as rulers was further supported not just by the 
successful development of religious feeling, but as well by the contradictory material 
luxury and opulence of the caliphs. E v e n  during the height of Abbasid rule power 
was in many ways limited to the urbanised areas. Control in the central regions lay in 
the hands of local dynasties who continued to support the authority of the caliph."^^  ^
Relations between the ruler and the remote countryside were too distant to require 
expression in terms of religion, however, the caliph’s power was accepted, providing it 
remained distant from local affairs.^^^
By the end of the reign of the al-Mansur in 775 Abbasid rule was firmly established and 
the empire unified, with the exception of Umayyad controlled Spain."^ ^^  However, in the 
10* century the Abbasid Caliphate began to be challenged by competing claims. In 932 
the Buyids occupied the Abbasid Capitol of Baghdad. Although they did not recognise 
the religious authority of the caliph, they made no attempt to remove the caliph from 
Baghdad out of fear the caliph would settle elsewhere and become a potentially 
dangerous element that could aid in supporting chal lengers .The  concept of an 
Islamic world united by religion had by this time been established, however, in 
geopolitical terms, the community remained distinctly fractured. It is observed by
Ibid, 104.
Hourani, History, 38-39.
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Hourani “that to keep so many countries with different traditions and interests under a 
single empire for so long had been a remarkable achievement. It scarcely could have 
been done without the force of religious conviction.”"^ ^^  However, it was this very 
emergence of rival forces claiming the title of caliph that required the need to define 
what this meant in political terms."^ ^^
The Fatimids originated in Tunisia in 910 lasting until 1171, overtime spreading 
through Egypt, Syria and western Arabia, establishing their capitol in Cairo. 
Ubaydullah, based on his claim of lineage from Fatima and Ali ibn Abi Talib,^^^ 
proclaimed himself to be caliph."^^  ^The Fatimids were eventually defeated in 1169. 
Their territory was left under the control of the Muslim Crusader leader Salah al-Din, 
who terminated the Fatimid entity in 1171 returning it to Sunni control.^^^ The Fatimids 
were replaced by the Ayyubid dynasty that maintained control over Egypt until 1252, 
Syria until 1260 and Arabia until 1229."^ *^ The Cordoba Caliphate was formed by a 
resurgence of the Umayyads in Andalusia, but it was not until the 10* century in 929 
that it was declared a caliphate. Eventually this Umayyad holdout began to fi*acture into 
competing powers and was consumed by the Christian states advancing southward.
The Abbasid Capitol of Baghdad eventually succumbed to Mongol aggression in 1258.
It was under Abbasid control that the relationship between the Ulema and the caliph 
was synthesised, and the justifications for a caliphate were clearly articulated. As well.
Hourani, History, 83.
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from the time of the Abbasids sharia was largely accepted by the Islamic community 
and upheld by its rulers."^^  ^The rulers exercised a political power without which the core 
structures of society and empire could not be maintained, nor could the traditional 
institutions of law and learning survive/^^ However, power needed to be linked to a 
religious authority to provide legitimacy, and this increasingly became the role the 
Ulema played.
Though Shi ’ite scholars came to differing conclusions regarding the role and legitimacy 
of a caliph, the Sunni Ulema had consolidated around a belief that the caliph was the 
head of the community, however, not infallible or an interpreter of religious faith. It was 
the learned Ulema who were the guardians of the faith which bound the umm a^^ Until 
the end of the Abbasid period a balance between differing authorities was successfully 
maintained, provided the caliph met with religious conditions set by the Ulema^^^ A 
structural relationship was now in place, with the Ulema maintaining religious authority 
and the caliphs acting as leaders of the community blessed with religious acceptance."^^^
5.3 The Ottoman Dynasty
In the 13* century the Turko-Persian Seljuk state began to disintegrate with a number of 
independent principalities forming in Anatolia. One of these was the Ottoman state that
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within a century would become an Islamic empire."^^  ^The Ottomans were strong 
proponents of Islam and viewed it as the source of their sovereignty/^^ The jihad  
against the Byzantines provided the Sultans with the necessary religious credentials to 
justify their rule in Islamic terms. However, the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258 
put an end to the system of the caliphate as it was understood at the time, resulting in a 
distancing between religious and political authorities.
As the Ottoman state grew into an imperial power it began to be challenged by the 
Shi ’ite Safavids who claimed to be the decedents of Ali. The Safavid dynasty was 
founded in 1501 by Shah Ismail Safavi lasting until 1736, and at the height of its power 
was comprised of the lands of modem Iran, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Georgia, Armenia, 
Turkmenistan, portions of Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan."^^  ^The religious legitimacy of the 
Safavid Empire was based on Shi’ism and posed a challenge to the political and 
religious authority of the Sunni Sultans."^^  ^On the basis of their Shi 'ite foundations, the 
Safavids were able to co-opt those who did not subscribe to the legitimacy of Sunni 
governing classes."^^  ^ Shah Ismain Safavi is believed by some historians to have falsified 
his family history, which was of Sunni origin, for political purposes. This allowed him 
to claim direct lineage to the Prophet and oppose the Ottoman claims of legitimacy. The 
Cambridge History o f Islam observes, “their fundamental object in claiming Shi'ite 
origins was to differentiate themselves from the Ottomans and enable them to enlist the
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sympathies of heterox e l e m e n t s . B y  appealing to Shi’ism the Safavids were able to 
attack not just the Ottoman claims to be pious Islamic leaders, but to attack the very 
foundations of their legitimacy, without which the Ottoman claim to represent the 
interests of Islam itself could be nullified. Much like the Shi'ite Iranian Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, the Safavids were not working to use religion within the dominant 
Sunni paradigm, but were attempting to assert their legitimacy outside of it.
The Ottoman Sultans occasionally made allusions to the idea of a caliph, however, the 
title did not carry with it the previously held claims to a universal authority that other 
caliphs had sought. Rather, it acknowledged that the power of the Sultan was greater 
than that of a local ruler."^ ^^  The Sultan was portrayed as the defender of Islam and the 
guardian of the holy places."^ "^^  The appeal to universalism was on the decline, however, 
the employment of religion as a tool of legitimacy remained in place. One manner in 
which this was achieved was through the organisation of an annual pilgrimage to Mecca 
which demonstrated Ottoman religious qualifications in the Islamic world. Yet, more 
significantly was the closer union between the institutions that preserved religious faith 
and law with the ruler."^ ^^  The Ottomans created an official state Ulema which played a 
significant role in imperial administration,"^^^ allowing the Sultan to issue degrees and 
orders through the intermediary voice of the religious elite."^ ^^  By making the Ulema a 
part of the bureaucratic function of the government, the Ottomans were able to bridge 
the divide between the realities of governing an empire and religious theory.
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Consequently, however, this integration resulted in the hampering of the spiritual 
development of Islam as an entity independent of government oversight/^^
Where the concept of a caliph had been largely silent during the Ottoman period, 
political realities of the 19* century resulted in a renewed resurgence of claims to divine 
rule. Hourani explains:
The claim of the Sultan to be caliph had not hitherto been put forward with much 
emphasis, except in the sense that any powerful Muslim ruler could be called caliph. 
From the middle of the 19* century, however, it began to be pressed more 
systematically, both a rallying cry to Muslims in the empire and outside to gather 
around the Ottoman throne and a warning to European states which had millions of 
Muslim subjects.'^^”
Claims to an all encompassing leadership over the Muslim community had declined to 
some extent, but its re-emergence in the middle of the 19* century has continued to the 
present day. In 1839 an Ottoman decree reflected the resurgence of Islam as a 
legitimising agent of political order:
All the world knows that since the first days o f the Ottoman state the lofty principles 
the Quran and the rules of sharia were always perfectly preserved. Our mighty 
sultanate reached the highest degree of strength and power and all its subjects of ease 
and prosperity. But in the last one hundred and fifty years, because of a succession of 
difficult and diverse causes the sacred sharia was not obeyed nor were the beneficent 
regulations followed; consequently its former strength and prosperity have changed into 
weakness and poverty. It is evident that countries not governed by sharia cannot 
survive. Full o f confidence in the help of the Most High and certain of the support of 
our Prophet we deem it necessary and important from now on to introduce new 
legislation in order to achieve the effective administration of the Ottoman government 
and provinces."^ '^
This was reflective of the renewed interest in using religion for political purposes. 
Although at times during the Ottoman period religion as a legitimising agent was taken
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for granted by co-opting the Ulema and the drive towards unity more limited, it was re­
invigorated during the 19* century. The convulsive moment of the collapse of Ottoman 
authority put the possibility of unification and the maintenance of God’s sovereignty in 
serious doubt, an event which has cast a shadow over Westem-Islamic relations and the 
affairs of Middle East politics to the present day.
5.4 Conclusion
Political legitimacy has consistently been expressed in religious terms in the Islamic, 
particularly Arab, world. Although this has been expressed subtlety in times of peace 
and more assertively in times of crisis, it has nonetheless been the most crucial element 
of political justification throughout the history of the Middle East. There has, however, 
been very little consensus on who possesses such legitimacy. There have been, 
historically, several claimants at any given time either coexisting, competing or in 
conflict."^^  ^Not since the early days of Islam have Muslims been unified politically, and 
not since Muhammad himself has there been any consensus on who should have the 
right to rule. However, this cyclical process of competition based around legitimacy and 
unity has persisted into the present. Thus, it is evident that the underlying tension 
between religious and political authority continues to remain a problem even in the 
contemporary era. Unity and absolute consensus on legitimacy have never since the 
origins of Islam been achieved, therefore, those who seek power through a unification 
discourse and appeals to religious legitimacy in the contemporary look to the early days
Charles J. Adams, Islamic Religious Tradition in the Study o f the Middle East, ed. Leonard Binder 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 31.
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of Islam and co-opt history as a tool for achieving these goals. As Tom Com notes in 
relation to the caliphate, “though calls for its restoration have practically never ceased 
since 1924, the two main obstacles have been, on the one hand the theological 
incompatibility of the conceptions of a renovated caliphate and on the other hand the 
political rivalries among mlers and states for the spiritual leadership of the Muslim 
world.”"^ ^^ In essence, this has always been the case. The implementation of nation­
states in the Middle East, however, in the post colonial era, has entrenched these 
rivalries in new ways that further limits or indeed ensures the impossibility of the 
unification of the Islamic or Arab world.
Tom Com, “The Clash of the Caliphates: Understanding the Real War of Ideas,” Small Wars Journal 
(March 24, 2011): 3.
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Chapter 6
The Struggle for Order in the 20* Century: Pan-Arabism and Political Islam
This thesis argues that the rise of Salafi Jihadism in the 20* century, and its most 
powerful manifestation al-Qaeda and its constituents, is related to the search for 
legitimacy and unity in the Arab/ Islamic world. Drawing upon a distinguished 
scholastic lineage from the medieval period to the 19* and 20* centuries, Salafi 
Jihadism is a doctrine that provides a discourse for an Islamic political order. The search 
for a new status quo in the Middle East began in the immediate aftermath of the 
Ottoman collapse. The imposition of nation-states in the region by Western colonial 
powers was, and still is, extremely problematic. In contrast to Europe, states in the 
Middle East did not develop through a long protracted process. This helps to account for 
the legitimacy crisis faced by the Middle Eastern state that requires regimes to employ a 
number of tactics, a mix of iron fisted rule and appeals to Islam as an agent of 
legitimacy, even in states that in effect function in a secular fashion.
The previous chapter discussed the Islamic imperial age from the time of Muhammad to 
the end of Islamic empires in the early 20* century. It observed the struggles and 
competition during this period to unify the Islamic peoples and for leaders to justify 
their rule in religious terms. This chapter looks at the crisis that followed the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the division of the region into nation-states. 
It observes the failed attempts of political Islam and Pan-Arabism to unify the region 
and successfully legitimise their projects. In the absence of an effective discourse on 
unity and legitimacy, the Salafi Jihadists seek to address these issues.
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Challenges to the ruling elites in the Middle East in the form of Islamist movements are 
not a new phenomenon. However, the failure of 20* century attempts, most specifically 
Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, along with the continuing tendency of states to resign 
to the new realities of a region split into nation-states acting in their own as opposed to 
Arab or Muslim interests, have been major contributing factors to the rise of Salafi 
Jihadism and al-Qaeda. The Middle East has been plagued by two contradictory forces 
in the 20* and early 21^ centuries, state interests and messianic missions. Contemporary 
unification movements have by all accounts failed, and this failure can be attributed to 
the fact that such movements have historically been led by a particular actor that sought 
to form Middle Eastern order in the image of and under the leadership of a particular 
power. The result of this has been twofold. One, states have largely accepted the status 
quo and abandoned unification projects in favour of pursuing state interests.^^"  ^Two, 
this acceptance of the status quo has been a significant factor in the transcendence of 
Islamism, which questions the order and leadership of the Muslim world, into Salafi 
Jihadism which acts globally through violent means to achieve the goal of acting as a 
successful legitimate agent of unification.
6.1 Legitimacy to Rule
For over 1300 years from the time of Muhammad in the 7* century Muslim rulers in the 
Middle East based their right to rule on God’s Sovereignty. A ruler, however, required 
both the practical ability to tend to the matters of state and the ability to appeal to
The United Arab Republic, the brief union between Syria and Egypt from 1958-1961, is the only 
successful merger of states in the Arab world during the post-Ottoman period.
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Islamic symbols, rhetoric, law and sense of community. Karl Marx observed that 
religion can be employed as a powerful tool for maintaining social control."^^^
Emmanuel Kant further insisted that religion was a form of social control that could not 
be obtained by a leader from the use of violence or other strategies. Religion can drive 
individuals to act in such a way as to benefit what is in the interest of those who govern. 
Further to this, religion is a source of legitimacy."^^  ^A spiritual bond was observed to 
exist between the ruler and the ruled during the time of the imperial caliphs. This social 
contract between the Sultan and his subjects was part of the source of accepting his 
legitimacy."^^  ^As Karateke appropriately observes, the caliphs were viewed by their 
subjects “as guided by divine will and receiving God’s direct assistance. Such an image 
of a ruler was not uncommon in pre-modem societies. It did not disappear entirely with 
the advent of the modem world.”"^ ^^ Karateke makes a rather important point. Even the 
‘secular’ mlers of the Arab world past and present have appealed to Islam for 
legitimacy. Hatina Meir argues, in regard to a modem Middle Eastem state, “while the 
effective entrenchment of the Egyptian state guaranteed stability it did not free the 
political elite from the constant need to exercise caution in its treatment of the Islamic 
element of society deeply tied to tradition.”"^ ^^
State formation in the region intensified the debate between traditionalists and the 
modemists regarding the role of religion in society. Leaders, such as Egyptian President 
Gamal abd al-Nasser, attempted to prioritise Arab identity over Islamic identity.
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However, with the failure of Pan-Arab ambitions and the consolidation of nation-states 
in the post Ottoman era, these debates which were once confined within localised arenas 
have been thrust out into the world at large. The inability of regional political elites to 
successfully position themselves as competent in satisfying the needs of the populace, 
not only in material and social terms but also in a spiritual capacity, weakens their 
legitimacy. It is a failing that al-Qaeda is attempting to exploit.
6.2 Replacing the Ottoman Order: Pan-Arabism and the Search for Legitimacy
The end of Islamic imperial institutions of governance in the Middle East in the early 
20* century eventually gave rise to self interested territorially bound n a tio n -s ta te s .I t 
was only following the disintegration of the Ottoman imperial order that it was possible 
for a new regional order to be established in the form of a nation-state system."^^  ^The 
end of the Sultan’s reign did not directly result in this but it did provide the opportunity 
for this particular kind of order to be established.'^^^ The resignation of Arab leaders to 
the reality of the nation-state system, which in essence respected the integral 
sovereignty of its neighbours, did not take place until after the various attempts at 
regional integration had burned themselves out. Even though the Ottoman collapse 
prompted greater intervention by European powers in the region that could have 
conceivably resulted in greater cooperation between states, leaders nonetheless 
gravitated towards a stance of rivalry and suspicion of each other that continues into the
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present."^^  ^As James Mayall explains, “during this period of Pan-Arab aspirations power 
politics still remained prevalent and reinforced the rational realist view of statecraft. 
Indeed, state nationalism began to erode any real feeling of solidarity among the various 
states.”"^ "^^ Equally, the Arab peoples themselves began to identify more significantly 
with the state than the notion of a collective Arab identity.
With the exception of the United Arab Republic, which was comprised of the brief 
union between Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, official attempts at Pan-Arab unity 
have failed. After the height of the Pan-Arab era, led by Egypt’s Gamal abd al-Nasser, 
states in the Middle East by the late 1960s had largely accepted the realities of the 
sovereignty of nation-states. In this, they began to privilege state interests to Arab or 
Muslim interests. Some Pan-Arab aspirants, however, remained committed. Saddam 
Hussein’s war to annex Kuwait and Mohomar Quadaffi’s weak effort to act as the 
vanguard of the Arab unification cause in the 1980s represented the last Arab national 
efforts to unify the region. The acceptance of the sovereignty of the nation-state by 
regional leaders, however, occurred at different times and was not a uniform process. 
Where Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia resigned to tend to their own affairs relatively 
early on, Jordan, Iraq and Libya came to these realisations later.'^^  ^Iran, though having 
little appeal throughout the broader Arab world, still uses the concept of Pan-Islamism 
as a foreign policy tool and a legitimising agent for internal purposes. Its bid to be a 
regional leader, however, was short lived, hampered by the sectarian divide between
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Shi ’ite and Sunni and the ethnic divide between Arabs and the majority Persian 
population of Iran.
The Middle East is not dramatically different from other nation-state sub systems in this 
case. Although the boundaries were established by imperial powers in an artificial 
fashion, states still grew into self interested units. The fact that power politics remained 
intact during the age of Arab nationalism gives clues to its failure. Lawson proposes that 
“how the coming of nationalism interacts with the emergence and consolidation of 
anarchic states remains an un-theorised and a rarely explored area of inquiry in the 
literature on International Relations.”"^ ^^  Further to this, how does this failure to secure 
Arab unity and the emergence of the nation-state affect the emergence of Salafi 
Jihadism in the late 20* century? The fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire and the 
new realities of power politics played by nation-states led to a decline in the classical 
conception of the Islamic world view defined by the dichotomy of Dar al-Harb and Dar 
al-Islam. This was detailed in Chapter 4. Many countries in the region replaced the 
concept of an umma tied to a strong religious identity with a secular idea of the people 
rooted in national citizenship. This was the basis of Pan-Arabism, as exemplified by the 
most prominent Pan-Arab movements Nasserism and Ba ’athhm.^^^ The ousting of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait in 1991, by a coalition of Arab and non-Arab states, was the death 
knell of the Pan-Arab cause and would effectively incapacitate the last Arab state
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capable of striving for regional unity. The raison de la nation had finally been defeated 
by the raison d ’état.^^^
The Arab world is characterised by a high degree of linguistic, religious, cultural and 
ethnic homogeneity."^^^ This sense of kinship along with the notion of a larger 
community, which is arguably stronger in the Middle East than elsewhere in the world, 
was still not significant enough for leaders to put aside state interests for the common 
regional good. The nation-states of the region, however artificial, still demonstrated 
behaviour easily recognisable through a classical realist lens defined by self help and 
self interest. In part, the failure of the Pan-Arab cause was self interest. Egyptian, Syrian 
and Iraqi experiments with Ba ’athism and Nasserism demonstrated that each state 
sought to engage with the Pan-Arab project, but under the hegemony of a specific state. 
As such, Egypt imagined and united Arab world led by Egypt, and Iraq, Syria and other 
states imagined an Arab unity characterised by their own hegemony. Despite the 
occasional genuine effort to further the collective interests of the Arab peoples as a 
whole, the general line of thinking in each of the Arab capitals increasingly shifted to 
the objective of increasing the power wealth and prestige of each state, as opposed to 
expending large sums of blood and treasure on regional unification projects.^^® The 
absence of a discourse on unity and legitimacy created a vacuum that the Salafi 
Jihadists are attempting to fill.
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6.3 Egypt: Gamal abd al-Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat
Egypt under Gamal abd al-Nasser represented the strongest claim by an Arab 
government to achieve regional leadership in the aftermath of World War Two. Pan- 
Arabism was more than a utopian idea, it was also a policy. As Michael Doran 
observes, “state interests made Pan-Arabism attractive to leaders in Cairo. The view of 
history that emphasises social and cultural roots cannot make sense of the puzzling 
pattern of Egyptian foreign policy.”^^  ^ Self interest cloaked in the dogma of Pan- 
Arabism, however, came to Egypt before al-Nasser’s reign, as demonstrated by 
Egyptian behaviour following the 1948 war with Israel. Egypt fought against Israel in 
1948 in order to maintain its hegemonic position in the Middle East.^®  ^At the 
conclusion of hostilities in negotiating the terms of peace, Egypt abandoned its Pan- 
Arab principles by requiring its allied belligerents to refrain from negotiations with 
Israel until Egypt had concluded its armistice. This was a tactic designed to secure the 
best conditions for the Egyptian state.
Al-Nasser claimed that he did not see himself as the leader of the greater Arab world. 
Rather, he claimed “the Arab peoples feel that what we do in Egypt reflects their 
collective hopes and aspirations.” ®^"^ Pan-Arabism, as practised by al-Nasser, however, 
could be easily understood in realist terms, as Pan-Arabism was a tool to promote al- 
Nasser’s objectives for E g y p t.A ra b  unification for al-Nasser, much like the
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perspective held by other self professed Pan-Arab leaders, is a union to be dominated by 
a given nation-state with that state’s interests privileged above the Arab cause.
The Egyptian attempt to use the Arab League to promote its leadership over the Pan- 
Arab cause was designed to weaken the hegemonic ambitions of Jordan and Iraq, 
leading to the formation of two regional blocks. Doran describes these as the Turko- 
Hashemite Entente (Iraq, Jordan, Turkey) and the Triangle Alliance (Egypt, Syria,
Saudi Arabia).^®  ^Using this alliance Cairo could challenge British military power and 
counter Iraqi and Jordanian designs on Syria.^®  ^Without the British as the provider of 
security the balance of power in the region would strongly work in the favour of Egypt 
and its allies, and against Jordan and Iraq. Egypt would then have a free hand to 
transform the state system in the Middle East in a way that suited its interests and under 
its leadership.^®  ^When Iraq attempted to annex Kuwait after its independence in 1961, 
citing historical Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory from the Ottoman period under the 
guise of Pan-Arabism to gain regional support, all attempts were stifled by Egypt. Al- 
Nasser could not allow Egypt’s strongest regional rival to steal its legitimacy by taking 
from Egypt the torch of the Pan-Arab cause.^ ®® If Arab nationalism was as al-Nasser 
argued, the ideological identification of all Arab peoples, then, Egypt had a right to 
intrude into the affairs of states not acting in accordance with Pan-Arab principles.^’"
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Lawson affirms that in the eyes of al-Nasser the relationship between nation-state 
sovereignty and Pan-Arabism rested on the idea that any real step towards Arab unity 
needed to be grounded in self determination/^^ Al-Nasser oversaw the height of the 
Pan-Arab campaign. He won the respect and admiration of fellow Pan-Arabists and 
engineered a vision to capture the imagination of the Arab world. However, this he did 
to capitalise on the concept he championed for the benefit of Egyptian interests.^ The 
1967 Arab war with Israel proved disastrous for the Arab allies, and represented the 
beginning of the end of Egypt’s Pan-Arab hegemonic ambitions. The October War of 
1973 further demonstrated the limits of Arab cooperation and the futility of Pan- 
Arabism, in the light of the preference of states to act consistently to advance their own 
interests. Anwar al-Sadat, who took power after the death of al-Nasser, moved in short 
order towards an Egypt first position after being shunned by Egypt’s Arab neighbours 
for signing the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978.^^  ^The agreement made Egypt the 
most powerful, and the first, Arab state to make peace with the Israeli state. Al-Sadat 
was not motivated by a long and lasting peace, but by a desire to change Egypt’s role in 
the Middle East by breaking jfrom Pan-Arab ideals and seeking to promote the interests 
of the Egyptian state.^ *"^
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6.4 Syria and Iraq: Ba^athhm
The ideology of the Ba ’ath party that became prominent in Syria and Iraq is primarily 
an Arab nationalist concept. B apathism prescribes three goals: 1) The unification of the 
existing Arab states into a greater political entity, 2) freedom from foreign influences 
and hegemonic forces, 3) socialism.^*^ Like Nasserism it is rooted in the concept of the 
oneness of the Arab peoples. It perceives a glorious past and a duty for the Arab peoples 
to fulfil a significant role in the future.^ Hence, the foreign policies of both Syria and 
Iraq have historically been deeply rooted in this concept, though be it from different 
national perspectives.
Syrian foreign policy has been shaped by the division of Greater Syria into four 
fragmented units, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine.^ The restoration of Arab unity 
and overcoming the imposed fragmentation of the region by imperial powers has been 
the official basis of Ba ’athist ideology.^ Syria has traditionally thought of itself as the 
“beating heart of Arabism,” giving it a vision of Pan-Arabism to be understood as Arab 
unification under Syrian hegemony.^ Though Syria briefly ceded its sovereignty 
during the union with Egypt, its foreign policy actions remained rooted in state interests. 
This insistence on prioritising its own ends, and the claim to special rights in the Bilad 
al-Sham (Greater Syria), inevitably put Syrian interests in conflict with that of other
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Arab powers, serving to weaken Arab solidarity/^® As Raymond Hinnebush argues, 
“what after all can be the substance of an Arabist policy which supports Iran against the 
other Arab states and attacks Palestinian resistance, the very expression of the Arab 
cause?”^^^
Al-Husri argues that it was because of the colonial aspirations of Britain and France that 
the Arab world was divided into nation-states. He further maintains that these powers 
continued to manipulate Arab affairs after independence, and that this was the lone 
obstacle to Arab unification.H ow ever, the legacy of Pan-Arabism characterised by 
competing state interests would appear to refute these claims. In the case of Syria’s bid 
to be an Arab bloc leader, its ambitions were hampered from the very beginning of 
independence from France by political conditions near its own borders in Lebanon. The 
Syrians and the Lebanese that supported the Pan-Arab objectives found themselves in 
immediate opposition to the Lebanese n a tio n a lis ts .A t the heart of the Lebanese 
nationalist movement is the Maronite Christian community. Even among the supporters 
of Arab nationalism divergent and conflicting interests plagued bi-lateral relations 
between the two Levant states.^ "^^  Unable to find a solution to the issue of unification, 
Lebanon and to a greater extent Syria, employed various tactics such as economic 
pressure, blockades and border closures to force an agreement.^^^ Lebanese Christian
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fears of being consumed by a Muslim/Arab dominated Greater Syria or an Arab Union, 
continues to have significant influence over Syro-Lebanese relations in the present/^®
Syria, likely as a result of its weaker position in the Arab world compared to Egypt and 
Iraq, had limited expectations of its ability to act as a successful regional hegemon. 
Syrian limitations were made evident after the 1967 defeat in the conflict with Israel. 
Years of disappointment with the various experiments for unity and the increased 
understanding of the costs of such experiments made Pan-Arabism ever less attractive 
to Syria. The 1967 defeat hurried Hafiz al-Assad’s accession to power, a leader who 
looked to exchange Syria’s messianic revisionism with more tangible goals of the 
defence of the Syrian state, the reacquisition of Greater Syria and improving its status in 
the Arab world.^^^
The legacy of Saddam Hussein may well be that he presided over the last secular 
attempt at Arab unification. He was viewed by many Arab leaders and Western powers 
to be an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and regional security with the 1990 invasion 
of the Gulf Emirate of Kuwait. Hussein was positioning Iraq to further enforce its 
hegemonic position in the eastem Arab w o r l d . I r a q  perceived not only the unification 
of the Arab world as a priority, but in addition the promotion of the interests of the Arab 
populations living in non-Arab states.^^® It is in this way that Iraqi foreign policy 
differed from that of Syria. Where Syria’s prime concern was the consolidation of 
Greater Syria, Saddam Hussein’s ambitions were much greater. In a 1975 speech
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Hussein announced, “in brief we want Iraq to play a leading role in the area and 
especially in the Arab homeland. We want Iraq to play a leading role in the 
consolidation of an anti-imperialist policy at the international level.”^^®
As Hussein began to position Iraq to challenge for dominance and leadership in the 
region it was dealt a heavy blow. The Islamic Revolution in Iran brought another 
contender into power. Khomeini’s regime would spark an eight year war with Iraq 
resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives at great material cost. As Ahman 
Yousef Ahmad notes, “it is perhaps an ironic twist of history that Iraq had to divert its 
resources, political and material, to the war situation just when all other conditions 
seemed favourable for it to play such a leading role.”^^  ^ Iraq, however, was not yet 
finished with its quest for Arab unity. In Egypt, like Syria, the failure of previous unity 
movements served to weaken Hussein’s adventurous campaign of 1990. As well, in the 
Gulf States, the ruthlessness of the Iraqi invasion presented Iraq as an immediate 
security threat to its neighbours. This combination of previous failures and fear of the 
Iraqi regime resulted in a greater identification with individual state units and state 
interests, as opposed to the Pan-Arab cause.^^^ Iraq was unable to successfully mobilise 
support from poor Arab countries against the wealthier states of the Persian Gulf, 
despite appealing to the sentiment that Arab oil wealth should benefit the region in a 
more egalitarian manner. The war proved to be damaging for Hussein’s regime. Egypt 
and Syria’s failure to fall in line with Iraq and US resolve to remove Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait weakened Iraqi military strength and freedom of action. This was the death 
knell of the Pan-Arab cause.
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6.5 Pan-Islamism: Iran
Although the variety of Pan-Islamism that took root in Iran in the 1980s bears limited 
significance to the emergence of Salafi Jihadist ‘terror’ organisations, it is nonetheless 
an important moment in Middle Eastem history and worthy of note. The Iranian bid to 
serve as a Middle Eastem hegemon was unlikely to succeed from the start. In the 
aftermath of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the retum of Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who had been exiled from the country in 1965 by the regime of Shah Reza 
Pahlavi, Iran began a campaign to unify the Middle East under its hegemony. Counting 
on support from the majority Shi 'ite population in Iraq that had long been oppressed by 
Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime, Khomeini called for the Shi’ites in Iraq to rise up 
against their oppressors. This provocative move led in part to one the 20* century’s 
most devastating conflicts, the Iran Iraq War (1980-1988), which severely damaged 
Iraq’s ability to challenge for regional hegemony.
Iran suffered from a distinct handicap in its quest for regional hegemony. It is an almost 
entirely Shi 'ite state with only a small Arab Sunni population. The unification envisaged 
by the Iranian regime was based not upon Arab solidarity but religious solidarity.
Where appeals to Islamic unity are not unique to the Iranian revolution, the legitimacy 
of a Shi 'ite led order in the larger Arab world did not resonate well. With the exception 
of Syria and Yemen Middle Eastem Arab states supported Iraq during the eight year 
conflict with Iran. However, despite these setbacks the Iranian leaders that followed 
have not ceased to influence regional affairs. The existence of Hezbollah and its 
continued struggle with the Israeli state exemplify Iranian resolve and ambition. Iran
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has attempted to frame its role in the region in terms of defiance of the West, especially 
the United States and Great Britain, and a virulent denunciation of Israel. Iran perceives 
Middle Eastem unity in religions rather than ethnic/ national terms. However, the 
realities of the historic conflicts between Persia and the Arabs, and more significantly 
the religious divide between Sunni and Shi 'ite, have resulted in the failure of the Iranian 
vision. This is likely to continue to be the case in the future.
6.6 The Rise and Fall of Political Islam and the Next Contender
Islamist movements in the Middle East have long been in conflict with the mling 
regimes of the region, challenging their legitimacy govem. However, from the 1950s 
through the 1970s Pan-Arabism captured the imagination of many in the Middle East.
Its ultimate failure was demonstrated by the events of the Six Day War, Anwar al- 
Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978 and Iraq’s failed attempt at 
regional hegemony. The laying aside of the Pan-Arab project represented an opening in 
the discourse on unity and legitimacy for Islamists who had been challenging the 
authority of Middle Eastem regimes since the Ottoman collapse. Despite the fervour of 
the Islamist movements of the 1970s and 1980s, they began to lose steam as a legitimate 
revolutionary force. This left them with a choice to either work within the political 
process of the nation-state or evolve into something quite d i f fe ren t .T he  premier 
reason, as Roy argues, for the weakening of Islamist movements, was that they have 
been in part secularised by the political process, political logic has tmmped religious
Roy, Globalised Islam, 1.
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logic/^"^ Most Muslim Brotherhood groups began to work within the legal framework of 
the state, except where they were prevented from doing so/^^ The state, as Kepel 
claims, “effectively defeated all the various attempts of Islamist militants to confront the 
regime directly.”^^®
Political Islamic movements began to demonstrate their futility with the assassination of 
al-Sadat. Not only did the state which al-Nasser founded survive, but so did al-Sadat’s 
regime, with many of the chief lieutenants remaining in place.^^^ The neo- 
fundamentalist movements, of which the Salafi Jihadists can be counted among, spread 
in part because the Islamist movements of the 1980s ceased to be a force for 
revolutionary c h a n g e .W h a t  had been lost with the failure of Pan-Islamism was an 
Islamic discourse on religious legitimacy and unity,^^® much as the failure of Pan- 
Arabism brought an end to the Arab unification discourse. In the early 1990s there was 
a dramatic shift in the nature of Islamic political violence. What had formerly been 
associated with Islamist movements was now the tool of neo-fundamentalist groups 
such as al-Qaeda.
The demise of the Pan-Arab project beginning in the 1970s, followed by the failure of 
Iraq to take advantage of its superior position as a regional leader, resulted in a lack of a 
viable unifying actor and an absence of a discourse on unity. Arab leaders no longer 
sought a single Arab state and grudgingly began to accept the existence of Israel. The
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great Islamist challenge from Shi 'ite Iran has been largely unsuccessful. Iran represents 
a challenge to regional stability, but has not the capacity to serve as a force challenging 
for regional hegemony. It appeared for a moment in the last decade of the 20* century 
that, much as Francis Fukuyama had predicted in The End o f History, r i v a l  ideologies 
had run their course. Liberalism had defeated nationalism. Fascism and Communism, 
leaving no other contenders to challenge its dominance.
As previously observed, the end of the Ottoman Empire did not directly bring about the 
rise of nationalist movements, however, the end of the Sultan’s rule did provide an 
opportunity for such movements to come about. In much the same manner the end of 
Pan-Arabism did not necessitate the rise of Sunni Pan-Islamism, it did, however, 
provide a vacuum in the ideological discourse on Middle Eastem unity and an absence 
of any actor to carry on the cause. Al-Qaeda has attempted to fill that vacuum.
The struggles of the 1990s in Egypt to quell Islamists attempting to wrest power from 
the regime and establish an Islamic state indirectly led to the events of 9/11.^ "^  ^The 
result of Mubarak’s crackdown on radical Islamists forced them from the region, just as 
Bin Laden had been exiled from Saudi Arabia in the prelude to the US invasion of Iraq. 
This moment of Hijra led to the creation of al-Qaeda, and transformed Islamists with 
local agendas of change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia into an international organisation 
with a broader Pan-Islamic agenda. New tactics of targeting the far enemy to weaken 
the near enemy began to be practised, as opposed to directly challenging the regional 
elites. What began as a local challenge to state power has become a challenge to the
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current international order, which as a result of the end of a state sanctuary, now uses 
local forces with local grievances under the banner of the al-Qaeda ideology in an effort 
to achieve a broader aim, the restoration of the lost caliphate/"^^
The invasion of Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban from power dramatically 
changed the nature of al-Qaeda and resulted in the decentralisation of the organisation, 
but it did not mean the end of al-Qaeda or its ability to maintain a strategy. Al-Zawahiri, 
al-Qaeda’s ideological chief, spells out al-Qaeda’s two phased strategy in his work 
Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. T h e  first phase would cause disruption in the 
greater Middle East, forcing the US to abandon support for Israel and the ruling Arab 
regimes, allowing for the creation of an Islamic state in Egypt. In the second phase the 
restored caliphate would be used as a spring board from which to launch the Global 
Jihad against the West.^ "^ "^  If al-Nasser’s defiance of the West during the 1956 Suez 
Crisis was the virtual birthmark of Pan-Arabism, then, the events of September 11, 2001 
have served a similar purpose for Salafi Jihadism.^"^^
Al-Qaeda looks to constituent groups as part of its strategy. Local entities take on the al- 
Qaeda brand name, commonly to deal with local grievances, and though the 
understanding of exactly how to achieve the broader al-Qaeda aims remains 
questionable, there is nonetheless a definable al-Qaeda ideology with a clear objective 
of bringing the Islamic world, and the Middle East in particular, under its hegemony.
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Chapter 8 explores this further. Al-Qaeda has conscripted numerous local movements 
with local grievances and issues into its Global Jihad. '^^  ^Often times seemingly 
unrelated causes are brought under the al-Qaeda umbrella, grievances that pre date the 
Global Jihad by decades or even centuries and have little to do with Pan-Islamic 
objectives.^"^  ^Chechen separatism, for example, existed long before the influence of the 
Salafi Jihadists in the Caucuses. Al-Qaeda routinely draws upon disaffected socio­
economic groups for the recruitment of foot soldiers and draws its leadership from the 
alienated radicalised elite.^ "^  ^This occurs not just in the Islamic world, but as well from 
the disaffected globally. In this, they intend to capitalise on the ultimate failure of the 
nation-states. Pan-Arab movements and Political Islam to effectively deal with the 
grievances of the people.
The reform movements within Islam began largely in the 19* century, as Chapter 7 will 
demonstrate. However, these seem not to have come to the attention of Western policy 
makers until the late 1970s, and were not taken with any degree of urgency until the 
beginning of the 2C‘ century. The West and its Cold War adversaries gave significant 
attention to the Palestinian cause and the various Arab wars with Israel, as well as the 
conflict in Afghanistan in the 1980s. However, they took little note of Islamism or 
international ‘terrorism’ until the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi during the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution. As Kilcullen argues, “the study of terrorism as an academic 
discipline emerged in the 1970s in response to the growing phenomenon of international 
terrorism. Before then terrorism was seen primarily as a component within localised
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insurgencies.”^^® The Iranian Islamic Revolution, partly because of the efforts of Iraq 
during the first Persian Gulf War but also because of its Shi’ite theology, never 
seriously threatened to dominate the region. Additionally, although Iranian foreign 
policy is steeped in anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric, actualised in the form of aid 
to Hezbollah, the fact that it is a Shi ’ite state diminishes its credibility no matter how 
staunchly it opposes Israel and the West.
Sunni Islamism began to demonstrate its significance during the same period. Where 
there had been decades of scholarly debate and attempts to challenge the ruling elite of 
the region, it was not until the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 that the Sunni 
version of Islamism appeared to be real in the Western mind. Pan-Arabism had so 
profoundly dominated Arab scholarship and politics since the independence of the Arab 
states that alternative dialogues had little place in the Arab political sphere. However, as 
Pan-Arab movements began to fade the opportunity opened for an alternative to the 
secular discourse on unity to take place in the form of Salafi Jihadism.
The killing fields of the Salafi Jihadist conflict may be Afghanistan and the tribal region 
of northwest Pakistan, but the ideological origins, masterminds and objectives are 
distinctly Middle Eastem. Bin Laden is of Saudi origin, al-Zawahiri is Egyptian, and 
many of the Mujahedeen who fought the Soviets and now the allies in Afghanistan are 
Arab. As Benjamin Schwartz observes, “personnel, money and ideology have always 
been centred in Arabia, in this the strategic limitations of the Afghan campaign become 
apparent. Only in this context does it become clear that the Afghanistan mission was
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necessary, but hardly sufficient to address the root of the th re a t .A fghan is tan  for al- 
Qaeda and its allies was more about opportunity than it was about a final objective, a 
fi*ont that spread into Iraq after the 2003 US led invasion.
In the absence of a viable actor and sufficiently strong leadership to unite the Arab/ 
Islamic world, it is left to al-Qaeda to take on this project with great enthusiasm. Al- 
Qaeda, then, in essence, is engaged in a messianic mission that firmly rejects the status 
quo world order and provides an alternative Islamic discourse to challenge its 
legitimacy and bring converts to the cause. By rejecting the nation-state, and therefore 
the dis-unification of Muslim peoples, al-Qaeda’s ideologues are challenging the 
legitimacy of the ruling elite and their ability to successfully represent the Islamic 
peoples. There is an attempt to construct an order that differs distinctly fi*om the status 
quo.^^^
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that after the collapse of Ottoman authority and 
the ensuing creation of Middle Eastem states there has been an increased escalation in 
the conflict over regional order. The first phase was an attempt at secular Pan-Arab 
unification and a brief Shi’ite challenge for power from Iran. The failure of Pan- 
Arabism, the weakness of the Shi ’ite Pan-Islamic challenge and the co-option of
Benjamin E, Schwartz, America’s Struggle against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salaji Movement (Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2007), 124.
Hatina Meir, Identity Politics in the Middle East: Liberal Discourse and Islamic Challenge in Egypt 
(London: LB. Tauris, 2007), 5.
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revolutionary political Islamist movements into the mainstream political realm by the 
regimes, has led to the realities of the status quo nation-state system. Al-Qaeda 
represents the current great challenge to create an alternative Middle Eastern order. It 
rejects the division of the Islamic, particularly Arab, world into separate nation-states. It 
challenges the current international order and seeks to change that order. The failure of 
the unity movements has been an opportunity for al-Qaeda.
These continued attempts at constructing some form of Middle Eastern unification, 
since the dissolution of the caliphate, demonstrates that the sovereign nation-state is 
extremely problematic in the region. Even though Pan-Arabism demonstrated the 
problem of unification coming down to local interests, something that was as well 
evident during the rule of the caliphs, there is still continued room and indeed a need for 
a discourse on unity. The realities of politics brought ruin to Pan-Arabism, and the 
regimes have co-opted political Islamists into the status quo political sphere. This has 
led to a vacuum in the discussion for unity that al-Qaeda has exploited.
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Section IV
The United States, the International System and Salafi Jihadism
This section engages with the third key assumption proposed in the introduction: In the 
contemporary period it is the US, and to a lesser extent other great and emerging 
powers, that engage in preserving the status quo international system. In this, the US is 
an obstacle to the unity and legitimacy project engaged upon by the Salafi Jihadists. 
Chapter 7 explores al-Qaeda’s ideology as well as its origins and historical lineage, 
arguing that al-Qaeda’s concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy conflict with the 
contemporary international system characterised by nation-state order. Chapter 8 looks 
at al-Qaeda’s constituents, those organisations that are its allies or act directly in its 
name, and those who are inspired by the al-Qaeda narrative. This demonstrates that the 
jihad  is truly global and that al-Qaeda has co-opted organisations that share its basic 
assertions; the desire to establish an Islamic trans-national state and the obstacles that 
the status quo global order and US hegemony present to this objective. Chapter 9 
demonstrates how the international system is an obstacle to the objectives of Salafi 
Jihadists, and further shows how the US aids in maintaining this system, thus, making it 
a focal point of the Salafi Jihadist struggle. Chapters 7 and 8 confirm that al-Qaeda and 
Salafi Jihadism are the next contenders seeking to unify the Islamic world under their 
vision of religious legitimacy. Chapter 9 speaks to the general hypothesis presented 
here, demonstrating that there is an incompatibility between the international order and 
the Salafi Jihadist vision of order. The US as a powerful actor is a major obstacle to 
these realisations.
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It is at this contemporary point in history that the struggle for legitimacy and unity in 
the Islamic world has come into conflict with an incompatible international system. It is 
in the 21^ century that this long ongoing project is experiencing its greatest challenge 
due to structural issues that define the international system, and the willingness of 
powerful actors to actively maintain the status quo. Despite those who argue that the 
nation-state is in decline, it has become the accepted model of sovereignty in the 
contemporary era. Never before has the proliferation of nation states been so great, nor 
have great powers sought not only to respect this notion of sovereignty, but actively 
promote it and maintain the status quo international system defined by it. It is in the 
contemporary era, in part because of these factors, that jihad  has become global. The 
power of the prevailing hegemonic actor is, despite assertions of its decline, still 
unprecedented. That other great powers are willing to work within the structure it 
provides is equally unprecedented. The status quo and the sovereignty of states are a 
significant obstacle to the Salafi Jihadist project that seeks religious legitimacy and 
unification of the Muslim peoples.
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Chapter 7
The Rise of Salafi Jihadism and the Emergence of the al-Qaeda Ideology
Daniel Bell pronounced triumphantly in 1962 that the time of ideologies having 
influence over the affairs of world politics had passed. In The End o f Ideology he argued 
that the next age of politics would be based on practical objectives as opposed to 
theories or ideologies.^^^ However, ideologies have not ceased to have a place in 
international politics and have significant implications for the future of Salafi Jihadism 
and al-Qaeda. Olivier Roy has argued that al-Qaeda is in fact a “brand name,” an 
ideological umbrella under which Islamist militants gather, as opposed to simply an 
international organisation with clear objectives, membership and leadership.^^"  ^The 
argument proposed here is that al-Qaeda has become in effect an ideology that will 
continue to have a profound influence on international politics.
This chapter will define what the components of this ideology are, chart its intellectual 
evolution by looking at successive scholars over time, and analyse its transition from 
the guiding doctrine of an organisation into an ideology in and of itself. What will be 
demonstrated is that al-Qaeda is more than an organisation, it is in itself an ideology. 
Additionally, this ideology is not simply a carelessly composed piece of propaganda 
created entirely by the contemporary leadership, but a well thought out doctrine which 
draws upon a respected lineage of Islamic thinking. Further, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the ideologues have constructed a doctrine which presents al-Qaeda as
Daniel Bell, The End ofIdeology: On the Exhaustion o f Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: Free 
Press, 1962)
Olivier Roy, “Al-Qaeda Brand Name Ready for Franchise: The Business of Terror,” Le Monde 
Diplomatique, September 1, 2004.
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not only the vanguard of Salafi Jihadism, but as well an institution that can complete the 
legitimacy and unification project.
Al-Qaeda as a myth and an ideology is now being immortalised in the way Nazism and 
Marxism Leninism were in the 20* century. Where Adolf Hitler and Vladimir Lenin 
have long since passed, they remain inspirations to groups who wish to change their 
local, national and or global political order. From rebels and revolutionaries in Latin 
America to white supremacists in the United States and Europe, this appears evident.
Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are legends and inspiration for global dissidents from now 
forward with the ideology they have helped to create, al-Qaeda.
The conflict between Salafi Jihadists and the United States has less to do with orthodox 
rationalisations such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, encroaching unfulfilled 
modernity, economic disenfranchisement, globalisation, US foreign policy or a clash of 
civilisations, as was discussed in Chapter 1. It is, instead, related to a centuries old 
struggle for dominance within the Islamic and particularly Arab world. How, then, does 
the branding and franchising of al-Qaeda fit into this concept? The attempt to galvanise 
Islamic society is not a novel objective. It was long the goal of the imperial caliphs until 
1924 when Kemal Ataturk dissolved the Ottoman Caliphate in favour of the creation of 
a Turkish nation-state, as was observed in Chapter 5. This concept of unity is a central 
tenet of the Islamic faith, made evident in political practise through the drafting of the 
Constitution of Medina in 622. The Islamic world was never united under one absolute 
sovereign. Islamic civilisation was always fragmented into minor states or managed by
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mercenary armies loyal to the patrimonial dynasties/^^ The collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, colonialism and the ensuing decolonisation of much of the Islamic world 
resulted in the implementation of Western style states in the Middle East. In this, the 
illusion of Islamic unity appeared to break down. Although unity in the Islamic world 
may never have existed if looked at through the lens of a Western concept of 
sovereignty, the end of the Ottoman Empire made these divisions evident.
Attempts to reconstruct the lost caliphate began almost immediately in the aftermath of 
the Ottoman collapse and the ensuing post-Ottoman state order. The institution of the 
nation-state in the Middle East has been under sustained attack since the moment of its 
birth.^^^ The failure of secular Pan-Arabism during the 1950s-80s to usher in a renewed 
political order and unite the Middle East encouraged Islamic revivalists to forge a new 
Arab-Islamic identity using religion as a legitimising agent. Islamist movements were 
able to take the already inherent anti-Western anti-American sentiment resulting from 
colonial intrusion, utilised by the secular leadership, and transform this into a religious 
nationalism, as opposed to a secular nationalism that was the dominant discourse for 
most of the 20* century. This was discussed in Chapter 6.
Although al-Qaeda may no longer be an organisation with direct command and control 
of its operatives, in the sense that it was prior to the allied invasion of Afghanistan, it is 
likely an even more powerful force as an ideology. As an ideology al-Qaeda can 
achieve a kind of immortality. It becomes a myth and a legend. Future generations of 
Jihadists can take up positions as ideologues further evolving its concepts, as previous
Bryan S. Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London: Routledge, 1974), 137.
Karsh, Islamic Imperialism, 234.
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Salafist thinkers have, continuing to inspire future foot soldiers for the cause. This can 
be done in the absence of any real command and control because of the technological 
inter-connectivity of the modem world. As al-Qaeda becomes less and less of a tangible 
entity, it becomes increasingly more difficult to combat. Al-Qaeda as an ideology 
provides legitimacy and philosophical foundations for those who wish to pursue the 
Islamic imperial dream of creating the new ‘golden age’ in the form of a contemporary 
caliphate, as well as any number of local objectives directly or indirectly linked to this 
overarching concept. It is, therefore, necessary to conceptualise what the al-Qaeda 
ideology is, the historical process of Islamic thinking that led to its creation, and what 
are its implications for international politics.
7.1 The Tenets of al-Qaeda’s Ideology
Salafism,yz/zW, Hijra and jahiliya are the four defining concepts surrounding the 
al-Qaeda ideology. In essence, they can be conceptualised as the problem, the 
methodology, the preparation and the action, which will bring about the solution. The 
problem is jahiliya, the cormption of Islamic society. It is an allusion to the condition of 
pre-Islamic Arabia and is translated as ignorance. The state of ignorance the Arab 
peoples lived in prior to Muhammad’s revelations from God. Salafism and its 
puritanical concepts of looking back to an uncormpted Islam in the time of the Prophet 
is the methodological approach to alleviate the condition of jahiliya. Jihad h  the action 
that will bring an end to jahiliya and bring about the solution, which is subjugation to 
God through the establishment of a new caliphate, encompassing the territory acquired
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at the height of the Islamic conquests. Hijra is the preparation that must be made for 
jihad. Only by first fleeing from the condition of jahiliya and making preparations for 
jihad  can this be actualised. The following paragraphs will explore these four key 
components of the al-Qaeda ideology and demonstrate how they fit together.
Salafist thinking is a relatively modem concept that emerged most prominently in the 
19* century from the works of Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1838-1897), the Iranian bom 
political thinker and Islamic nationalist who worked for Pan-Islamic unity. The Salafist 
doctrine is centred upon the concept of looking back to a prior historical period in an 
effort to understand how the contemporary world should be ordered in accordance with 
Islamic principles. What follows from al-Afghani is an evolutionary intellectual process 
over the next century and a half to the present day, through a number of thinkers who 
have helped to shape what has become the contemporary Salafi Jihadist doctrine, which 
is the foundation for the al-Qaeda ideology. The term Salafism derives from the Arabic 
word Salaf referring to righteous predecessors, specifically the immediate successors to 
the Prophet. It, like many Islamic revivalist concepts, is concemed with an idealised 
Islamic world that can be a model for the contemporary world by looking to the time of 
the Prophet and seeking out the original Islam.
Al-Afghani, writing in the middle of the 19* century, lived in a time of not only 
Westem intmsion into the Islamic world but also a perceived humiliation by many 
Muslims in the face of Westem advances in science, culture and technology. An 
admirer of Westem rationalism, and believing that Islam was not irreconcilable with
557 Livesey, The Salafist Movement.
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Westem r e a s o n i n g , al-Afghani sought to answer this perplexing question. How could 
Islam, which had so long reigned as a dominant civilisation, producing a wealth of 
literary, scientific, medical and cultural achievements, guided by God, have fallen so far 
behind the West after extensive periods of such exceptional dominance? Al-Afghani 
propagated the idea that the reason for the decline of Islamic civilisation in the face of 
Westem advances and dominance was the result of Muslims having strayed fi*om the 
path of tme Islam. If a spiritual revival could be achieved, then, the Islamic world which 
once had been superior to the West could find the capabilities of competing with and 
surpassing the West as it had done centuries before.^^^
From al-Afghani to al-Zawahiri there has been a progression of this kind of Salafist 
thinking that seeks to look to Islam’s earliest beginnings, a ‘golden age’, to find 
solutions for shaping modem Islamic society. Islam, it is argued by Salafists, was 
perfect at the time of the Prophet, and since that time there has been a consistent 
straying from the original condition. Islam, as a complete social, political and economic 
system, provided all the tools necessary for society to function. It is this departure from 
the tme Islam that has resulted in the decline of Islamic civilisation. By looking back to 
the past it is possible to put Islam on the path to renewal, and retum Islamic society to 
its rightful dominant position.^^^ Al-Afghani sought to reach this end by looking at the 
nature of contemporary Islamic society itself, to find methods of reforming it so as to 
emulate the earliest Islamic period. However, in the 20* century jihad hdiS been 
advocated by the Salafi Jihadists as the appropriate methodological approach for 
reviving Islamic civilisation.
Henzel, “The Origins of the al-Qaeda Ideology,” 72. 
Ibid.
Livesey, The Salafist Movement.
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Jihad is literally translated as the Arabic word for struggle or effort, specifically, a 
struggle in the path of God. The Quran contains 114 suras (chapters) which contain in 
total 6,234 ayas (verses). Of these, 28 ayas make reference to jihad, the term being 
mentioned specifically on 41 instances.^^^ Jihad is a highly contested concept within 
Islam and is of a rich and complex nature, such that its meaning, justification and 
appropriate application has been a source of debate amongst Islamic scholars 
throughout the centuries. The doctrine of jihad  is not based on a single authoritative 
interpretation. Like much of Islamic political thought the concept of jihad  is the product 
of diverse authorities interpreting and applying the concept to specific situations over a 
broad tapestry of time and place.^^^ Hence, it emerges in varying situations as 
something quite different depending upon who is making the ruling or interpretation. It 
is evident from this that jihad  contains a somewhat vague and broad definition. The 
term, then, seems encapsulated in an inescapable tautology, as it is understood as what 
Muslims say it is.
Considering the broad complexity of meaning associated with the term and its popular 
usage in contemporary Islamist discourse, it has become a deeply contested and 
controversial concept, both within and outside of the Islamic world, both among the 
Islamic religious establishment and as well its detractors.^^"  ^Jihad can be understood as 
both a personal and a collective effort in the path of Allah. It is a personal endeavour to 
seek God’s will, resist temptation and strive to be a better Muslim, or a collective effort 
to better ones community, as well as defend it or expand it by means of war. Warfare is
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described as the lesser jihad  and community and personal betterment as the greater 
jihad?^^
The lesser jihad, as engaged upon by Salafi Jihadists, is foremost in the mind of 
contemporary, particularly Westem, society. It must be reiterated that the early days of 
Islam were characterised by a struggle for survival. Islam’s Hobbesian origins have 
significant influence upon how jihad  is conceptualised by Salafi Jihadists.^^^ The lesser 
jihad  can be as much offensive as defensive. The offensive jihad  is justified by the 
spread of the faith, as characterised by the periods of Islamic conquest particularly 
during the Umayyad caliphate, and defensive in the face of non-Muslim aggression as 
characterised by the Cmsades. The Quran states:
To those against whom war is made, permission is given to fight because they are 
wronged, and verily Allah is most powerful for their aid. They are those have been 
expelled from their homes in defiance of right. For no cause except they say our lord is 
Allah. Did Allah not check one set of peoples by means of another, there would have 
surely been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques which the 
name o f Allah is commemorated in abundant measure? Allah will certainly aid those 
who aid his cause, for \on \y  Allah is full of strength, exalted in might able to enforce 
his will.^^^
Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for Allah
does not love transgressors 568
P.L. Heck notes that “the Umayyad logic of state had profound and lasting effects on 
the Islamic conception of jihad. Jz/zW became itself conceived of as a tool in the service 
of territorial expansion, rather than a religious struggle at the level of devotion to God’s
Ibid.
Chapter 4 argued that the Salafi Jihadist concept of international relations is rooted in part in 
traditional Islamic thinking that can be likened to a Hobbesian understanding of the world. 
Quran, 22:39-40.
Ibid, 2:190.
206
cause.”^^  ^Islamic scholars argued that since the Quran was revealed to Muhammad in 
stages throughout his life, and therefore at different stages in the development of the 
umma, that Quranic revelations may have been revealed at different times to address 
particular needs, thus, giving the concept of jihad temporal flexibility. As this is the 
case, some revelations refer to only specific historical events. S u r a  2 verse 106 and 
Sura 16 verse 101 are supportive of this claim: “None of our revelations do we abrogate 
or cause to be forgotten. But we substitute something better or similar. Don’t you know 
ûïài Allah has power over all things.”^^  ^ “When we substitute one revelation for another 
and Allah knows best what he reveals in stages. They say you are but a forger, but most 
of them do not understand.”
Verses 9:29 and 9:5 of the Quran demonstrate the offensive concept of the lesser jihad  
and lend to its justification on the basis of spreading the faith.
Fight those who believe not in God nor the last day, nor hold that forbidden which hath 
been forbidden by God and his apostle, nor hold the religion of truth even if they are the 
people of the book, until they pay tax with willing submission and feel themselves 
subdued. ’^^
When the sacred months have passed slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and 
take them, and confine them and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush.^ '^^
From this, the Ulema could provide medieval kings with the legitimacy they needed to 
acquire territory by force with religious sanction. Chapter 5 discussed how this was 
accomplished fi’om the time of the Abbasids to the Ottomans.
P.L. Heek, “Jihad 'RsvisodP Journal o f Religious Ethics 32, no.l, (2004): 108. 
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The legal declaration of jihad  is dependent upon a religious ruling, a fatwa, issued by 
someone in authority with legal expertise, such as a mufti/^^ In Jihad  can be 
legitimised or have its legitimacy challenged.H ow ever, as Esposito observes, who 
can declare jihad  and what constitutes a legal action and not an unholy act of war, 
would “like beauty be determined by the eye of the beholder.”^^  ^In addition to 
justification for conflict, the Quran makes provisions as to how such conflict should be 
conducted, an Islamic jus in bellum.^^^ Who is to fight and who is exempt; “no blame is 
there on the blind, nor is there blame in the lame, nor on one ill.”^^  ^“There is no blame 
on those who are infirm, or ill, or find no resources to spend. If they are sincere to Allah 
and his messenger no ground can there be against such as do right; and Allah is oft 
forgiving and most merciful.”^^  ^When hostilities should end; “But if they cease Allah is 
oft forgiving and most mercifiil.”^^  ^The treatment of prisoners; “Therefore, when you 
meet the unbelievers in fight smite at their necks, at length when you have thoroughly 
subdued them, bind and bond firmly. Thereafter, is the time for either generosity or 
ransom.” A concern with proportionality; “Whoever transgresses against you 
respond in kind.”^^  ^Provisions for peace making; “If your enemy inclines toward peace 
then you to should seek peace and put your trust in God.”^^"^
The Sunnah refers to sayings and deeds of the Prophet as reported by his 
contemporaries. Problematically, however, Hadiths began to grow exponentially.
A mufti is a trained Islamic scholar charged with making interpretations of sharia (Islamic law). 
Esposito, Unholy War, 34.
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Ibid, 32.
Quran, 48:17.
Ibid, 9:91.
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Ibid, 47:4.
Ibid, 2:294.
Ibid, 8:61.
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seemingly out of control, with sayings and deeds being attributed to the Prophet by 
individuals seeking to resolve personal issues/^^ Twenty years after the Prophet 
Muslims had published an agreed upon version of the Quran but had failed to prevent 
the creation of new unreliable Hadiths?^^ In an attempt at resolution Muslim scholars 
sought guidance in the Quran. Al-Bukhari and al-Hajjaj published the two most reliable 
and agreed upon collections of Hadiths, Sahih al-Bukharf^^ and Sahih Muslim^^^ 
respectively. These were accepted to be genuinely committed to a portrayal of the 
Prophet’s exact words and actions.^^^
Most Muslims accept the notion of jihad  as a dual concept, the greater jihad {al-jihad 
al-akhbar) and the lesser (jihad al-asghar).^^^ The greater jihad  refers to the struggle to 
be a better Muslim, which contains no violent implications. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi 
writes of a Hadiîh which tells the tale of the Prophet returning from a raiding party. In 
this excerpt Muhammad is reported to have said, “you have come forth in the best way 
of coming forth. You have come from the smaller jihad  to the greater jihad."' They said, 
“and what is the greater jihad." He replied, “the striving of God’s servants against their 
idle d e s i r e s . T h i s  was understood as the jihad  against oneself.^^^
Wars of defence were not in line with the goals of Muslim kings who had imperial 
ambitions. This contradiction soon became evident during the 8* century, a period of
Marranci, Jihad Beyond Islam, 19.
Ibid, 29.
Al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, trans. Mohommad Muhsin Khan (Dar us-Salam: Maktaba, 1994) 
Al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, trans. Abdu Hammid Siddiqi (Adam Publishers and Distributors, 2007) 
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significant Islamic expansion.^^^ Muslim rulers sought out Islamic scholars to justify 
actions of unprovoked wars/^"* It is similarly the case that Bin Laden and other militants 
have sought to characterise Salafi Jihadist actions as a response to a perceived injustice, 
rather than acts of outright aggression. Following the events of 9/11 Bin Laden stated, 
“in my view, if an enemy occupies a Muslim territory and uses common people as a 
human shield, then it is permitted to attack that enemy.”^^  ^He continues, “America and 
its allies are massacring us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq. The Muslims 
have the right to attack America in reprisal. The 9/11 attacks were not targeted at 
women and children. The real targets were America’s icons of military and economic 
power.”^^  ^Bin Laden’s rhetoric had a tendency to shift focus over time to suit particular 
geopolitical conditions. Where Bin Laden first scorned the West for its military 
presence in Saudi Arabia in 1998,^^  ^later speeches focus on Iraq and Afghanistan.^^^ 
More recently there has been an attempt to ally al-Qaeda to the Palestinian cause, as the 
broader Islamic world is sympathetic to this particular i s s u e . B i n  Laden stated in 
January, 2010 following the attempted bombing of a US flight to Detroit on Christmas 
day 2009, “America will never dream of living in peace unless we live in it in Palestine. 
It is unfair that you enjoy a safe life while our brothers in Gaza suffer g r e a t l y . T h i s  
is reflective of changes in the political climate and is an attempt to gain legitimacy and
Maraca, Jihad Beyond Islam, 23. 
'^Ibid.
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support.^^^ This rhetoric may be, as David Axelrod suggests, “the same hollow 
justifications for the mass slaughter of innocents that we’ve heard before.” ®^^ However, 
there is something of significance here. Al-Qaeda’s rhetoric must change as world 
events change, as the ability to exploit new markets for ‘terror’ is the key to its 
continued relevance.
The Quran and Sunnah have not been the only influences upon the concept of jihad  
within Islam. It is also a product of various political factors over time. The juridical 
tradition of the fiqh f’^  ^the concept and long tradition of the umma, the eventual collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire and more recent events such as the colonial experience, have all 
helped to shape the meaning of jihad. These issues have played a role in the shifting of 
the focus of jihad towards that of holy war by the Salafi Jihadists.^®"^  Abdullah Azzam, 
one of the leading Afghan Arabs and founder of the Office of Services, the predecessor 
to al-Qaeda, succinctly describes how the Salafi Jihadists conceptualise the concept of 
jihad; "Uihad and the rifle alone, no negotiations, no conferences, no dialogues.”^^  ^
Azzam fled Palestine, as others such as Bin Laden fled the Middle East, not only to 
fight the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, but to have the opportunity to train fighters 
for the future jihad. They fled the Middle East to make Hijra.
Hijra is both a concept within Islam and an historical event that is of revered 
importance to Muslims. Such great importance has been placed upon the Hijra of 622
“Al-Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” Congressional Research Service, accessed February 
27, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf.
Al-Jazeera, “Bin Laden Warns of More US Attacks.”
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C.E. that the Islamic calendar known as the Hijri begins not with the birth of the 
Prophet, or any other significant event of Islamic history, but rather in the year of the 
Hijra. This is the year of Muhammad’s migration with his followers fi*om Mecca to 
Yathrib (Medina).^®  ^In the summer of 622 of the around seventy of Muhammad’s 
followers left Mecca for the city of Yathrib, 275 miles to the north. They were joined 
several months later on September 24 of that year by the Prophet himself and his 
associate Abu Bakr.^^^ This migration was necessary to escape the corrupt condition of 
Arab society,^®  ^which was from the perspective of Muhammad and his followers, 
existing in a state of jahiliya. Only after the Hijra could a ‘true’ Islamic community 
successfully be established.^^®
The Hijra, apart from being a physical exodus, was also a spiritual one. It allowed the 
believers to escape their pre-existing tribal identities and replace them with an Islamic 
identity tied to the concept of the umma.^^^ As Firestone notes, “war and revenge could, 
therefore, be motivated more out of a sense of common identity through the 
brotherhood of believers, the super tribe of Islam.”®^  ^The efforts that had previously 
been afforded to kinship feuds were now given spirituality and externalised onto the 
non-believing other. This had the effect of enhancing the strength of the group 
solidifying its internal sense of kinship.®^^
^  Esposito, Unholy War, 31.
Karsh, Islamic Imperialism, 13.
Trevor Stanley, “The Evolution of al-Qaeda: Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,”
The Review, April, 2005.
^  Esposito, Unholy Wars, 31.
Stanley, “The Evolution of al-Qaeda.”
Coopor, New Political Religions, 118.
Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origins o f Holy War in Islam (Oxford: Oxford, University Press, 2002), 
121.
Cooper, New Political Religions, 118.
212
The Hijra of 622 served several ends and was a watershed moment in early Islamic 
history.®^ "^  It was first a practical existential move for pure survival, necessitated by the 
hostility Muslims had met with in Mecca. However, it also allowed Muhammad to 
transform Islam from a religious faith to a power in the form of a ‘state’ through the 
Constitution of Medina. Yet, of even greater significance, it forged an Islamic identity 
and incubated what Ibn Khaldun would later refer to as assabiya, group feeling in the 
corpus of one indivisible community of believers, the umma. This has substantial 
implications in regard to the contemporary al-Qaeda ideology.
Bin Laden emphasised the Hijra and portrayed his followers as if they were re-enacting 
the Prophet’s flight from Mecca to Medina.®^  ^Just as Muhammad was forced to flee his 
native town of Mecca so that he would be able to fight for the global expansion of 
Islam, so too were Bin Laden and his followers forced to flee the Arab world.®*® 
Describing al-Qaeda’s activities in this manner is an intentional allusion to the time of 
the Prophet.®*  ^It paints the battle against the infidel as something from Islamic 
antiquity. Pronouncing their own societies as jahili and fleeing to foreign lands where 
they can work to establish a base to train and someday retum and liberate their home 
land, is more than just a tactical necessity. It is an appeal to Islam’s glorious past to 
invoke support and gain legitimacy. Hijra, although a practical component of the al- 
Qaeda operational model, contains an important historical and spiritual context that 
makes the concept a defining element of the al-Qaeda ideology. Bin Laden observes, 
“we left our country on jihad  in the path of Allah, and it is for the sake of Allah, praise
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and glory be upon Him, that we made this blessed Hijra to facilitate the 
institutionalisation of sharia.
Following the Hijra, when the community becomes sufficiently strong, comes jihad. 
This would be a jihad  to liberate the Muslim world, and eventually the world at large, 
from the condition of jahiliya, restoring God’s sovereignty. The term jahiliya was first 
used by the Prophet to refer to pre-Islamic Arabia.®*® It is conceptualised as a condition 
of ignorance that the Arab peoples lived in prior to God’s revelation to Muhammad. 
Though jahiliya in pre-medieval times was regarded as only a period in history and a 
vision of the nature of that period of history, it has since been resurrected to be 
understood, in the eyes of contemporary Salafi Jihadists, as the condition of modem 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This must be changed by bringing the world into line 
with God’s will through the waging of jihad. It is a significant piece of the al-Qaeda 
ideology as it defines, though in a rather broad sense, what it is they seek to change.
For Salafists the retum to jahiliya began shortly after the period of the time of the 
Prophet and the following Rightly Guided Caliphs (622-661). Sayid Qutb revived this 
concept working from the thinking of Ibn Taymiyya. For Taymiyya it was the Mongol 
invaders®^ ® who were jahili,®^* for Qutb it was the West and the apostate regimes of the 
Arab world. ®^  ^Qutb re-interpreted the concept of jahiliya to refer to the imperialist non-
Jamal Abdel Latif Ismail, Bin Laden wa I Jajeera wa Ana (Qatar: Dar al-Hurriya, 2000), 119.
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Muslim West and the tyrannical Middle Eastern secular regimes. In this, he was able to 
conceptually re-work the traditional ideas of a world divided into two conflicting 
spheres, the Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam.
Salafist thinkers rely heavily on the past for meaning and guidance.Al-Qaeda uses 
this imagery to give its message credence in the broader Islamic world by drawing on 
the historical jahiliya. In addition, it provides for the concept of the corrupt, godless, 
threatening other, which is to be challenged. Like other 20* century ideologies it 
provides the ‘us and them’ dynamic, painted in terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in a righteous 
existential struggle. The next part of this chapter will look at the lineage of significant 
Salafist thinkers and how their works, in regard to these four defining concepts, has 
contributed to what has become the al-Qaeda ideology.
7.2 The Evolution of Reformative Islamic Thought: al-Afghani to al-Zawahiri
What emerges in the late 20* century as al-Qaeda’s principle ideological doctrine is not 
the product of a single historical event or the creation of a single individual. It is, rather, 
an evolutionary philosophical ascent dating back to the middle of the 19* century. It has 
been forged over the last century and a half by a number of prominent scholars and self- 
appointed religious experts to not only be the founding doctrine for an international 
organisation with a broad range of political aims, but an ideology in and of itself. 
Further, it has become the umbrella under which numerous organisations and
Ibid, 43.
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individuals sharing the beliefs of al-Qaeda gather. The next chapter will further explore 
al-Qaeda’s constituents.
As previously outlined, Salafism, y zAW, the state of jahiliya and the Hijra, are the four 
key defining components of the al-Qaeda ideology. Each of these concepts, as well as 
serving the practical function of defining the objectives and modus operandi of al- 
Qaeda, serve another critical end. These themes often resonate well with the concept of 
history that some Muslims share, and are an attempt to demonstrate the legitimacy of al- 
Qaeda’s philosophy by making clear allusions to the early Islamic period and tapping 
into the collective Muslim consciousness. Each of these four themes has gone through a 
philosophical evolution as interpreted and reinterpreted by thinkers from al-Afghani in 
the 19* century up to the contemporary al-Qaeda ideologues such as al-Zawahiri, often 
drawing upon the medieval works of such thinkers as Ibn Taymiyya.
Taymiyya was a scholar of Hanbali law working in the 14* and 13* centuries, a time of 
intense external pressure on the Islamic world. It was during a time in which the 
Mongol Dynasty challenged the Abbasid Caliphate. He is one of the most influential 
theorists for contemporary Salafi Jihadists.®^ "* Ibn Taymiyya, as a traditional thinker, 
observed a strict methodological approach with the Quran and Sunnah as the only true 
sources of knowledge. His approach to Islamic scholarship and statecraft sought to draw 
guidance from the past and look at Islam in its most basic and elemental form.®^ ® Ibn 
Taymiyya introduced the concept of the new jahiliya,®^® positioned the importance of
Trevor Stanley, “Taqi al-Deen Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya,” accessed Dec 15, 2009, 
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jihad  as equal to the five pillars of I s l a m , a n d  argued for the restoration of the 
caliphate in a new historical set t ing.Taymiyya refused to accept the subordination of 
religion to politics, for him they were intrinsically linked.®^ ® He placed the concept of 
jihad  at the centre of Islamic practise,®®® as a duty to overthrow the forces of the new 
jahiliya which he understood as the retum to the state of pre-Islamic ignorance.®®* Ibn 
Taymiyya’s thought regarding jahiliya, apostasy Jihad  and legitimate mle have re- 
emerged in the 20* and 21 centuries. His work was profoundly influential on 
contemporary Islamic political thinkers such as Salam Faraj, Sayid Qutb, Maulana 
Maududi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He is a stoic icon and foundational contributor to 
what has become the al-Qaeda ideology.®®^
The road to al-Qaeda’s ideology begins with Jamal al-din al-Afghani. His philosophy 
re-opens the door for ijtihad, considered closed by the Ulema, and introduces the 
concept of Salafism. He argues that ijtihad is necessary to deal with the contemporary 
crisis of the decline in prosperity and power of imperial Islam.®®® To his mind it was the 
spiritual and moral decline of the umma that was to blame for this continued fall fi*om 
prominence.®®"* While travelling the Islamic realm calling for reform to defend against 
and drive away the West, he was simultaneously an admirer of Westem rationalism, 
technology and scientific advances.®®® Islam and Westem rationalism were not
Benjamin, The Age o f Sacred Terror, 49.
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incompatible he argued. It was possible to selectively incorporate Westem concepts,®®® 
while seeking to reform the umma by looking through the Salafist lens back to the time 
of the Prophet for guidance and employing ijtihad to adapt these teachings to modem 
times. Al-Afghani’s effort was to bridge the gap between the outright secular modemist 
and the traditionalist, to save the Islamic world from its relegated position as a 
civilisation which was no longer influential in the way it had previously been.®®^  Al- 
Afghani’s call for ijtihad was a dynamic departure from the teachings of the traditional 
religious elite, and represented a direct challenge to their ecumenical authority.®®^
If al-Afghani is the catalyst for the modem Islamic revival in the 19* century, then his 
followers Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida were the synthesisers in the 
early 20* century.®®® Abduh, like al-Afghani, was a modemist advocating ijtihad, the 
Salafist way and an incorporation of Westem rationalism.®"*® His followers, however, 
would take his teachings in two divergent directions. Some would inspire the reformists 
and neo-Islamists who would seek a middle path. However, on the opposite side of the 
paradigm was Rida who took Abduh’s teachings in the direction that would eventually 
set the foundations for what would become the al-Qaeda ideology.®"** Rashid Rida 
continued to work with the Salafist model employed by al-Afghani, looking back to the 
time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs for direction. However, he took al-Afghani’s 
reasoning a radical step further, insisting that only an Islamic world completely absent
Ibid, 133.
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of Westem influences could escape the colonial noose and the condition of jahiliya.®"*^  
Rida took his quest to Egypt and resurrected Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of the new 
jahiliya, applying it to his own time. Using the Quran to legitimise his condemnation, 
the mling secular authorities were deemed apostate in the same manner the Mongols 
had been in Ibn Taymiyya’s time.®"*®
The collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 marked a watershed in both Islamic 
history and Islamic political thinking. Kemal Ataturk’s decision to terminate the 
caliphate and tend to the business of building a secular nation-state in Turkey had a 
profound influence on the rise of Salafi Jihadism. With the end of the caliphate came 
the end of the illusion of Islamic unity, and deeply damaged the prominent concept of 
the umma. Driven by a sense of cultural catastrophe Hassan al-Banna in 1928 
established the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, more commonly known as the Muslim 
Brotherhood.®"*"* Al-Banna was deeply angered by the decision of the Ulema, who 
declared that in the absence of a caliphate Muslims could not live properly as Muslims 
should.®"*® He additionally rejected the concept of a Muslim nation-state like that of 
Turkey.®"*® The objective of the Muslim Brotherhood was to restore God’s sovereignty 
promoting a government that operated “on the basis of Muslim values and norms.”®"*^ 
The organisation’s original motto sums up its position; “God is our objective, the Quran
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is our constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle is our way, and death for the sake 
o f Allah is the highest of our aspirations.”®"*^
Al-Banna rejected the distinction between the lesser and greater jihad , p r o m o t e d  the 
idea of the new jahiliya that manifested itself in the form of the secular apostate 
governments, and championed ijtihad.^^^ However, the Brotherhood was never able to 
construct a coherent model for taking power.®®* It would, however, continue to be a 
breeding ground for radical Islamic thought in the decades following its founding, 
producing one of the most influential thinkers of the 20* century, Sayid Qutb.
The prominent Pakistani thinker Maulana Maududi, founder of Jamaat i-Islami, 
provided the link for the transition between Hassan al-Banna’s vague methodological 
approach to establishing an Islamic state and the sophisticated ideology of Sayid Qutb. 
Drawing upon the Salafist tradition he built upon the concept of the new jahiliya.®®  ^
Maududi’s new jahiliya, however, went somewhat further. He observed that Muslims 
had essentially overthrown God’s sovereignty and imposed secular legal structures.®®® 
Islam, Maududi declared, “is a revolutionary ideology.”®®"* It is a religion that “seeks to 
alter the social order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets 
and ideals.”®®®
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Sayid Qutb is arguably the most essential contributor to what is the al-Qaeda ideology. 
Qutb, who at one time admired the United States, took a different approach after a brief 
period of living in the US. He observed America and the West in general as decedent, 
sinful and c o r r u p t . I t  is Qutb who makes the important connection between the US 
and the Islamic world. Previously the focus of Salafist concern was with the colonial 
powers and the domestic apostate regimes.
Qutb returned to Egypt after his stay in the US and joined the Muslim Brotherhood, 
becoming a prominent intellectual filling the vacuum created by the death of Hassan al- 
Banna, before he was eventually executed by al-Nasser’s regime in 1966.^^  ^Qutb was 
able to ftise together the core elements of radical Islamic Salafi t h ough t .Us ing  
Maududi as the bridge he transformed al-Banna’s simplistic and methodologically weak 
concept of escaping the jahili society into a revolutionary call to arms.^^^ Qutb purged 
Islamic discourse of its spiritual content and transformed a religion into a dogmatic 
social, economic and political bluepr int .Drawing upon his predecessors and the 
Salafi methodology he was able to extract the concepts of Hijra, jahiliya and jihad  out 
of their simply spiritual context into core elements of a political ideology with a 
definitive goal.
Jahiliya, for Qutb, was not indicative of a specific time or place but had existed 
universally within and without the Islamic world since not long after the time of
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Muhammad. It is an ubiquitous aspect of the human condition.^^^ Qutb wrote, 
“everything around us is jahiliya, people’s perceptions and beliefs, habits and customs, 
the sources of their culture, arts, literature and their laws and legislations. Much of what 
we think of as Islamic culture, Islamic sources or Islamic philosophy, is in fact 
jahiliya.”^^  ^More damning than Maududi’s assessment, it is an infectious condition that 
had no temporal or physical boundaries. It was the usurpation of God’s sovereignty 
which was to blame for this unenviable condition of modem humanity. Qutb’s work 
represents a blueprint for revolution. In essence, Qutb believed that a revolution would 
bring into being a new reality that previously existed only in the minds of the 
revolutionaries.^^^ It would manifest itself in the form of a new caliphate mled not by 
human law, but by God’s law.
Qutb, like many who are radicalised, experienced a profound moment of conversion.
For him, however, it was less the result of political events (domestic or international), as 
demonstrated by his early association with the Egyptian regime working for the 
Ministry of Education, but rather it was based upon a moral objection to a particular 
culture and its perceived effects upon his own. What Qutb succeeds in doing is defining 
in the contemporary the character of the Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam relationship, 
most specifically by comparing the United States and Egypt. In his discussions of his 
experiences in America he resembled more a Christian evangelist of the era than an 
Islamic militant. It was American obsession with materialism, individual freedoms and 
open sexuality which seems to have been most objectionable. He writes with disdain for 
example, “the American girl is well acquainted with her body’s seductive capacity, she
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knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely 
thighs, sleek legs and she shows all this and does not hide it.”
Modem ideologues drawing from Qutb’s work can frame their arguments regarding 
targeting the West not just in material, political and economic terms, but they can 
construct them within the language of resistance to oppression in cultural terms as well. 
It is not only the bombs, guns and economic power of the hegemon that oppresses the 
Islamic world they can argue, but also its culture that leads its people astray by enabling 
the condition of jahiliya to remain. Much like the concept of the ‘Great Satan,’ as 
popularised by Ayatollah Khomeini, the West and its values tempt pious Muslims away 
from righteous living. It is, however, argued here, that this is a tool to gain support and 
is not in itself the primary cause of the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the United 
States.
Muhammad abd al-Salam Faraj led the organisation Jamaat al-Jihad that on October 6, 
1981 assassinated Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Faraj was highly critical of the 
Muslim Brotherhood for attempting to work within the Egyptian political process for 
gradual change, rather than forcing change through the sword of jihad. Faraj, like Qutb, 
attempted to rob Islam of its spiritual facet and in this de-legitimise the authority of the 
Ulema. Faraj argued that the Muslim leaders of the 7^  ^and 8* centuries who conquered 
the world from Spain to India were not great Islamic scholars, and that the elite of al- 
Azhar had not been able to spare Egypt the humiliation of capitulation with European 
colonial powers.^^^ For Faraj there could be no compromise. It was his belief that killing
^  Qutb, “The America I Have Seen,” 22. 
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the Pharaoh, as he referred to al-Sadat, would spark an Islamic revolution in Egypt.
The assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by Faraj’s organisation changed the nature of the 
Islamist struggle. The ensuing crackdown which followed on Islamist organisations 
hindered operations in the region and forced Jihadists like Azzam to look abroad for 
sanctuary. It is at this moment that the jihad hQgan to evolve into a global rather than 
regional phenomenon.
Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, known infamously as the Godfather of Jihad, helped to 
found the al-Qaeda network in the 1980s, originally known as the Maktab al-Khidamat 
(Office of Services) or Bayt al-Anser (House of Auxiliaries).^^^ He summarises what al- 
Qaeda is to be:
Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into 
society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither 
earthly nor heavenly, that does not require a vanguard that gives everything it possesses 
in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer 
endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah 
has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes al- 
Qaeda al-Sulhah for the expected society.
His legacy is that of transferring a struggle that had largely been limited to the Middle 
East into what would become a global political phenomenon with consequences for the 
security of the world at large. Azzam was neither a theorist nor a theologian. His goal 
was not to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan, but rather saw the Soviet 
occupation as an opportunity. It was, for him, the model of an Islamic resistance. It was 
here that a vanguard for the umma could be established.^^^
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Azzam was originally associated with the Palestinian struggle. However, he observed 
that this had become increasingly nationalist losing its religious elements. Jihad was to 
be in the service of the umma as a whole, not just a specific territorial element of it.^ ^  ^
With the Saudi Arabian and Pakistani elite eager to export domestic radicals and bolster 
their religious credentials, and the United States sensing an opportunity to embarrass the 
Soviet Union, the fields of Afghanistan were fertile for the sowing of Salafi Jihadism. 
After Azzam died under mysterious circumstances in 1989 Bin Laden took control of 
the organisation. Azzam appears to have lacked any clear vision of how to direct the 
organisation. Marrying Bin Laden’s financial resources and vision for the Global Jihad 
with al-Zawahiri’s theological respectability, the second version of al-Qaeda was 
formed.Despi te  being the most notable contemporary Salafi Jihadist and having 
become the face of ‘terrorism’ itself. Bin Laden was a minor figure in the intellectual 
evolution of the Salafi Jihadist ideology. Rather, it is al-Zawahiri who is responsible for 
forging the al-Qaeda ideology. Azzam transformed a mixed group of Jihadists working 
with national movements into a unified international force during the Soviet Afghan 
War.^^  ^It is, however, al-Zawahiri who crafted the ideology for this force.
Al-Zawahiri’s significance is questioned by some, in particular by an executive report 
produced by the Combating Terrorism Center at the US Military Academy entitled the 
Militant Ideology Atlas. T h e y  argue that Bin Laden was an influential figure in terms 
of ideology, but al-Zawahiri is of minimal importance. They contend that instead al-
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Ibid, 296.
Andrea McGregor, “Al-Qaeda’s Egyptian Prophet: Sayid Qutb and the War on Jahiliya,” Terrorism 
Monitor 1, no. 3 (May, 2005)
William McCants, et al.. Militant Ideology Atlas (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006) 
Ibid, 9.
225
Maqdisi, the owner of the al-Qaeda website, is of the greatest importance. This is
problematic for several reasons. Al-Zawahiri’s significance lies in fusing disparate 
Islamists groups under a uniform ideology. As stated previously, where it was Azzam 
who combined these groups into a fighting force it is al-Zawahiri that gives them an 
identity through the crafting of a distinct ideology. Al-Maqdisi’s influence is not 
disputed, but al-Zawahiri’s thought and image was primary in making the jihad  truly 
global. The writers argue that this false assumption regarding al-Zawahiri’s importance 
to the movement is a result of him having been “often portrayed by Western media as 
the main brain in the jihadi movement.”^^  ^It is, however, precisely this ubiquitous 
image provided by the Western media that bolsters his prominence. His work Knights 
Under the Prophet’s Banner^^^ was distributed by a London based newspaper and 
widely available in English, giving al-Qaeda’s message reach into the Dar al-Harh.
The study also suffers from methodological flaws as well. It makes use of citation 
analysis which has been widely criticised by a number of authors. Citation analysis is 
essentially a quantitative count of the number of times an individual, a group or an 
institution has been referred to by o t h e r s . I n  this case, it is a measure of the influence 
of an individual, al-Maqdisi. However, as Moravcsik and Murugesen argue, “citations 
for this purpose have evoked a certain amount of criticism from some who have felt for 
a variety of reasons such measures give an ambiguous or even misleading picture.”^^  ^
Chubin and Moitra state that “we can take neither references nor citations at face
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value.”^^® Indeed, there are assumptions regarding citation analysis that are particularly 
questionable when ascertaining the importance of Salafi Jihadist ideologues. This is 
particularly the case as most Salafi Jihadist material is web based. Citation of a source 
implies that the document has been read, assumes that having been cited it reflects its 
merit and that all citations are in fact e q u a l . T h e s e  are sweeping assumptions that are 
difficult to qualify. The most compelling problem, however, is that the value of citations 
is in essence questionable in the absence of knowledge regarding norms and 
practises.^^^ The study, as its authors note, “is limited to the Tawhed website, al- 
Qaeda’s online library.”^^  ^This literature is written primarily in Arabic so the texts are 
limited to radical intellectuals who read Arabic. The devotion of the study to one 
website which is accessible only to those who read the Arabic language limits its scope. 
With the continued growth of ‘home grown terrorists’ particularly in Europe and North 
America, Salafi Jihadism is not exclusively an Arabic language phenomenon. 
Consequently, it is the contention here that al-Zawahiri’s work, distributed in English, is 
more reflective of the Global Jihad.
Knights under the Prophet's Banner^^^ published in Al Sharq alAwsat is the al-Qaeda 
manifesto, outlining in great length and detail the organisation’s objectives, strategies 
and ideology. Al-Zawahiri’s theoretical approach is deeply rooted, and in many ways 
mimics, that of Sayid Qutb. The concepts of jihad, jahiliya, a basis in Salafist doctrine 
and a staunch defence of the physical Hijra, are all integral parts of al-Zawahiri’s
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thinking. Al-Zawahiri’s primary contribution to the al-Qaeda ideology is a method of 
drawing Islamist struggles away from their localised dimension. The discourse of many 
of these struggles is laden with Western concepts such as socialism and nationalism, the 
Palestinian struggle being a specific example. Al-Zawahiri takes these local struggles 
and places them firmly within the trans-national concept, linking those local objectives 
to that of the objectives of the Global Jihad.^^^
For al-Zawahiri a jihadi movement must not take on Western concepts of politics. 
Nationalism, socialism and secular movements deviate fi*om the path of true Islam. All 
movements should be conceived of as a single struggle for the liberation of the umma, 
shunning particular nationalistic tendencies. The best method of achieving liberation for 
all Muslims is first to target the far enemy, particularly the United Kingdom and the 
United States. By promoting the far enemy as the first peg that must fall, he posits the 
external forces represent a definitive obstacle to any domestic change. The decision 
to prioritise the far enemy is likely a result of the events in Egypt in 1981. The actions 
of Faraj and his organisation in assassinating Anwar al-Sadat caused his successor 
Hosni Mubarak to crack down on Islamist organisations. The ambitious nature of 
Faraj’s theory and actions changed the situation. If the institutions of government could 
not be reformed from within, the logical option was to relieve them of their Western 
benefactors. It would appear that this trend may be changing to focus on Israel, both as 
a result of increased security in the West post 9/11 and an attempt to gamer support for 
a cause that is perceived to draw sympathy from around world.^^^
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Disparate Islamist groups have long viewed their struggles in domestic terms and 
accommodated no interference by other organisations beyond moral s u p p o r t . A l -  
Zawahiri would still appear to accommodate loyalties to Egypt as Bin Laden did for 
Arabia, as their discourse would demonstrate. However, the willingness of al-Zawahiri 
to give up his leadership position in Egyptian Islamic Jihad to join al-Qaeda and the 
ability to form an ideological argument to convince the reluctant leaderships of 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda to merge under one international banner, was the 
pivotal moment in hnngmg jihad  to the global stage.^^  ^This synthesised the al-Qaeda 
ideology and was the beginnings of al-Qaeda as an ideology. Further, this ideology has 
been utilised to convince numerous Salafi Jihadist organisations to join al-Qaeda. As the 
next chapter will demonstrate, the al-Qaeda ideologues have reduced the grievances of 
Salafi Jihadists in general to the least common denominator. The objective is unity and 
religiously sanctioned leadership. The US and the international system must be 
challenged to alter the status quo so that these objectives can be achieved.
7.3 Al-Qaeda as Ideology
The argument that al-Qaeda, rather than being just an international ‘terror’ organisation 
is in fact an ideology in its own right, holds substantial credence. Since the allied 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which resulted in the fall of the Taliban regime, al- 
Qaeda has been in effect a stateless entity lacking the pre-invasion command and 
control of its operations which were possible under the protection of their Taliban hosts.
Ibid.
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What has emerged is a new kind of international ‘terror’ organisation in need of 
analysis and understanding. If al-Qaeda is a non-state actor, how then do we 
conceptualise what al-Qaeda is in its stateless form?
The relationship of socio-religious movements like al-Qaeda to the nation-state, and 
therefore the public sphere, is somewhat ambivalent and does not fit neatly into the 
straitjacket of traditional political categories such as reformist, revolutionary, 
conservative or react ionary.They seek to create a collective identity and interact 
within the public sphere without taking the form of a nation-state.^^^ The al-Qaeda 
ideology has been described as conservative, millenarian, Wahhabi, Pan-Islamic, 
apocalyptic, conspiratorial, neo-fundamentalist and counter-hegemonic.^^^ It is, 
however, best described as Salafi Jihadist, combining elements of what Giles Kepel 
refers to as “respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form and an absolute 
commitment to jihadP^^^
Al-Qaeda’s themes resonate with many across the Islamic world seeking coherent 
explanations for the plight of their co-religionists in areas characterised by conflict, 
poverty, struggle and tyranny. The concepts of the state of jahiliya, the Hijra
and a feeling of collective identity, what Ibn Khaldun termed assabiya manifested in the 
concept of the umma, are all present in the al-Qaeda doctrine. These themes take ancient
Armando Salvadores and Mark le Vine, “Socio-Religious Movements and the Transformation of 
Common Sense into a Politics of Common Good,” in Religion, Social Practice and Contested 
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traditions that people can easily recognise and transfer them into the modem in a way 
that many Muslims can readily identify. Ideology, be it of a national or religious 
connotation, claims to return to the past, but in reality is a modem creation borrowing 
from history for a modem ends.^^  ^Al-Qaeda’s ends are political change, a rejection of 
the status quo and the implementation of a new order based on unity and religious 
legitimacy. How this is to be done and what form is it to take are not yet clearly 
described, but an overthrow of the status quo is the first step in the process. The al- 
Qaeda leadership see themselves and their followers as the vanguard of an intemational 
Islamic movement committed to ending Westem interference in the Islamic world, the 
removal of Middle Eastem regimes, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the 
implementation of a new order based on sharia, eventually uniting all sectors of the
696umma.
In many places both within and without the Islamic world, particularly where the 
process of political dialogue is rigidly closed, al-Qaeda’s message is heard. What has 
resulted from this are disparate groups donning the al-Qaeda garb, accepting its basic 
tenets, ascribing to the Global Jihad, and in practicality often attempting to affect their 
own particular reality. In this, they adopt the well respected universally recognised 
name al-Qaeda. This is not to imply that al-Qaeda no longer acts as an organisation, it is 
only to suggest it has evolved into also taking on the role of an ideology, with many 
willing to act in its name without its direct control. This is, in many ways, not dissimilar 
to the continued existence of 20^  ^and 21®‘ century Westem political movements such as 
neo-Nazi or revolutionary Communist organisations, long after the termination of the
Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 198.
696 Congressional Research Service, “Al-Qaeda.
231
host such as Hitler’s fascist regime or the Soviet Union. However, in the case of al- 
Qaeda, it is not the end of the founding institution leaving remnants in the form of 
minor organisations that in some form resemble it in appearance and practise, but rather 
an evolution in the nature of the trans-national actor. This method of adaptability is 
made further possible by technological developments in a globalised world.
The heart of this issue is the linking of the local and the intemational. Al-Qaeda’s 
networks, chain of command, hierarchy and links were formed in Afghanistan at the 
local level and then transformed to the baseless trans-national dimension.^^^ Local 
struggles acquire intemational linkages and the ‘terrorist’ ideology spreads from its 
base.^^  ^Local groups with local interests obtain links with al-Qaeda headquarters and 
act in its name. These units may be well organised like those in Yemen and Algeria, or 
they may be only a thuggish disordered group composed of criminals, juveniles and 
cultists led by a local charismatic figure. It is similar in many ways to the franchising of 
a business; the patrimonial organisation defines the concepts, or in this cases the 
ideology, and lends the use of its name.^^^ In essence, then, there is no intemational 
‘terrorism,’ but rather groups that operate without references to a specific nation-state 
and do not recognise borders.^^^
The removal of the Taliban fi"om power forced al-Qaeda to adapt it strategies and 
transform itself into a ‘franchising’ ideology. The elimination of the Iraqi Ba 'athisX 
regime opened up a fi*esh market for al-Qaeda’s operations. It is indeed as an ideology
Roy, “Al-Qaeda Brand Name.”
Desai Meghnad, Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology o f  the New Terror (London: Tauris, 2006), 84. 
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that al-Qaeda may be at its most lethal. It is a name that has credibility amongst 
dissidents as any attack in its name re-enforces its appearance of being omnipresent, 
capable of striking anywhere. Its strength is its adaptability and appeal to the politically 
disenfranchised. It is an elusive hydra that can take on any local form to attend to any 
local grievance while being shrouded in the ideological dogma of Salafi Jihadism. In its 
ideological form al-Qaeda needs no territorial headquarters or host nation-state, which 
only helps to elevate its concepts and allows its leadership to evolve to the status of 
myth and legend. Conflicts are increasingly being fought not in the mountains of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in the realm of cyber space where the ideology of al- 
Qaeda will continue to live on and influence radicals long after Bin Laden and al- 
Zawahiri have gone.
7.4 Conclusion
Though Bell may have declared ideology defunct in the context of intemational 
relations in the 1960s, they clearly have continued to influence the broader scope of 
global politics in the early 21®^ century. Ideology has a central role to play in the politics 
of the Salafi Jihadists. This chapter has analysed the al-Qaeda ideology, first by defining 
it and examining its core tenets, then, charting its intellectual evolution from the 
medieval to the modem, and finally observing its transformation from simply a doctrine 
for an intemational ‘terror’ organisation into al-Qaeda as an ideology itself. It has been 
demonstrated that the al-Qaeda ideology is not simply a haphazardly constmcted piece 
of propaganda. Instead, its ideologues draw upon an historical lineage of respected 
Islamic thinking evolving from the medieval thought of Ibn Taymiyya to the origins of
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the Salafist movement in the 19* century with Jamal al-din al-Afghani, and finally into 
the contemporary.
The ability to connect the past to the future to legitimise its cause has been a prominent 
factor in spreading the Salafi Jihadist message and challenging the West in a conflict of 
ideas that is reflective of competing universalisms. Further, it has been demonstrated 
that after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the allied invasion the 
nature of al-Qaeda began to evolve from simply a ‘terrorist’ organisation into an 
ideology. Lacking a territory to make Hijra, al-Qaeda was faced with an existential 
struggle. It was during this time that al-Qaeda emerged as not just an institution with a 
founding doctrine but in fact an ideology under which disparate groups could gather. 
Professing to al-Qaeda’s key concepts and with an adherence to its larger objectives, 
local groups began to act in its name, aiding in building its mythical stature and giving it 
the image of having far reaching capabilities. This metamorphosis of al-Qaeda into an 
ideology will ensure that it will have implications for intemational politics for some 
time. Like the Westem ideologies of Nazism and Marxism-Leninism, it will remain a 
reality and continue to be employed by those ascribing to its tenets and seeking to 
change their local, national or indeed the intemational order, long after its founders and 
chief ideologues have passed. As an ideology it is a tool for those who ascribe to this 
vision of an idealised ‘golden age’ of Islam and an idealised Islamic community that 
can be brought into existence through the waging of the Global Jihad. It professes the 
need for unity and legitimacy, and outlines the challenges to this goal. It shows that in 
the contemporary the obstacles to unity and legitimacy are the stmcture of the 
intemational system and the hegemonic actor that helps to maintain the status quo. It
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has been demonstrated that an understanding of the al-Qaeda ideology, its historical 
evolution and its emergence as an ideology in and of itself, is an integral part of 
conceptualising Salafi Jihadism and its war with the United States and the West. The 
next chapter will explore al-Qaeda’s global constituents and observe al-Qaeda’s success 
in convincing disparate organisations of how the obstacles to unity and legitimacy can 
be resolved through a collective effort.
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Chapter 8
Glocalisation: al-Qaeda and its Constituent Players
The Global Jihad has evolved and expanded significantly since its humble beginnings in 
the early 20* century. Bom from grass roots movements challenging Arab leaders at the 
infancy of state formation in the wake of the collapse of Ottoman authority, through the 
rise and fall of Pan-Arabism and Political Islam, it has evolved into a vast loosely 
connected global network in the post 9/11 period. The Global Jihad is a movement 
without a clear centralised authority. It is practised in its various geographical locations 
often independent of any central command, each group tending to its own affairs. Al- 
Qaeda’s quest has been to hamess this Global Jihad by acting as its ideological guide, 
encouraging individual groups to act in step with its global agenda, offering support 
technical and material, as well as ideological credentials and name recognition. Each 
organisation under the al-Qaeda banner, while tending to its own local matters, 
proclaims allegiance to the ideology of the Global Jihad that al-Qaeda claims to be the 
vanguard of. Roland Robertson refers to the notion of “Glocalisation,”^^  ^whereby 
affiliated ‘terror’ organisations can be understood to act and think locally as well as 
globally. They treat local grievances and global concems as intimately linked, so that 
local problems can be marshalled as recmiting tools and propaganda weapons in the 
interest of the Global Jihad and its objectives.
Al-Qaeda has evolved from its confines in Central Asia to a global phenomenon by not 
only attempting to guide the Global Jihad but also adapting its own strategies in
Roland Robertson, Globalisation, Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1994)
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reference to the realities it cannot control. As with any political entity, be it dictatorial, 
democratic, theocratic or intemational, it must seek to reach its ends not only by 
marketing its vision for the path to success, but also by adapting its envisioned path 
accordingly with the realities and local viewpoints of its constituents. Al-Qaeda has 
evolved into an organisation which embraces and supports its constituent players, who 
tend to their own local matters while still aiding the Global Jihad, serving varying 
functions in diverse geographical locations. The constituents take on the al-Qaeda garb, 
or ally themselves to al-Qaeda, in support of the central institutions global vision.
The previous chapter argued that al-Qaeda acts as an ideological umbrella under which 
other Salafi Jihadist organisations gather. This chapter seeks to further support this 
argument empirically through an investigation of al-Qaeda’s constituents, those in 
which it has co-opted into the larger jihad. While serving local interests these 
organisations can aid in altering the battlefield, eliminating the obstacle of the hegemon, 
allowing over time the removal of the linchpin of nation-states in the Middle East and 
throughout the Islamic realm. The vision of the al-Qaeda ideologues that seek to 
challenge the status quo of the intemational system is easily adopted by Salafi Jihadist 
groups, as it is agreeable to both local and global objectives. Al-Qaeda seeks to draw 
upon the power of local jihads and incorporate them into the broader Global Jihad.
This thesis argues that the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the United States and its 
allies is related to the incompatibility of an intemational system characterised by the 
sovereignty of nation-states and the Salafi Jihadist objective of Muslim unity and 
legitimate govemance based on a particular Islamic perspective. The US as a hegemonic
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actor helps to maintain this status quo and is an obstacle to Salafi Jihadist objectives. By 
employing constituent players al-Qaeda can challenge US interests globally to the 
benefit of its primary objectives. Though these local conflicts may not always directly 
be related to the Global Jihad, they are beneficial in draining US and allied material, 
morale, credibility and political will to assist in maintaining the global order that is built 
upon the structure of sovereign nation-states. Al-Qaeda links these constituent 
organisations under the al-Qaeda brand. It has successfiilly reduced the differences 
between the central organisation and the constituents by seeking the common ground on 
which they can all agree; Islamic unity and legitimate govemance. The contemporary 
intemational system and the hegemonic power are obstacles to this and must be 
challenged.
This chapter will explore al-Qaeda’s affiliates, allies and those it inspires, as well as its 
competitors that share similar objectives. Al-Qaeda’s closest constituent organisations 
are its affiliates that have taken its name directly, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda in Iraq, as well as Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad which has largely been consumed within the central institution. There are 
also organisations that have maintained their own identity while still cooperating on the 
global and local stage. Additionally, there are organisations composed of smaller units 
as well as individuals that are inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology. Finally, are those 
organisations which act as competitors but still maintain the objective of Islamic unity 
and legitimacy.
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There have at times been significant tensions between al-Qaeda and its associates, 
particularly in regard to its more powerful counterparts. It was al-Zawahiri’s moulding 
of a cohesively palatable ideology that aided in building al-Qaeda’s reputation and 
persuaded others to join the cause. The greatest significance of this is less al-Qaeda’s 
ability to co-opt previously long established players, but its ability to spawn smaller 
players globally that act in its name and under its ideology and method. This has 
ensured its longevity, in that it is no longer absolutely dependent on an individual icon 
or a group of core lieutenants. The death of Bin laden in May of 2011 may be a 
significant symbolic moment in the conflict between the Salafi Jihadists and the West, 
in particular for the United States, but it does not signal the end of Salafi Jihadism.
Several commentators, particularly in the Middle East, have suggested that this 
momentous event signals the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda. A Saudi political analyst 
insisted that the “elimination of the leader of the terrorist al-Qaeda organisation is a step 
towards supporting intemational efforts aimed at combating terrorism, dismantling its 
cells and wiping out the deviant thought behind it.” *^^  ^In Iraq state minister Ali al- 
Debbagh suggested that “the end of this man (Bin Laden) will put an end to many 
terrorist acts in the world and will have a direct impact in Iraq, as it will demoralise al- 
Qaeda members in Iraq.”^^  ^Haidar al-Mullah concurs, adding that “this is extremely 
important for the security of Iraq, because killing the head of al-Qaeda will eventually 
lead to the disappearance of al-Qaeda’s force in Iraq and in the region.”^^  ^However, as 
previously established, al-Qaeda is an ideology, a loose connection of global units both
Faisal al-Obeid et al., “Arab World Sees bin Laden Death as Step Towards Eliminating Terrorism,’ 
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large and small brought together by a single goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate 
and instilling sharia. The death of one, though iconic, figure is unlikely to result in the 
in the end of al-Qaeda, much less the Salafi Jihadist ideology. The organisation has 
demonstrated its potential to adapt and its constituent players provide a vital component 
of the strategy to ensure al-Qaeda remains significant.
Phillipe Errera suggests in Three Circles ofThreat'^^ that there are three forms in which 
intemational ‘terrorists’ take. The first is al-Qaeda, a non-hierarchical institution with a 
strong central ideology containing non-negotiable demands on its enemies. The second 
are organisations that share the ideology and assert similar goals of the reinstituted 
caliphate, however, remain more concretely tied to local conflicts. The third group are 
those that seem to emerge and disappear following an attack, bandwagoning under the 
al-Qaeda ideological umbrella.^^^ These organisations have entirely autonomous 
leaderships and make their own operational choices regarding targets, possibly having 
no real connection to a legitimate al-Qaeda member. The following pages are an 
investigation into al-Qaeda’s associates as well as its competitors to demonstrate a 
common thread among them, the desire to establish an Islamic trans-national state and 
the obstacles that the status quo global order and US hegemony present to this objective.
Philippe Errera, “Three Circles of Threat,” Survival, no. 47 (2005) 
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8.1 Al-Qaeda’s Global Affiliates: AQIM, AQAP, AQI and EIJ
The Global Jihad has its origins in Afghanistan. However, the Salafi Jihadist ideologues 
first concern has always been the Middle East and the Arab world in particular, with 
Afghanistan serving as a suitable opportunity for a place in which to make the Hijra, 
fight the infidel and gain strength. The strategy of the Global Jihad has moved in a 
different direction than was first envisioned by the Salafi Jihadists, morphing into more 
of an ideology as opposed to a command and control operation. Political change in the 
Middle East, however, still serves as the primary focus of al-Qaeda central.
Al-Qaeda’s most powerful branches are located in the Middle East and North Afiica, 
representing a shift in its focus following its decentralisation after the invasion of 
Afghanistan and new opportunities that emerged following the removal of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Several distinct al-Qaedas have come into being in the region, 
evolving from other local groups taking the al-Qaeda name and pledging allegiance to 
its ideology. Of specific interest to this thesis are al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al- 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in Iraq and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. It is the 
organisations located in the Arab world that are of the greatest significance here, as they 
are representative of al-Qaeda’s first objective of creating an Islamic state in the region 
to eventually rebuild the caliphate encompassing the geographic boundaries of early 
imperial Islam.
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Abdel Droukdal the leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb declared in 2008, “our 
general goals are the same goals of al-Qaeda the mother.” ®^^ This is reflective of al- 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s transformation from a local organisation with aims of 
toppling the leadership in Algeria, into an organisation with intentions to act locally as 
well as regionally and globally. Previously the organisation was known as The Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat, however, it was confirmed as an al-Qaeda branch 
group by al-Zawahiri in an interview on September 11, 2006. Al-Zawahiri states, “the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined the al-Qaeda organisation. May 
this be a bone in the throat of American and French Crusaders and their allies, and sow 
fear in the hearts of the French traitors and sons of a p o s ta te s .U p o n  the capture of 
French hostages in September 2010 the group deferred to al-Qaeda central, insisting that 
discussions for the release of the hostages would have to be “negotiated with Bin Laden 
himself.” ®^^ AQIM demonstrated its commitment to the strategy of the Global Jihad 
before joining al-Qaeda, having targeted Russian and US contractors operating in 
A lgeria.^The merger was based in part on al-Qaeda central’s desire to launch the 
movement westward. With Moroccan, Libyan and Tunisian organisations having been 
deprived of their local base. North African Salafi Jihadists were drawn to the 
organisation as a means of joining the Global Jihad. In this AQIM offers al-Qaeda a 
means to recruit in the Maghreb
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Since the 2006 merger the rhetoric from AQIM has been increasingly global and anti- 
Western, calling for jihad  against the United States, France and Spain, though its 
external operations have largely been limited to the Sahel region^ of Africa/
AQIM’s predecessor The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was formed in 
Algeria during the 1990s in response to a military coup that prevented an Islamist party 
from winning elections in 1992/^"  ^Since that time the organisation has become 
increasingly active outside of Algeria, primarily in the West African Sahel. In 2007 the 
group was responsible for the killing of four French tourists. In 2008 they claimed 
responsibility for the assassination of twelve Mauritanian soldiers, as well as the 
kidnapping of a United Nations envoy to Niger.^*^ These attacks have been followed by 
numerous incidents since that time. Its membership is composed primarily of Algerians, 
but as well of nationals from countries throughout the region, including those from 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria and Benin.^^^ Although AQIM remains a 
largely regional threat it is wedded to the global agenda and attempts to demonstrate its 
commitment to the broader jihad  through its rhetoric and targeting of Westerners. Its 
greatest significance, however, may be as a recruiting post and clearing house for 
Jihadists seeking to move on to Iraq or elsewhere on the largeryz/zac/battlefield.^*^
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is based in the Arabian country of Yemen. Yemen is 
a more attractive option as a base of operations for al-Qaeda than Saudi Arabia. Yemen, 
unlike Saudi Arabia, is significantly more rural, isolated geographically from its
The Sahel consists of parts of several African states including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
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neighbours, and contains an economically disenfranchised population with a central 
government that is largely unpopular. Yemeni authorities have a limited ability to act 
unilaterally against internal threats without first approaching tribal leaders to gain 
support.^Additionally, the country suffers from decreasing oil revenues, population 
explosion, limited access to water and decreasing government revenues to counter its 
socio-economic concerns.^In this sense it has a great deal in common with al-Qaeda’s 
original geographic location along the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border. From this difficult 
to govern and access region with a population that harbours tribal loyalties and distrust 
of central government, al-Qaeda can remain free to operate with the added advantage of 
close proximity to Saudi Arabia, which allows them to harass its government.
The present version of AQAP is an off shoot of a previously established al-Qaeda 
organisation based in Yemen which was effectively destroyed by an intense counter 
‘terrorism’ campaign by the Saudi security forces from 2003-2007. The Saudi initiative 
forced many of the organisation’s members to flee to Yemen to avoid capture or 
execution. These refugee Jihadists, however, laid the foundations for a re-emergence of 
al-Qaeda’s presence on the Arabian Peninsula. On January 24, 2009 al-Qaeda’s Saudi 
Arabian and Yemeni leaders merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
proclaiming their unity and allegiance to al-Qaeda central.^ *^* Overall the organisation 
has demonstrated four distinct objectives; attack the US homeland, attack US and 
Westem interests in Yemen, destabilise the government of Yemen and assassinate 
members of the Saudi royal family.
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These actions are done in the interest of its goals of vacating the Arabian Peninsula of 
non-Muslims and establishing a local Islamist emirate en route to the establishment of a 
global Islamic caliphate/^^ As the prominent AQAP leader Sayid al-Shehri asserted, 
“we will tread their path until we establish the Islamic state, the prophetic caliphate, 
until we establish the laws of Allah, or until our blood mixes with theirs/^^ Al-Awlaki 
confirmed the group’s objective of creating an Islamic state, “we seek to apply the rule 
of the Quran and make the word of Allah supreme over all other, and God willing we 
will strive to achieve these goals with all that we posses and we fight to the last man 
against whomever stands in our way.”^^"* The group has been responsible for several 
recent ‘terror’ incidents both within and outside of the Middle East. In 2009 the 
organisation attempted to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, 
the head of Saudi Arabia’s anti ‘terror’ unit, as well as killing four South Korean 
tourists in Yemen. The group has claimed responsibility for the attempt to detonate a 
bomb on a US flight to Detroit and plans to send package explosives to locations within 
the United States by means of air freight.
Although AQAP appears primarily interested in targeting the Yemeni government, it 
has demonstrated the capability and desire to target the US directly .A l-A w laki was 
representative of this trend. Bom in New Mexico in the United States he was arrested in 
2007 in Yemen for possible connections to the events of 9/11, and it was after his
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release that he began to openly advocate jihad  against the He is believed to have
influenced Major Nidal Hassan who allegedly committed the mass shootings at Fort 
Hood army base Texas in 2009. In addition, he has been connected to Faisal Shahzad 
who failed to detonate a car bomb in Times Square New York in 2010.^^^ Additionally, 
he was connected with Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab who attempted to ignite explosive 
chemicals aboard a US commercial flight in December of 2009.^^^
AQAP is representative of the hybrid nature of al-Qaeda itself, acting both locally and 
globally. This is a clear demonstration of the concept of glocalisation. The far enemy/ 
near enemy debate, as carried on between al-Qaeda central and its constituents, now 
appears to be blurred into a strategy that privileges both as opposed to one necessarily 
over the other. Rather, they chose to strike wherever and whenever opportunities are 
presented. The organisation is largely an entirely hybrid a c t o r . A Q A P  is believed to 
be relatively small in numbers, at present having only around a few hundred active 
members.^^^ However, its significance may lie less in its strike capabilities and more in 
its utility as a voice for the Salafi Jihadist ideology. The organisation is responsible for 
an English language magazine Inspire which contains stories regarding the individual 
experiences of Jihadists, ideological discourse, perspectives on current events, dialogue 
with al-Qaeda leaders and instructions and advice for joining the Global Jihad, as well 
as contacts for contribution to the publication. What is clearly demonstrated in these 
publications is al-Qaeda’s attempt to employ different ideas, myths and traditions to
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gain support by linking local issues to the central theme and objectives of the 
organisation.^^ ^
A feature article in Inspire attributed to al-Zawahiri demonstrates this hybrid mentality, 
describing the short and long term plans for the Global Jihad. Al-Zawahiri observes, 
“the short term plan consists of targeting the Crusader Jewish interests as everyone who 
attacks the umma must pay the price in our country and theirs, in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Somalia and everywhere we are able to strike their i n t e r e s t s . T h e  long 
term plan he describes in two parts, the first is to “work to change these corrupt and 
corruptive regimes.” The second is “to hurry to the fields of jihad  for two reasons; the 
first is to defeat the enemies of the umma and repel the Zionist Crusade, and the second 
is for jihadi preparation and training to prepare for the next stage of jihadl'^^^ He 
concludes by tying al-Qaeda’s discourse on unity and religious legitimacy to an issue 
that resonates throughout the Muslim, particularly Arab, world. He observes that “we 
must awaken in the hearts of the umma the spirit of resistance and jihad; confrontation 
of aggression, oppression and tyranny; firmness on truth and rejection of the culture of 
concession and methodology of backtracking which has led some to abandon the 
government of sharia and concede four fifths of Palestine.”^^"^  AQAP is serving as a 
significant media tool for spreading the Salafi Jihadist message to the world, as well as 
providing a base in Arabia j&om which to attack the al-Saud regime.
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Al-Qaeda in Iraq, like al-Qaeda itself and a number of its constituents, is the product of 
the ambitions of more than one organisation that have merged under a single banner. 
Al-Qaeda was originally formed by Bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al-Bahshiri and Abu Hafs, 
but in essence became an alliance between Bin Laden’s organisation and the Egyptian 
al-Zawahiri and his supporters. AQI as well was formed from a coalition of Salafi 
Jihadists, gathering members from Ansar al-Islam, Jaish Ansal al-Sunnah and al- 
Tawhid wa al-Jihad, in the wake of the US led invasion that removed Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.^^^ Al-Qaeda central and its constituents have not always shared the same 
strategic vision, as is demonstrated by the often strained relationship between the al- 
Qaeda ideologues and al-Qaeda in Iraq as led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until June 7, 
2006. Al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda based their visions of jihad  on differing 
conceptualisations of the “enemy’s centre of gravity.”^^  ^Ultimately, this resulted in 
disagreements between the two organisations on the manner in which the jihad  in Iraq 
should be conduc ted .They  did, however, share a single long term goal, the 
establishment of the caliphate as a single trans-national Islamic state.^^  ^As al-Zawahiri 
observes in a letter to al-Zarqawi in 2005, “if our intended goal in this age is the 
establishment of a caliphate in the manner of the Prophet and if we expect to establish a 
state predominantly according to how it appears to us in the heart of the Islamic world, 
then your efforts and sacrifices, God permitting, are a large step directly towards that 
goal.”"'"
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Differences pertaining to methods of operation, however, were made less significant by 
the presence of the US forces in Iraq. As Fishman observes, “al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in 
Iraq held differing visions of jihad  while working t o g e t h e r . T h e  case of al-Qaeda in 
Iraq demonstrates al-Qaeda’s willingness to cooperate with groups who differ in 
strategy and the prioritisation of particular short term objectives to work for a grander 
long term objective. This also demonstrates the value and appeal the al-Qaeda name 
possesses to Islamic militant groups that may prefer a strategy which differs from that 
which al-Qaeda dictates. Yet, they are willing to swear allegiance to the larger 
institution for the benefit of name recognition, recruiting, finance and support. These 
marriages of convenience are possible because of a single aim of Islamic unity and 
religiously legitimised governance, which the international system and the United States 
are obstacles to. The US is positioned as a major obstacle to the broader objective of the 
Salafi Jihadists, but as well is an obstacle to the local objectives of constituent groups 
that stem from the same problem, a hegemon guaranteeing the existence of the status 
quo.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq is of particular interest because of its importance to the al-Qaeda 
cause. Iraq, located in the heart of the Middle East, former Capitol of the Abbasid 
Caliphate, occupied by infidel soldiers most importantly from the US, is an important 
opportunity for al-Qaeda in its quest to establish an Islamic state in both strategic and 
propaganda terms. In regard to this thesis, the union of these organisations demonstrates 
the larger appeal by militant groups to al-Qaeda’s goal and the problem that the 
contemporary international system represents. Problematically for al-Qaeda, its
740 Fishman, 167.
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affiliates in Iraq have suffered significant setbacks. According to a 2009 Congressional 
Report AQI remains viable but has become a reduced security threat:
AQI remains active and operationally capable despite significant hardship in northern 
Iraq, including within Ninewa Province, which remains the group’s logistical centre.
Despite significant leadership losses and a diminished presence in most population 
centers, AQI continues to conduct periodic, targeted HPAs,^" ’^ albeit at a reduced rate.^ "^ ^
The organisation still remains wedded to the al-Qaeda network and its ideological 
leader al-Zawahiri, even following the death of Bin Laden. In a statement released 
following the raid on Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan an AQI spokesman declared 
the groups’ allegiance to the al-Qaeda cause and confirmed its support for al-Zawahiri 
as the heir apparent. The spokesman observed, “to our brothers in al-Qaeda, first among 
them Sheik Ayman al-Zawahiri and his brothers in the leadership of the organisation, 
may God reward you and grant you patience for this loss.”""*' AQI has been weakened 
materially, yet, it is still a constituent player in the Global Jihad and serves as a 
powerful example of the continued possibilities that the strategy of co-option and a 
glocalised vision of theyzAW has for al-Qaeda’s continued relevance.
Egyptian Islamic Jihad was formed in the 1970s and is responsible for the assassination 
of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, which was a landmark moment in the 
evolution of jihad  into a global phenomenon. Originally the organisation was concerned 
with establishing an Islamic government in Egypt, however, in 1998 they began to
HP As refer to high profile attacks.
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coordinate their activities with al-Qaeda, formerly merging in June 2 0 0 The group 
has been linked to a number of attacks in and outside of Egypt including the 1993 
assassination of Egyptian officials, the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, 
the assassination attempt of Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995, and the attempted 
bombing of the US Embassy in Albania in 1998.""^  ^Significantly, in regard to its role in 
the Global Jihad, EIJ has been linked to the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
Al-Zawahiri, a former member of EIJ, was brought into the al-Qaeda leadership’s inner 
circle along with Muhammad Attef in an effort to combine the efforts of the two groups. 
EIJ began to receive significant funding from al-Qaeda following the 1998fa h m  issued 
by al-Qaeda detailing the group’s grievances and forewarning of strikes against the US. 
Accordmg to a declassified document issued by the Australian Parliament, EIJ has both 
a domestic and international wing. The report notes that:
The EIJ exists as two factions, the international and the domestic. The international 
faction, led by al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri is largely subsumed within al- 
Qaeda and has the same goals as that group. Terrorist activities by the EIJ international 
faction are likely credited to al-Qaeda rather than the EIJ. The domestic faction is 
mostly inactive due to successful, sustained actions by Egyptian authorities. The EIJ 
aims to overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the establishment of an Islamic 
state. More broadly, the international branch has adopted the global jihadist goals of al- 
Qaeda.^ '^ ’
This is again evidence of the continued trend towards glocalisation and demonstrates 
the overall drive towards the creation of a trans-national Islamic order that would serve
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to unify the Islamic world and provide legitimate governance. It also evidences al- 
Qaeda’s willingness to employ both local and global strategies to achieve its aims.
8.2 Al-Qaeda’s Friends and Allies
Al-Qaeda’s allies are too numerous to be named within the limits of this thesis. They 
exist globally comprised of larger well established organisations and smaller local 
institutions. Yet, they have similar objectives and share Salafi Jihadist beliefs. As 
Jacobsen observées:
In recent times jihadi political Islam has come to produce a range of extremist groups 
including al-Qaeda and many of its associate groups. These groups have been willing to 
wage acts of violence without rules and constraints in pursuit of goals of establishing 
Islamic order within the Muslim countries and beyond, in defiance of the prevailing 
Westphalian geo-political divisions of the world.^^^
Several of these organisations are located in Asia, such as Harakat ul-Jihad, Tehrik e- 
Taliban (the Taliban in Pakistan) and Lashkar e-Taiba the group responsible for the 
2008 attack in Mumbai which killed 173 people. Jemniah Islamia has traditionally been 
the leading jihadist organisation in Indonesia. However, recently it appears that Jihadists 
in Indonesia are linked to a number of organisations. Most closely associated with al- 
Qaeda is an organisation located in Ached, which is an alliance of members from these 
various groups that appear dissatisfied with the strategies of their own institutions. As 
Sydney Jones observes, this newly formed group in Ached “is a composite of people 
from a number of different militant groups like Jeemah Islamiya, Kompak and Daioil 
Islam, who are frustrated with what they see as a lack of action within these groups.
Jacobsen, Re-envisioning Sovereignty, 7.
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They are more radical and apparently see themselves as Indonesia’s al-Qaeda.”"^*" This 
is indicative of the trend of organisations with local interests of establishing an Islamic 
state moving in the direction of sympathies for a global caliphate, mixing the local with 
the global in advance of their objectives.
Much of the periphery of the Arab Islamic world is ripe for fostering jihadist 
organisations. The lack of internal security and sufficient border control in these areas 
helps to provide safe havens for al-Qaeda’s allies. East Africa is just such a potential 
safe haven, hi a 2008 video al-Shabaab in Somalia pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda 
and the al-Qaeda ideology. Al-Zawahiri later praised the organisations efforts. He 
observed, “with Allah's help they (al-Shabaab) won’t lay down their weapons until the 
state of Islam is set up, and they will perfomi jihad  against the American made 
govermnent in the same way they perfomied jihad  against the Ethiopians and prior to 
them the warlords.”"^ ® In confirmation of this loyalty pledge to al-Qaeda central al- 
Shabaab released a statement in 2010 claiming that they and al-Qaeda have agreed “to 
connect the horn of Africa jihad  to the one led by al-Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama 
Bin Laden.”" '^
Where the Somali organisation appears largely to direct its efforts within Somalia, it is 
still a potential constituent player in the Global Jihad. A US State Department Countiy 
Report states that “al-Shabaab’s leadership was supportive of al-Qaeda.”"^ " Further, in 
regards to implications in the Global Jihad and threats to the West, Dennis Blair notes
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that “we judge most al-Shabaab and East Africa based al-Qaeda members will remain 
focused on regional objectives in the near term. Nevertheless, East Africa based al- 
Qaeda leaders or al-Shabaab may elect to redirect to the homeland of some Westerners 
including North Americans now training and fighting in Somalia.”"^'
This threat may only be a potential possibility, however, there is a significant 
connection here that may benefit al-Qaeda’s broader cause. Several individuals of 
Somali origin in the United States have left the countiy to join the j i h a d The Somali 
population in the US and Canada is significant, and where al-Shabaab have yet to 
demonstrate they are intent on becoming a major player in the Global Jihad, this store of 
potential resources for conducting domestic strikes and the organisations pledge to al- 
Qaeda make this at least a possibility. In July of 2010 al-Shabaab amiouneed the 
launching of its own television news channel claiming that its purpose is “to teach, to 
inform, and to incite.”"^  ^The rhetoric which is being produced has a distinct 
internationalist tone. The narrator of the video referred to the peacekeeping mission in 
Somalia as an “American led Western cause,” language that would likely appeal more 
to Global Jihadists than to Somalis themselves. In an attempt to dissuade Western 
political leaders from getting more involved in the region the narrator warns;
And just like the Americans and the Ethiopians whose bodies have been dragged in the 
streets of Mogadishu, the charred bodies of your (Ugandan and Burundian) soldiers 
have now received a well deserved treatment, putting an end to the bright optimism that 
drove them here in the first place. The blackened bodies of your sons now serve as a 
spectacle to thousands of cheerful Muslims. Becoming aware of the mujahedeerfs
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resolve to annihilate their soldiers one after the other, the disgraced African Crusaders 
began pleading for dialogue/^^
Since al-Shabaab first began releasing statements in 2007 the focus of its rhetoric has 
changed from a local to a more global focus. In 2008 they stated their desire to establish 
“the Islamic kliilaafah from East to West after removing the occupier and killing the 
apostates.”"^ " By 2009 this rhetoric shifted entirely from a strictly nationalist agenda to 
a global narrative. As Cody CuiTan observes;
By early 2009 the group had successfully changed its narrative ft om that of a 
nationalistic struggle to one fmnly grounded in broader Islamist principles, namely the 
establishment of sharia and the pursuit of a global caliphate. Over the course of 2009 
and in 2010 waging Global Jihad moved to the forefront of al-Shabaab’s stated goals.
This shift in focus in not uncommon for Salafi Jihadist organisation and would appear 
to be representative of a trend, particularly in North and sub-Saharan Africa. Al- 
Qaeda’s allies have traditionally focused less on jihad  as a global project and more on 
domestic concerns. However, al-Qaeda has successfully co-opted weaker organisations 
into the Global Jihad by crafting the message that change in a single nation-state will be 
ineffective and, at least in the Islamic world, it is precisely nation-states which are 
problematic. Al-Qaeda has ideologically and operationally moved away from the near 
enemy/ far enemy debate and employed a glocalised strategy. In creating a near/ far 
consensus that has appeal throughout the world of Islamic militancy al-Qaeda is further 
trying to position itself as the vanguard of the Salafi Jihadist cause.
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8.3 Global Competitors: Same Goal, Different Methods
It is important to note that al-Qaeda is not without competitors, organisations that differ 
in strategy and method while still advocating the same goal of establishing an Islamic 
caliphate. This thesis primarily observes al-Qaeda and its constituents, however, it 
would be presumptuous to maintain that al-Qaeda has achieved absolute dominance as 
the only ideological representative of the Salafist Islamist movement. Indeed, as Gerges 
notes, “conventional wisdom has it that al-Qaeda’s Global Jihad ideology is 
representative of all jihads, which is false; it represents a branch of a highly diverse and 
complex movement, one that has undergone dramatic shifts from localism to globalism 
and now appears to target internal and external enemies alike.”"^ " What binds them 
together, however, is an agreed upon grand objective, the establishment of an Islamic 
order.
Al-Qaeda has campaigned to be the vanguard of the Salafi Jihadists movement, having 
successfully marketed itself as a brand name and an ideology. Nevertheless, they are not 
the sole voice of those who advocate the caliphate with a global organisational 
presence."^® Hizb ut-Tahrir and Takfir wal Hijra are notable organisations who 
challenge al-Qaeda’s claim to be the dominant actor which speaks for the Muslim umma 
and the struggle for its unification under a single leadership. Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to 
pursue nonviolent means of achieving these objectives, where Takfir wal Hijra has 
adopted an approach which is willing to sacrifice strict Islamic teachings on conduct as
Gerges, The Far Enemy, 129.
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long as this is in aid of the greater cause. These are not the only organisations which 
challenge al-Qaeda, they are, however, prominent. Despite the potential for cooperation 
and the cross fertilisation of jihadist ideology, they occupy different distinct positions 
on the jihadist political map.
Takfir wal Hijra was founded by Shuki'i Mustapha, a disciple of Sayid Qutb in Egypt in 
the 1960s, as an off shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood with the explicit aim of 
establishing an Islamic caliphate."^' As the organisation’s name indicates, Hijra is an 
integral part of their method of operation during a period of weakness. Mustapha 
observed:
If the Jews or anyone else came, our movement ought not to fight in the ranks of the 
Egyptian army, but on the contrary ought to flee to a secure position. In general, our 
line is to flee before the external and internal enemy alike, and not to resist him.^^^
This method was emulated by the Mujahedeen and the Afghan Arabs who retreated 
from the regimes of the Middle East to wage jihad  again st the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan during the 1980s. Al-Zawahiri synthesised the ideas of Mustapha and 
Muhammad abd al-Faraj to create the al-Qaeda doctrine on Hijra, which is the 
paradigm supported by most Salafi Jihadists in the contemporary era. Takfir wal Hijra 
adherents have no moral objection to conforming to Western cultural norms to remain 
undetected. The violation of strict Islamic codes of behaviour such as the eating of pork 
or consumption of alcohol can be disregarded in the name of blending in and achieving 
the organisation’s objectives.
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Takfir wal Hijra has no central command structure and could be more effectively 
understood in ideological terms. Though it is suspected that they have connections with 
al-Qaeda, most notably with Takfir wal Hijra operatives having provided support for the 
March 11,2004 bombings in Madrid, it remains an independent institution."^' Primarily, 
al-Qaeda and Takfir wal Hijra differ on which targets to prioritise. Though some that 
eventually joined al-Qaeda such as al-Zawahiri, as noted in his work The Road to 
Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo were finnly committed the Takftri practise of 
targeting the near enemy first (Arab Regimes), al-Qaeda’s shift in the 1990s to privilege 
the far enemy (the West and Israel), created tensions betw^een the two groups."^^ With 
the new trend towards a glocalised strategy the potential for further cooperation may 
increase.
Hizb ut-Tahrir claims to be a nonviolent organisation, defening violent jihad  at least 
until a more suitable time. The group was founded in 1952 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani 
with the explicit goal of rebuilding the lost caliphate. A map of the Hizb world vision 
indicates this caliphate would stretch through the Middle East and North Afiica across 
Central Asia, Pakistan, India and into South East Asia and Indonesia, as well as 
encompassing parts of Spain and the B a l k a n s . T h e  ideology and method set out by 
Nabhani in The Islamic Stat^^^ and The Economic System oflslam^^^ is rather 
comprehensive and specific, giving detailed plans of exactly what an Islamic state
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would be and how it would be governed. It gives consideration to economics and 
politics as well as social issues. The party states its aims clearly on its website:
Hizb ut-Tahi’ir is a political party whose ideology is Islam. Its objective is to resume the 
Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam 
and carries its call to the world Hizb ut-Tahrir has prepared a paity culture that includes 
a host of Islamic rules about life’s matters. The party calls for Islam in its quality as an 
intellectual leadership from which emanates the systems that deals with all man’s 
problems, political, economic, cultural and social among others. Hizb ut-Tahrir is a 
political party that admits to its membership men and women, and calls all people to 
Islam and to adopt its concepts and systems. It views people according to the viewpoint 
of Islam no matter how diverse their nationalities and their schools of thought were. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir adopts the interaction with the umma in order to reach its objective and it 
struggles against colonialism in all its forms and attributes in order to liberate the umma 
from its intellectual leadership and to deracinate its cultural, political, military and 
economic roots from the soil of the Islamic lands. Hizb ut-Tahrir endeavouis to change 
the enoneous thoughts which colonialism has propagated, such as confining Islam to 
rituals and morals.
Where certain ideological similarities with al-Qaeda are obvious in the Hizb doctrine 
and the desire to work for the trans-national Islamic state is evident, the Hizb leadership 
claims to operate within established political structures and to act non-violently to 
achieve its aims. This would appear to be in contrast with al-Qaeda’s doctrine summed 
up in the words of Azzam, "jihad and the rifle alone; no negotiations, no conferences, 
and no dialogues.”""^  However, Zeyno Baran notes, as other critics have, that Hizb ut- 
Tahrir acts as a “conveyor belt” for those who eventually “graduate” to al-Qaeda.""^ 
Individuals are often radicalised by Hizb ut-Tahrir’s comprehensive ideology but seek 
to move beyond the parameters the institution has set to work within the legal political 
process. Frustration with the stagnant political process can be a catalyst for motivating 
individuals to join the Global Jihad and act violently in pursuit of its objectives, 
deeming politics as a Western kufar undertaking that has no place in the Salafi Jihadist 
practise.
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Ed Hussein, a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, observes that “Nabhani had 
designed a highly centralised state, controlling almost every area of life from the centre. 
He had detailed the role of the army, the function of the citizen, the purpose of the 
education system, the running of the economy, the minutiae relating to the life of the 
caliph. W h i l e  al-Qaeda’s ideologues have reached deep into Islamic history to 
justify the Global Jihad in the creation of an ideology, an-Nabhani was equally 
concerned with statecraft and the building of a functioning bureaucracy of the caliphate 
using the work of a 13* century Muslim scholar al-Mawaridi, who himself had detailed 
the political organisation for the Abbasid Empire.""' Though an-Nabhani passed his 
work off as original, it was in fact adopted from al-Mawaridi, whose concepts could be 
traced back through the Umayyad system to that of the Byzantine and Persian systems. 
For Hussein this demonstrates that that there was no “original Islamic political 
system.”""'^  This could help to explain the reluctance of the al-Qaeda ideologues to deal 
with practical issues of social and economic organisation. Doing so could be understood 
to undermine the legitimacy they endeavour to create by appealing to strictly Salafi 
Islamic resources bypassing the holders of traditional religious authority, the Ulema.
In addition to this is the matter of strategy. Hizb ut-Tahrir advocates the targeting of the 
near enemy (Muslim rulers) as primary, as opposed to al-Qaeda’s glocalised strategy. 
They argue that before the current state based order can be replaced with an Islamic 
order the rulers of Islamic lands must be replaced. Targeting the United States directly 
is inefficient. However, the removal of these regimes in the Islamic world first will 
more readily facilitate the change they advocate and prepare the way for an Islamic
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state.""^ What this aims to highlight is that there are in fact competing Islamist 
narratives with competing methods and ideologies vying for space in the public 
discourse on how to achieve a renewed caliphate. Al-Qaeda is but one of these voices, it 
is, however, a powerful well recognised one. Even so, differing ideological approaches 
and methods do not detract from the notion that there is a singular objective for which 
the Global Jihad is waged, the building of an Islamic political order based on unity and 
religious legitimacy.
8.4 The Freelance Jihadists
The evolution of al-Qaeda and the changing nature of technology has, to some extent, 
freed al-Qaeda from the need to be an organisation with a direct command and control 
apparatus. The cyber jihad has meant al-Qaeda’s message is easily transmitted to 
individuals in almost any geographical location who don’t necessarily speak Arabic and 
who may be of any socio-economic background. In effect, anyone can now be a jihadist 
without the need to travel to remote parts of the world to receive training and 
indoctrination. In the early days of the Afghanistan jihad  in the 1980s this was not the 
case. In Join the Caravan written by Abdullah Azzam, a key figure in the formation of 
al-Qaeda, are listed contact phone numbers and a mailing address at Peshawar 
University in Pakistan to aid aspiring Jihadists attempting to join the Global Jihad.""^ 
Intelligence and security issues evidently prevent this from being a possibility in the 
present, but neither is it necessary. A cursory glance of the Salafi Jihadist literature.
Barak Mendelsohn, God V5. Westphalia (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, August 30, 2007)
Azzam, Join the Caravan.
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widely available on the internet, gives clear advice for how to wage jihad  at the 
individual level without the need to have direct contact with a legitimate member of the 
al-Qaeda organisation. Inspired Jihadists are largely targeted outside of the Muslim 
world, communicating in English and appealing to technologically savvy individuals. In 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s English language journal Inspire appears an article 
entitled How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen o f Your Mom?^^ This gives the reader 
instructions on making crude explosive devices using easily accessible materials.
This kind of marketing gives the Global Jihad an infinite pool of potential recruits and 
could create a chaotic security dilemma. The third level of the Global Jihad, the 
individual, insures that anyone can be al-Qaeda, anyone can be a jihadist. It allows al- 
Qaeda to achieve a mythical status as it can claim to be responsible for any individual 
action without actually having had direct communication with the individuals involved. 
Al-Qaeda’s most dangerous legacy may be that its potential to inspire and cause damage 
is becoming exponentially greater even though its material and operational capabilities 
are diminishing. As Benjamin Davis notes, “more than guns, bombs, or missiles, the 
internet is the most important tactical tool for terrorist groups today.” Spectacular 
events like 9/11 may be increasingly difficult to coordinate and ultimately carry out, but 
access to Salafi Jihadist material makes smaller, though lethal, operations of increasing 
significance. Operations at this level are more difficult to detect and prevent from 
coming to action.
Anwar al-Awlaki, “How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom,” Inspire, no. 1 (Summer, 
2010): 33.
778 Benjamin R. Davis, Ending the Cyber Jihad (Washington DC: Catholic University, 2006): 1.
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8.5 Conclusion
Al-Qaeda has numerous affiliates and allies from several institutions globally, however, 
it is also connected loosely or directly to smaller groups of Salafi Jihadists and to 
individuals acting in its name. Within the confines of this research it would be 
impossible to give a detailed summary of all of al-Qaeda’s believed constituents, or to 
give an account of the numerous Salafi Jihadists writers who have flooded the internet 
and Islamists book stores claiming al-Qaeda credentials and aspiring to its ambitions. 
The US Department of State lists 47 foreign ‘terror’ organisations.""" The UK Home 
Office proscribes 46 international organisations under the Terrorism Act of 2000."^® A 
complete observation of each organisation and the unquantifiable number of individual 
aspirants and smaller organisations would not be possible within the confines of this 
research. It is, however, possible to demonstrate that among the major players both al- 
Qaeda’s affiliates, allies, competitors and those it inspires, that there is agreement in 
regard the end goal, the creation of an Islamic caliphate. The contemporary international 
system is an obstacle to this ultimate realisation, and the United States and its allies, as 
actors that seek to maintain the status quo, put themselves at odds with the Salafi 
Jihadist mission.
Though this thesis has given substantial attention to al-Qaeda the organisation and al- 
Qaeda the ideology, it is broadly concerned with Salafi Jihadism in general. This 
chapter has attempted to demonstrate common themes amongst not just al-Qaeda and its
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” United States Department o f State, accessed June 1, 2011, 
http://www.state.gOv/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
“Proscribed Terror Groups or Organisations,” UK Home Office, accessed May 15, 2011, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/
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closest constituents, but as well to those groups and individuals to which it is allied, 
inspired and even those with which it is in competition, those who may share its 
objectives but disagree on strategy and theological matters. The search for Muslim unity 
and religiously legitimised governance, however, is what binds these organisations 
together.
Al-Qaeda has continued to evolve, particularly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. This evolution is not only necessary for its survival because of existential 
threats posed to it by those who seek its destruction, but is as well a necessary tactic to 
market itself as the vanguard of the Global Jihad, gain recruits and position itself as the 
defining ideological centre of the Salafi Jihadist movement. Just as any organisation is 
forced to evolve to achieve its ends, gamer support and effectively market its ideas, al- 
Qaeda is doing the same. By locating the least common denominator among militant 
organisations of significant strength or weaker institutions and as well individuals, it can 
wed its strategy to local and individual grievances while putting aside less significant 
issues in the path of achieving its ends. Unification of the Islamic world and its 
legitimate governance is the most basic tie that binds Salafi Jihadists. The contemporary 
international system and the nation-state concept of sovereignty that characterises it, is 
problematic. US hegemony must be dismpted to achieve the aims of Salafi Jihadists. By 
earning the support of constituents and successfully marketing its ideology, al-Qaeda 
can make the jihad  a global enterprise and challenge the hegemon’s ability and 
willingness to continue its active support of the status quo.
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Chapter 9
The International System, Nation-States and US Hegemony: The Salafi Jihadist
Resistance
The modem intemational system is the result of a long historical process understood as 
developing in the 17* century with the creation of nation-states in Europe. However, it 
is only recently that the system of sovereign states has been consolidated in such an 
unambiguous fashion. Indeed, as Robert Jackson observes, it was only at the end of the 
Cold War that sovereignty emerged in practise as well as theory."^^ He refers to this as a 
“global covenant” where there is an observance of the “sanctity, integrity and 
inviolability of all existing states regardless of their level of development, form of 
govemment, political ideology, pattem of culture or any other domestic character of 
condition.”"^ " It was only at this time that formal empires ceased to exist creating a state 
system that was absent of imperial organisation that had begun to break down in the 20* 
century. The United States as a powerful hegemonic actor is instrumental in aiding the 
existence of the contemporary world order. Salafi Jihadism can be understood to be 
seeking to achieve an altemative world order based on its ideological understanding of 
Islam. These influential non-state actors clearly play a powerful role in intemational 
politics and the resistance to the state and the intemational system in general. Salafi 
Jihadists by their rhetoric and action demonstrate the primacy of the state and the 
intemational system along with US power, as an obstacle to the Salafi Jihadist 
enterprise. Since the failure of Pan-Arabism to unify the Middle East in the 20th century 
there has been no credible discourse or assertion for unity in the Arab/ Islamic world.
Robert Jackson in, The Globalisation o f World Politics Fourth Edition, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith 
and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49.
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Additionally, since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire there has been no 
effective leadership qualified through religious legitimacy. The current intemational 
system is characterised, in part, by nation-state sovereignty and US hegemony. It is 
argued that this presents significant obstacles to Muslim unity and religiously 
sanctioned govemance.
As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the current impasse between the US, its allies and Salafi 
Jihadism, has less to do with values, globalisation, Israel/ Palestine, economic 
disenfi-anchisement, despotism or a particular foreign policy. Without taking an 
apologist position that ignores the realities of these issues and the severe impact they 
have on the region, this thesis argues that the answer to the research question presented 
here is related to the realities of the intemational system that the US aids in maintaining. 
The contemporary order impedes long standing attempts at Islamic, particularly Arab, 
unity and efforts to establish God’s sovereignty in a manner that is more profound than 
in previous historical settings. As was asserted in Section III, there has been a long 
standing search for unity in the Islamic, particularly Arab, world and a quest for 
legitimacy expressed in religious terms. Al-Qaeda has inherited the mantle of this drive 
and has effectively created an ideology for taking power and achieving this through 
violent means, as was demonstrated in Chapter 7. Section II demonstrated that there are 
altemate Islamic concepts of sovereignty, legitimacy and indeed intemational politics, 
that do not necessarily correspond to Westem Intemational Relations approaches. Thus, 
the Jihadist concept of order differs from that of the contemporary Westem 
understanding, and al-Qaeda’s vision of order is derived from Islamic concepts of the 
intemational, sovereignty, statehood and legitimacy.
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Salafi Jihadism cannot be understood in the same manner as the various movements 
which challenge the neo-liberal world order. It is derived fi*om long historical trends and 
deep ideological roots based on divine concepts of extra-rational agency that cannot be 
said to be the case for contemporary movements that challenge the status quo. This 
chapter will demonstrate the central argument of the thesis. The US maintains a 
powerful hegemonic potion that aids in keeping the intemational system, characterised 
by nation-state sovereignty, in place. This is a major obstacle to a project which seeks 
Muslim unity and religiously legitimised govemance. As Chapter 8 asserted, these 
Islamic notions of order have a broad church of followers with varying origins and local 
grievances, but al-Qaeda has successfully reduced their differences to the lowest 
common denominator: 1) Islamic mle is the solution for all grievances. 2) The US and 
the intemational system are major obstacles to that realisation. It would be irrelevant 
which hegemonic power were currently helping to keep the status quo in place.
Whoever maintains the system is a possible target for Salafi Jihadist aggression. China, 
Russia and European countries as powerful states have come under attack by Salafi 
Jihadists, yet, none have been the subject of the degree of ire and pride of place in the 
Salafi Jihadist rhetoric as has the United States. The result of 9/11 has been a 
strengthened resolve of the United States, in contrast to the Salafi Jihadist strategy, to 
preserve the status quo of existing states and the intemational order."^' Indeed, the 
creation of an Islamist intemational has created a need for greater cooperation between 
powerful states in opposing a movement that threatens the current order. In this, it is 
evident that Salafi Jihadists will inevitably target any state that aids in maintaining the 
current order.
Anatol Lieven, “The Secret Policeman’s Ball: The United States, Russia and the Intemational Order 
after 11 September,” International Affairs 78, no. 2 (April, 2002): 245.
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9.1 Constructing World Order: From The World Wars and Cold War to The New 
World Order and 9/11
Richard Hass observes that the modem Middle East has been subject to four distinct 
eras in contemporary h i s t o r y . T h e  first era was that of the Ottomans ending after 
World War One and the collapse of the caliphate in 1924."^  ^ The second era was a 
period of colonisation with British and French management of the region, coming to an 
end after World War Two and the relinquishing of colonial control."^^ The third era was 
defined by the Cold War and Arab nationalism, ending abmptly with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union."^" The fourth contemporary era is defined as the period of American 
influence and hegem ony.Sa la f i  Jihadism which began to develop during the first era 
in a response to increasing encounters with European powers, has changed the focus of 
its aggression in each of these stages. During the colonial period the message fi*om the 
Salafists observed European powers as the obstacles to unity and religiously sanctioned 
goveming. During the early part of the Cold War Salafi Jihadists focused more intently 
on the intemal leadership of the states of the Middle East. Nasserism and the Pan-Arab 
discourse succeeded in limiting this aggression as it provided a concept of unity, though 
not legitimised through religious means. With the passing of Pan-Arabism Salafi 
Jihadism arose as a militant force employing the old anti-colonial discourse, not only in 
opposition to the superpowers, but against the indigenous leadership as well. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and continued failed efforts to remove the secular leaders 
of the Middle East Salafi Jihadism has followed with the times, attacking the guardians
Richard N. Haas, “The New Middle East,” Foreign Affairs (Nov/ Dec 2006): 3. 
Ibid.
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of the contemporary order that prevents both unification and the realisation of God’s 
sovereignty.
The present intemational order is a result of two order building projects. The first, the 
creation of a nation-state system and the associated principles of sovereignty and 
legitimacy. The second, the constmction of a liberal world order by the US and UK."^" 
Building upon the liberal principles established through the power of the British Empire 
the United States has aided in building an intemational order characterised by state 
sovereignty, and it is American power, both soft and hard, that has been essential in 
maintaining the existing status quo.""° The nation-state system that was created in 
Europe has since encompassed the globe and self determination along with mutual 
recognition of sovereignty among states has enforced the primacy of the state itself.""^ 
Despite the occasional violation of the norms of state sovereignty, the state remains the 
most agreed upon component of intemational order.""^ In the post colonial period the 
state has been the compulsory model for independence and this has helped to shape the 
contemporary intemational system.""'
Notable scholars, and indeed Salafi Jihadists alike, have referred to the United States as 
an empire. Some, such as Max Boot"""^  and Niall Ferguson,""' openly champion this 
notion as they argue imperial power serves as an arbiter of stability. Others, like Noam
Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire,” 58-59.
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 203. 
Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire,” 59.
Ibid.
Sami Zubaida, Islam the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East 
(London: LB. Tauris, 1993), 121.
Max Boot, “American Imperialism? No Need to Run Away from Label,” CFR, accessed January 6, 
2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5934.
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall o f  the American Empire (London: Penguin, 2005)
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Chomsky""^ and Edward Said""" use the term critically, while still others deny the 
validity of this term at all, offering instead the term hegemony as a more appropriate 
understanding. Ikenberry understands US power as unique. There exists, he argues, an 
“American led liberal world order with no historical precedent.”""^  Joseph Nye argues 
that it would be better to understand America as possessing soft power which it can use 
to influence the world at large.""" The literature produces a variety of views. However, 
as Michael Cox asserts, “if the discussion about empire has achieved nothing else it has 
at least forced those who have not thought about the problem before to confront one of 
the great silences in both academic Intemational Relations and American political 
discourse.” ®^^
Allison Ayers suggests that what best characterises the US is the concept of an informal 
empire where the dominant power limits self determination and forces states to act 
within the “norms and principles of the emerging world order. For the purposes of 
this thesis it is argued that hegemon is what best describes the US. It is recognised that 
hegemony may be defined by different qualities in various historical settings and that 
each case is unique. In the contemporary era this hegemony is characterised by a liberal 
world order and part of this order is the division of the world into nation-states. This 
order limits the freedom of action of both states and non-state actors. Salafi Jihadists 
who seek to establish an idealised unified Islamic state find the US, as a key provider of
Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, America’s Quest fo r  Global Dominance (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 2003)
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, February 10, 1993, accessed August 19, 2010, 
http://engres.ied.edu.hk/literature/ElecturetMatiAVeek3tRudvardKiplinEVCulture%20and%20Imperialis 
m.pdf.
Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire.”
Joseph Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Public Affairs (2005)
Michael Cox, “Still the American Empire,” Political Studies Review 5, no. 1 (January, 2007): 3.
Allison J. Ayers, “Imperial Démocratisation and Govemance in the New Imperial Order,” Political 
Studies 57, no.l (March, 2009): 1.
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the status quo, to be an obstacle to these objectives. The post Second World War order 
is a consolidation of the nation-state system that has been organised under US 
dominance. It is this dominance, or as it is understood here hegemony, of the United 
States in this period that has increasingly insisted on the maintenance of the status quo 
system of nation-states.
The US has sought to support and maintain the liberal world order since World War 
Two, and is still engaged, if not more so since 9/11, in ensuring the continued existence 
of this system.Fol lowing the Second World War international order was provided by 
the cooperative efforts of the victorious powers, whereby they attempted to supervise 
and police the wor ld .However ,  the onset of the Cold War quickly changed the nature 
of international politics, dividing the world into two ideologically opposed camps, the 
capitalist West and the Communist East, and as well the non-aligned world. During this 
time the United States proclaimed itself to be the “leader of the free world” and a 
“shining city on the bill” that inspired those to democracy and freedom. Beyond this 
politicised terminology, however, that attempted to provide a good versus evil 
discourse, the United States was a hegemonic power that sought to counter the Soviet 
Union, and Communism in general, aggressively with its own ideology that promoted a 
democratic liberal international order.
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a dramatic unexpected shift in 
international politics. The bi-polar structure that had been the defining feature of world 
politics for nearly half a century was swiftly reduced to a structure where the United
Mackubin Thomas Owens, A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order (London: 
Elsevier Limited, 2006), 311.
803 Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1996), 145.
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States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Nye asked, “if the old order has 
collapsed what will be the new distribution of power?”^^"^  For realist theorists of 
International Relations two main ideas developed following the Cold War in response to 
this question. The first, that the US would withdraw from international engagement as 
its foreign policy makers could no longer demonstrate clear reasons for expending 
blood and treasure to act as a global securitising f o r c e . T h e  opposing view insisted 
that the ability of the United States to influence world politics would be dramatically 
increased and that the international order would witness a uni-polar moment where the 
US could act unrestrained in the absence of a balancing power.
For some in the Middle East the demise of the Soviet Union represented the tragic loss 
of a powerful patron that could not he replaced by another state.^®^  For others, however, 
it was a great victory over a powerful non-believer actor which was a crucial moment in 
the long historical struggle between the Muslim believers led by the various caliphs and 
the non-believers led by imperial forces.^^^ The end of the Cold War had significant 
effects on the evolving nature of the Global Jihad. First, inspiring the Mujahedeen 
Myth, and second, leaving the United States as the lone super power. A super power 
that could effectively project its power globally, and more importantly unchallenged, in 
its efforts to preserve the liberal international order.
Joseph Nye, “What New World Order,” Foreign Affairs (March/ April, 1992): 86.
Steve Smith, “The End of the Unipolar Moment: September 11 and the Future of World Order,
International Relations 16, no. 2 (2002): 172.
806 Bernard Lewis, “Free at Last: The Arab World in the Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs (March/ 
April, 2009): 84.
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The Mujahedeen Myth suggests that a band of poorly equipped hut determined fighters 
aided by God had expelled the powerful Soviet Union from occupied Afghanistan, and 
this had resulted in the ultimate demise of the Soviet Empire. The Soviet Union was 
viewed to be the stronger of the two superpowers in terms of fighting capabilities and 
political will for a protracted war. Therefore, if the Mujahedeen had defeated and 
ultimately caused the destruction of the Soviet Union, it followed logically that the 
defeat of the United States could be achieved as well.^^  ^Bin Laden observed, “Russia 
was the head of the Communist bloc. With the disintegration of Russia, Communism 
withered away in Eastern Europe. Similarly, if the United States is beheaded the Arab 
Kingdoms will wither away. Americans are afraid of death. They are like mice. If 
Russia can be destroyed the United States can also be beheaded.”^^ ^
During the 1990s the Salafi Jihadist strategy began to shift. Groups prior to this had 
been largely nationally bound as opposed international in their outlook, with specific 
grievances that could conceivably be negotiated.^Evidently, there were numerous 
instances of international ‘terrorism’ prior to the end of the Cold War, however, they 
were directed for the most part towards their immediate targets and had yet to establish 
a global strategy. Following the Soviet collapse international Islamic ‘terrorism’ began 
to emerge as a significant global force. The change in the organisation of the 
international system shifted the strategic orientation of the Global Jihad. There were no 
longer two superpowers to play against each other. As previously mentioned, the 
situation in Afghanistan is significant, not just in the promotion of a myth but equally in
Ibid, 84.
Hamid Mir, “Interview with Osama bin Laden, March 18, 1997,” Bin Laden Statements 1994-2004, 
accessed January 9, 2011, littp://www.fas.org/irn/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf.
Albert J. Bergensen and Omar Lizardo, “International Terrorism and the World System,” Sociology 
Theory 22, no. 1 (March, 2004): 42.
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geostrategic and material terms. Nearly a decade of fighting in Afghanistan created a 
network of trained and ideologically indoctrinated Salafi Jihadists that were now free to 
he redeployed elsewhere. The objectives of the Salafi Jihadists to build a formidable 
fighting force through the hijra had been achieved.
9.2 Resisting World Order
Much of the academic discourse regarding hegemony and resistance to the dominant 
hegemonic power is rooted in the study of political economy. Hegemonic stability 
theory regards the United States as maintaining a liberal economic world order.^*  ^
Therefore, it is conceivable to become deeply engaged in the economic and critical 
aspects of the conflict between Salafi Jihadism and the United States by suggesting that 
the major opposition to US hegemony, as presented by the Salafi Jihadists, is a 
resistance to unequal economic practises and the cultural and materialistic aspects that 
accompany the liberal international world order. This deprives the Islamic world of its 
spiritual compass and serves as a tool of oppression by the hegemonic power. These 
assertions cannot be entirely dismissed and, as Chapter 1 argued, there are numerous 
factors that influence the Global Jihad but do not explain it in its entirety. Cultural 
imperialism and economic hardship exist around the various parts of the world but have 
not produced the unique response that characterises the Salafi Jihadist resistance to the 
international system and its hegemonic benefactor.
Charles Kindleberger is closely associated with Hegemonic Stability Theory arguing that the 
international system is more likely to remain stable if there is one powerful nation-state that is more 
dominant than the remaining actors. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1986)
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Salafi Jihadists object to the cultural contamination of the Islamic world and the 
economic practises that follow the liberal world order, but the resistance is less to a 
particular order that is described here as liberal, but rather to any order that does not 
have its roots in the Islamic tradition and prevents the emergence of such an Islamic 
order. Communism, as was clearly demonstrated in the origins of the Global Jihad in 
Afghanistan, was not acceptable as an alternative paradigm of international order. This 
is not just in reference to its economic principles, but more simply because the model 
did not fit with Salafi Jihadist prescriptions of order.
Theorists of International Political Economy have done a great deal to advance research 
on counter-hegemonic movements that resist the liberal international order on the basis 
of unequal economic practises and challenge the hegemonic power and the international 
order that it maintains. Along with this the ‘Mcdonaldization’ of non-Western countries 
and cultural imperialism are argued to disrupt societies and generate alienation fi*om and 
corruption of indigenous cultural norms. These arguments are not without merit. 
However, Salafi Jihadism must be conceptualised through a different lens than the other 
prevailing counter-hegemonic movements.
System challenging groups reject the legitimacy of the international system and act to 
replace the sovereignty based system with an alternative organising principle.^*^ 
Mendelsohn argues that violent non-state aetors challenge the international system 
primarily by rejecting the rules on which the international system is founded and those 
institutions that are active in maintaining order, which manifests as a rejection of the
Mendelsohn, God w. Westphalia, 54.
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state as the premier political unit of the system.^Therefore, “al-Qaeda poses a 
ehallenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the international 
society as a whole.” *^"^ Steve Smith argues that the events of 9/11 demonstrated that 
states are no longer the key actors in international relations.^^^ Though it is agreed that 
al-Qaeda is “a very different kind of organisation to the state both in identity and 
structure,” and that this structure is the “antithesis of the hierarchical modem state,”^^  ^it 
is still maintained that the state is the key actor in international relations.
Al-Qaeda is a powerful non-state actor, but its actions indicate quite the opposite of 
Smith’s assertions. Al-Qaeda challenges the state overtly through an aggressive militant 
process, not ambiguously and organically in the way the processes of globalisation and 
trans-national corporations and institutions do. The state is an obstacle to Salafi Jihadist 
objectives and they have spent significant energy attempting to subvert the integrity of 
the states in the Islamic world. It would, therefore, appear that even in the minds of the 
Salafi Jihadists the state is the key actor in international politics. It is not disputed that 
there are numerous varieties of powerful actors in the international system and the 
sovereignty of the state is increasingly challenged. They have not yet, however, 
superseded the state in terms of relevance. Although this thesis focuses on a non-state 
actor and recognises that the contemporary international system is a creation of recent 
history and will likely be altered in the future, it is not yet ready to dismiss the 
importance of the state so readily.
Ibid, 50.
Ibid, 56.
Smith, “The End of the Unipolar Moment,” 177. 
^'^Ibid.
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Faruq Hamada Professor of Hadith Studies argues for an Islamic political order to 
replace the Middle East nation-state system.^He asserts that this kind of federalised 
unity has not been unprecedented in other parts of the world and in fact is a necessity if 
the Islamic sphere is to compete in the contemporary world. Hamada further notes that 
“Muslim unity is primary in a world of political blocs and ideological alliances. There is 
no place for mini-states. Disparity did not stop China, the United States and the USSR 
from forming a single state, why could not Muslims do the same?”^^  ^From this point of 
view an Islamic bloc would appear un-prohlematic, at least as a utopian notion. 
However, the end goal of the Global Jihad would not just be the emergence of a Muslim 
bloc of states, hut a phenomenon that would continue to press for expansion, even after 
the idealised Islamic order is instituted in the Islamic world.
The international system, characterised by nation-states and a hegemonic actor and 
great powers that help to preserve it, is a significant obstacle to the Salafi Jihadist 
project based on Muslim unity and religiously sanctioned governance. The 
entrenchment of this system prevents the construction of an Islamic order. Ikenberry 
asserts:
The Liberal international order is highly developed, expansive, integrated 
institutionalised and deeply rooted in the society and economics of both advanced 
capitalist states and developing states. For over half a century this order has been 
usually capable of assimilating rising powers and reconciling political and cultural 
diversity.^*^
Faruq Hamada, Constructing the Umma Between Islam and Contemporary Thinking 
(Rabat: 1986), 112-113.
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Further to this, China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, The European Union and other great 
and emerging powers may struggle over the rights privileges and responsibilities of a 
leading state within the system, but they do not seek to overturn the existing order.
They do not seek to change the rules of the game, but rather labour to obtain more 
authority and leadership within it.^ ^^  There have at times emerged ambitious rulers who 
pursue change outside of the established parameters, however, they often face a 
coalition of powers who prefer to maintain the status quo.^^  ^Similarly, Salafi Jihadists 
who seek to challenge the status quo will face actors who are willing to work together in 
the interest of maintaining the international system.
Salafi Jihadists have evidently rejected the international order and assert this resistance 
in religious terms, in search of a political agenda to change the existing order. It is 
resistance that in another historical or societal context could he expressed in secular 
terms. The task of this thesis has been to demonstrate that Salafi Jihadist resistance is 
both unique and common. It is based on a desire to obtain power and unity by 
dismantling the nation-state system in the Middle East. However, it is unique in that it is 
the manifestation of Islamic history and ideology with particular concepts of order that 
the liberal international order cannot, as Ikenherry suggested, “reconcile” with.
™ Ibid, 61.
Ibid, 57.
 ^Norman Graeber, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan (Delaware: 
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9.3 Post Hegemonic Challenges to World Order
Since the 1980s scholars of International Relations have heen debating American 
decline and its fading influence as a global power. This argument has yet to reach any 
consensus, with some scholars arguing it is less that America is in decline but rather that 
others are on the ascent, and that the uni-polar moment immediately following the Cold 
War and the demise of the bi-polar system will result in a number of emerging great 
powers to rival the United States.^^^ Whether or not the US is in decline and in danger 
of losing its hegemonic position remains unresolved in the scholarship of International 
Relations, and in particular International Political Economy. However, what is without 
dispute is the growth of China and others such as Brazil and India. This thesis argues 
that it is the position of the US as a dominant hegemonic actor and its influence 
globally, particularly in maintaining the status quo of the international system, that has 
resulted in the conflict with Salafi Jihadism. Further, this is less to do with anything 
specifically American, he it values or policy. It would, therefore, seem evident that if 
other powerful states began to spread their influence internationally and aid in 
maintaining the status quo, particularly in the Arab/ Islamic world, then, they too would 
come into conflict with Salafi Jihadism and find themselves as targets in al-Qaeda’s 
broader global agenda.
China has maintained a policy of non-intervention into the affairs of other states for 
over 60 years. However, sub-national and trans-national threats along with China’s 
increased interests abroad will undoubtedly challenge this policy of non intervention.
825 Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs (May/ June, 2008)
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which is grounded substantially in a concept of world order that privileges state 
sovereignty .With China’s economic interests having grown exponentially on a global 
scale, significant Chinese economic investment has been made in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, making the stability of those states critical to Chinese interests.^^^ China 
has as well developed an interest in maintaining the status quo order including support 
for regimes that Salafi Jihadists view as apostate. As China becomes increasingly 
engaged outside of its own borders it is likely that the Salafi Jihadists will be forced to 
focus on Chinese foreign interests in much the way the United States has been 
targeted.^ ^^
Bin Laden in a 1998 interview expressed the al-Qaeda position on China, which would 
appear to conceptualise China, like the Islamic world, as oppressed by the Western 
powers. Equally, however, he expressed a veiled warning:
I often here about Chinese Muslims but since we have no direct connection with people 
in China and no member of our organisation comes from China, I don’t have any 
detailed knowledge about them. The Chinese government is not fully aware of the 
United States and Israel. These two countries also want to usurp the resources of China. 
So I would suggest the Chinese government be careful of the US and the West.^^^
China would appear peripheral to the Global Jihad and indeed the broader Muslim 
world, with the exception of the Muslim minority in the northwest province of Xinjiang 
known to its Muslim inhabitants as East Turkestan. Al-Qaeda has traditionally refrained 
from targeting China, possibly as a strategic matter of not wishing to incur the wrath of 
another significant power. In parallel China has endeavoured to pre-empt any attempt
Brian Fishman, “Al-Qaeda and the Rise of China: Jihadi Geopolitics in a Post-Hegemonic World,” 
The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 3 (Summer, 2011): 48.
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by al-Qaeda to direct the Global Jihad against Chinese interests by refraining from 
rhetorical confrontation with the Salafi Jihadists.
In 2006 a video entitled Jihad in Eastern Turkestan appeared on a UK based Islamic 
website with Uighur militants displaying weapons making threats to attack the enemy 
(China). The video expressed clear sympathies with al-Qaeda containing images of the 
9/11 attacks, demonstrating that these militants are drawing inspiration from al- 
Qaeda.^^^ In 2008 the Turkistan Islamic Party announced its intentions to carry out jihad  
in China, and since has been responsible for the production of an online magazine 
similar to Inspire as produced by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This Turkestan 
publication is written in Arabic which is not spoken in the region. This appears to be a 
tactic for the purpose of soliciting support from jihadist benefactors and positioning 
Xinjiang as a part of the Global Jihad.^^^
On July 5, 2009 riots erupted in the Xinjiang city of Urumqi between Muslims and 
ethnic Han Chinese, resulting in the deaths of 184 p e o p l e . T h e  riots were followed by 
a crackdown from Chinese authorities to restore security. From the Salafi Jihadist 
perspective this was viewed as the brutal oppression of Muslim people. A Chinese 
official, however, attempted to ease the concerns of Muslims stating, “measures that the 
Chinese government takes to stop riots do not target any specific ethnic population but
Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth George Pereire, “An al-Qaeda Associate Group Operating in China,’ 
China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no. 2 (2006): 58.
Jacob Zenn, “Jihad in China? Marketing the Turkistan Islamic Party,” Terrorism Monitor 9, no. 11 
(March 17,2011)
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the violent crimes that aim to split China and mar the ethnic relationships. We hope 
Muslim compatriots will understand the truth.”^^ ^
During the same month the al-Qaeda affiliated group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreh 
expressed solidarity with the Chinese Muslims threatening to kill 50,000 Chinese 
workers in Algeria. Later, in October of 2009, al-Qaeda spokesmen Ahu Yahya al-Libi 
condemned Chinese actions and invited the Muslims of Xinjiang to join the Global 
Jihad:
There is no way to remove injustice and oppression without a true return to their 
religion and serious preparation for jihad  in the path of God the almighty and carry 
weapons in the face of those Chinese invaders. It is the duty for Muslims to stand by 
their wounded and oppressed brothers in East Turkestan and support them with all they 
can.^ "^^
Al-Lihi, in a video entitled East Turkestan the Forgotten Wound, laid out the specific 
grievances al-Qaeda has with China in relation to Xinjiang. 1) Trying to dissolve 
Islamic identity in East Turkestan just as Europe did in Andalusia and the Jews are 
doing in Palestine. 2) Colonising Xinjiang with Han Chinese and aiding them with jobs, 
land and money. 3) Limiting the growth of Muslim populations with abortions and 
taxation. 4) Robbing the Muslims of natural resources. 5) The killing of 200,000 
Muslims. 6) Separating Muslim women from their families by exporting them to work 
in factories in the east causing them to lose ties with their family and culture and turn to 
atheism or kill themselves.^^^ The situation in China additionally caught the attention of
Ibid.
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al-Qaeda central with al-Zawahiri associating China with the traditional powers and 
linking it to the Global Jihad as a status quo maintenance actor. Al-Zawahiri stated:
Respect for the principles of the United Nations basically means ruling by other than 
sharia and also means recognition of Israel’s control of Palestine and Russia’s control 
of Chechnya and indeed all of the Muslim Caucasus, and it means recognition of 
Spain’s control over Ceuta and Melilla and China’s control over East Turkestan, 
because all these states are members of the UN whose charter calls for respecting the 
unity and integrity of those territories.*^^
From this it can he observed that China is increasingly attracting attention from al- 
Qaeda and potentially could be observed as a target, as it behaves as other great powers 
which help to maintain the status quo.
Despite receiving limited attention, due to the killing of Bin Laden in Pakistan by US 
forces, the Turkistan Islamic Party released another video in May of 2011 entitled Letter 
to the Chinese People, expressing similar grievances to those espoused by al-Lihi.^^^ 
This would seem to be a case of standard method of operation for al-Qaeda and its 
associates, linking a local plight to the Global Jihad, in what was referred to as 
glocalisation in Chapter 8. Where al-Qaeda has heen historically reluctant to engage 
with China, emerging realties of international politics will undoubtedly cause al-Qaeda 
to readjust its strategy. Though the Xinjiang movement at present cannot be compared 
to al-Qaeda’s operations against the United States and its allies, it demonstrates that as 
China becomes more global and its interests spread it too will become a target of al- 
Qaeda as it aids in maintaining the status quo.
Al-Zawahiri, From Kabul to Mogadishu.
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9.4 Conclusion
The international system, characterised hy state sovereignty and a hegemonic actor, 
prevents the realisation of the Salafi Jihadist aims. First, the unification of the Islamic 
particularly Arab world, and second, the organisation of an Islamic political order based 
on God’s Sovereignty and Islamic practises. This in itself is not a novel concept. 
However, an investigation of the contemporary world order and looking to historical 
and emerging orders detracts from the notion that what Salafi Jihadists object to is 
anything that is particularly American, apart from its unprecedented power and a 
willingness to maintain the existing international order. The factors introduced in 
Chapter 1 undoubtedly have had an effect on the rise of Salafi Jihadism and its 
continued existence. It is not debated that Israel, modernity, US culture and foreign 
policy, and the process of globalisation serve as valuable tools in recruiting Salafi 
Jihadist foot soldiers. However, when the question is observed as a whole, rather than in 
specific geographical or temporal spaces, the Global Jihad can be understood at the 
systemic level.
Islamic concepts of the international, sovereignty, statehood and legitimacy vary. 
However, the Salafi Jihadist concept is in large part incompatible with the existing 
order. The Islamic concepts of the international that al-Qaeda have employed in the 
construction of its ideology do not conform to existing orthodox concepts of the 
international and the existing world order. Whatever the features of the current order in 
social, economic, cultural or material terms, the premier variable which prevents an 
Islamic order is the division of the Islamic world into nation-state units and the
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willingness of the hegemon, along with other powers, to maintain this system. As long 
as this is the case unity and legitimate sovereignty, as prescribed by the Salafi Jihadist 
understanding, is impossible to establish. Whoever maintains this order is engaged in 
the task of preventing the emergence of a trans-national Islamic state, whether this is by 
design or simply as a side effect of the nature of international order. The United States 
is at cross point in history where long standing Islamic ideas regarding unity and 
legitimacy intersect with a system that the US aids in maintaining. This has stopped the 
long running process from continuing. If in the future other great powers become more 
substantially invested in maintaining the status quo, they will also find themselves in the 
position of encountering Salafi Jihadist resistance.
285
Conclusions
This thesis asks: What are the social, ideological and historical trends that have brought 
Salafi Jihadism into conflict with the US at the turn of the 21*^  century? The literature 
on the Global Jihad is exhaustive. Journalists, scholars, analysts and practitioners have 
produced a quantity of information that leaves the subject of Salafi Jihadism caught in a 
dense forest that has become increasingly difficult to navigate. Though distinguished 
scholars, such as Fred Halliday, Olivier Roy and Giles Repel, were contributing to the 
most valuable of this literature long before the events of 9/11, the aftermath of that day 
has resulted in an ever increasing volume of works that make this area of research 
particularly expansive. Further, it is not only those who observe the Global Jihad 
abstractly and attempt to conceptualise it, hut as well the Salafi Jihadists themselves and 
the political elite that have further muddied the scholastic waters. It has become to an 
extent a dialogue between the Salafi Jihadists and those who oppose it. Ideas like the 
Clash o f Civilizations thesis, a product of Western academic scholarship, becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, giving the Salafi Jihadists a language to explain their 
perceptions of events in a manner the West can understand. As the Global Jihad has 
grown increasingly global, winning converts and adversaries in areas that would not he 
considered Islamic or Arabic speaking, the scholarship continues to expand. The 
explanations for the origins of the Global Jihad have become more confused since 9/11, 
lost in the limitless pages written on the subject. This thesis is aimed at bringing some 
clarity to the matter hy looking at the problem in a systemic manner. It attempts to move 
beyond purely Western oriented conceptions, yet, is also mindful of the variety of
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messages and purposes of those messages emanating from the Salafi Jihadist 
community.
It is impossible to account with any degree of certainty as to why any given individual 
joins ranks with the Salafi Jihadists and becomes involved in the Global Jihad. 
Economic disenfranchisement, the effects of the processes of modernity and 
globalisation, sympathy for the people of Palestine and disenchantment with the Israeli 
state, international policies and practises of the West, the perception of Western culture 
as decedent, depraved, materialistic and godless, and indeed religious fervour. All have 
a role to play in this and cannot be discounted in an investigation at the individual level. 
However, none of these explanations gives much insight into the larger problem, which 
requires a systemic investigation. Why any given individual joins a cause is often of 
little value in understanding the causation of events. It is historical trends, systemic 
pressures and viewing the international system holistically that can offer the most 
pervasive perspectives in understanding why Salafi Jihadism has come into conflict 
with the US.
The Global Jihad exists at a point in time. It has not always existed and will likely 
dissolve or he subject to a metamorphosis in the future. However, investigating 
historical trends and the structure of the current international system has something to 
offer in understanding why the current situation exists. This thesis has argued that the 
current international order is, in part, maintained hy a willing hegemonic actor. Whether 
or not this is likely to continue or for how long is not the subject of interest here. The 
contemporary order, characterised hy the sovereignty of nation-states, is disruptive to
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certain Islamic concepts of order grounded in Islamic theology and alternative concepts 
of sovereignty, legitimacy and unity. This thesis has attempted to avoid normative 
approaches and remain clear of the argument that any type of extra rational belief can be 
deemed inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or inevitably contributes to violence. It is only 
argued that Islam, as it is interpreted hy Salafi Jihadists and indeed others, contains a 
concept of order which offers an alternative to the present international order that 
defines the modem world. Hence, the hypothesis this thesis has intended to demonstrate 
is valid: One of the primary factors driving Islamic, or more specifically Salafi Jihadist, 
violence against the United States and its allies lies in an incompatibility between the 
stmcture of the international system and the historical search for Muslim unity and 
religiously legitimised governance that Salafi Jihadists seek to actualise.
On the face of it, suggesting that Salafi Jihadists seek a single Islamic state with 
religiously legitimised governance is not exceptionally novel, as it is an idea deeply 
imbedded in the discourse of the Salafi Jihadists themselves and recognised by a 
significant body of literature. This is often, however, taken as something that can only 
be related to the contemporary era and contemporary issues and circumstances. As this 
thesis has demonstrated, it is palatable to many scholars to look for answers that are of 
contemporary origin, as taking the Salafi Jihadists at their word is less possible. 
However, it is argued here that the Salafi Jihadist ideologues are quite serious in their 
efforts. The end goal is an Islamic state mled by the Salafi Jihadists’ interpretation of 
sharia. The Salafi Jihadists do indeed speak of the other issues discussed in this thesis, 
and their list of grievances and issues has increased significantly since Bin Laden’s 
fatwa in 1998. Ideologues focus increasingly on Palestine and Iraq and are at the present
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time heavily focused on taking credit for the Arah Spring. Bin Laden before his death 
even offered his position on climate change and environmental security. The Global 
Jihad is opportunistic and has a chameleon like character, expanding to wherever it can 
find constituents by linking local issues to the broader jihadist project. However, this is 
always done in a manner that reduces the interests of disparate Salafi Jihadist groups to 
the least common denominator: The objective is Muslim unity and religiously 
sanctioned leadership. The US and the international system must he challenged to alter 
the status quo so that these objectives can be achieved.
The end of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, resulting in the division of the Middle East 
into nation-states, was a significantly problematic moment for the Islamic world. The 
rapid move to divide the lands of the Middle East into nation-states still proves to be an 
issue that leaves unresolved concerns. For over 1300 years, prior to Kemal Ataturk’s 
decision to disband the caliphate, unification of the region under a single political and 
religious authority remained at least a possibility. The failure of Pan-Arabism and 
Political Islam to come to terms with the crisis left a vacuum in the discourse on unity 
that has heen increasingly filled by the Salafi Jihadists. Problematically, within the 
region itself the states of the Middle East have largely resigned to the status quo, 
choosing to tend to the business of statecraft. Equally problematic, the structure of the 
international system has developed since the Ottoman collapse in such a way that 
nation-state sovereignty is the preferred model of political organisation. The United 
States has increasingly grown to hegemonic status following World War Two and helps 
to maintain this kind of order. Jihad was largely waged within the Islamic world until
838
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the end of the 20^  ^century, aimed at toppling the ruling regimes most notahly in Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. Failing to disrupt the status qoo Jihad  was engineered into a global 
enterprise.
The Arah states have managed for several decades to fend off the Salafi Jihadists 
challenge, forcing the Salafi Jihadists to take a global approach aimed at weakening the 
system itself hy attacking the country they perceive as the chief benefactor of the 
international order. Increasingly, Jihadists may move beyond the obsession with the US, 
as other actors intervene to ensure the maintenance of the status quo. The Global Jihad 
at the most basic level is a dispute over order, with concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty 
and statehood that differ sharply fi-om the contemporary structure. This kind of struggle 
is not new, and these kinds of discussions have been ongoing in the Islamic world for 
centuries. The development of a truly international system in the 20^  ^century, and its 
maintenance by a hegemonic actor with unprecedented power along with other great 
powers that are willing to work within it, has brought these conflicts out of the Islamic 
world into the world at large.
In dealing with particular challenges to the Islamic world, and indeed humanity in 
general, scholars, practitioners and politicians seek to understand the roots of the Global 
Jihad and offer solutions to bringing it to an end. The first chapter of this thesis engaged 
with these assumptions, noting that these assertions do indeed warrant merit but fail to 
conceptualise the phenomenon as a whole. If poverty is eliminated, some argue, then, 
the Global Jihad will wither. If unequal economic practises and cultural erosion are 
seriously engaged with, the products of globalisation and rapid development, then, the
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Global Jihad will lose ground. For many in the Middle East the crisis of the foundation 
of the Israeli state is the focal point, and only hy negotiating a settlement can the Global 
Jihad be challenged. Still others may suggest that as long as Israel exists at all the 
Global Jihad will go on. More suggest that it is simply a matter of imperial hubris, 
arrogant and domineering foreign policy practises from the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, support for Arab regimes and Israel, to general intervention in the affairs of the 
region at all hy the West and the United States that brought the Salafi Jihadists to seek a 
conflict. If serious consideration were given to altering this behaviour, then, the Global 
Jihad would surely end. For still others the West and the Islamic world are incompatible 
in the sense that Western values conflict with traditional Muslim values. It is the 
decadence and materialism of the West that drives Salafi Jihadists. Cultures and 
civilisations are then destined to clash.
The merits of these assertions are conceivable as they are common themes in the Salafi 
Jihadist discourse. In the mammoth quantity of statements issued by al-Qaeda central 
and its constituents these popular themes emerge woven into the broader narrative. Each 
of these issues are relevant to the Global Jihad and are indeed subjects that are a part of 
the Salafi Jihadist cause. Equally, these grievances and positions serve as valuable 
recruiting tools for future Jihadists. They do not, however, offer a sufficient answer to 
the research question this thesis asks. What are the social, ideological and historical 
trends that have brought Salafi Jihadism into conflict with the US at the turn of the 21*^  
century?
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Though the various proposals for the cause of the Global Jihad have a role to play, the 
issue is that of causation. It is indeed necessary, as Carr suggests, to “simplify the 
multiplicity of answers, to subordinate one answer to another and to introduce some 
order and unity into the chaos of happenings and the chaos of specific causes.”^^  ^
Whatever the volumes of Salafi Jihadist discourse that speak to these issues, it has heen 
observed here that al-Qaeda has various messages for different audiences. The 
undercurrent of their narrative, however, looks to a premier objective, as an 
investigation into the al-Qaeda ideology in Chapter 7 has shown. Through investigating 
Islamic international political theories, as was done in Chapter 4, the genealogy of this 
ideological position becomes evident.
From orthodox International Relations Chapter 2 demonstrated that the realist tradition 
provides a valid picture of the contemporary international system characterised by 
nation-state sovereignty and a hegemonic power that works to maintain it. In the 
contemporary international order there is an increasing harmony of interests among 
states and a growing international society as described by scholars of the English 
School. States in the Middle East are prepared to play the game of international politics 
and pay the price of admission to the community of states. This, however, is precisely 
the problem. The interests of the Salafi Jihadists do not set with the interests of the 
Middle Eastern states, the international community or the West and the United States. 
The realist paradigm, in regards to Salafi Jihadism, does suffer some limitations as some 
realist scholars such as Stephen Walt have readily admitted.^"^° However, realist 
concepts of interests and power are persuasive. Crudely, the interests of the Salafi
Carr, What is History, 118,
Kreisler, “Stephen M. Walt Interview.
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Jihadists have come into conflict with the interests of the United States and its allies.
The Salafi Jihadists do not act within the confines of the international system, they work 
to undo and restructure it with an alternative concept of order, sovereignty, legitimacy 
and statehood.
This thesis hegan with a central hypothesis: One of the primary factors driving Salafi 
Jihadist violence against the United States and its allies lies in the incompatibility 
between the contemporary international system and the Salafi Jihadist vision of an 
Islamic political order. From this are proposed three key assumptions, one based on 
extra-rational belief, one historical and the other contemporary. 1) There are distinctly 
Islamic concepts of order legitimacy and the state that differ from Western concepts that 
characterise the contemporary international system. 2) There has historically been a 
drive, a discourse and indeed action to create an Islamic political order based on the 
unity of the Muslim people governed hy a religiously sanctioned leadership based on 
these Islamic principles. 3) In the contemporary period it is the US, and to a lesser 
extent other great and emerging powers, that engage in preserving the status quo 
international system. In this the US is an obstacle to the unity and legitimacy aspirations 
in a profound and unique way that al-Qaeda and Salafi Jihadism in general seek to 
actualise with a particular ideological understanding of Islam. After first engaging in 
Section I with some of the critical arguments for the rise of Salafi Jihadism and its 
conflict with the US, noting the flaws in these arguments, then setting out a theoretical 
framework from which to begin, this thesis engaged with these three key assumptions in 
sections II, III and IV.
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Section II investigated the first assumption and demonstrated that there are indeed 
specifically Islamic concepts of order, legitimacy, statehood, sovereignty and the 
international. Comparing these to Western concepts it can be observed that there are 
varying Islamic ideas and schools of thought. Salafi Jihadists have a particular notion of 
these concepts that derive from the Islamic tradition. Section III investigated the second 
question and demonstrated that there has been an historical search for unity and 
religiously sanctioned governance in the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East. 
Attempts in the 20^  ^century to recapture this idealised political order have failed. 
Neither Political Islam nor Pan-Arahism were capable of acting as successful legitimate 
unifying movements. Section IV engaged with the third key assumption, showing that 
al-Qaeda has picked up the mantle of those seeking unity and legitimacy. They have 
constructed an ideology derived fi-om a long Islamic scholastic lineage to legitimise 
their claim, as Chapter 7 demonstrated. They have inspired others to their cause 
reducing Salafi Jihadist grievances to the lowest common denominator, as Chapter 8 
demonstrated; Islamic rule is what is needed and the US is an obstacle to this 
realisation. Further, this section demonstrated in Chapter 9 how the contemporary 
international system is an obstacle to Salafi Jihadist objectives, and how the US serves 
as an actor which aids in maintaining that system. Hence, the international system 
characterised by nation-states is an obstacle to the objectives of unity and legitimacy 
that Salafi Jihadists seek. The US as a powerful actor helps to maintain this system and 
puts itself into conflict with al-Qaeda and Salafi Jihadism in general.
This thesis has sought to make links between historical realties and perceptions and the 
contemporary structure. Arguments that suggest there is an inevitable clash between
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competing cultures and civilisations prove unsustainable. Equally, failing to take 
historical experience and ideology seriously by privileging exclusively contemporary 
concerns as the causation of events is limited. Islam and the Middle East are not 
extensions of the Western experience. Islam and the Islamic world need to at the least 
be considered on their own terms in ways that are not always clearly recognisable 
within exclusively orthodox International Relations. Yet, there is a world system and 
this system privileges, recognises and promotes a particular kind of order, and this form 
of political organisation does not fit the ideological paradigm set by the Salafi Jihadists. 
We must find a via medium between the past and the contemporary as well as the 
Islamic and the Western if Salafi Jihadism is to be accurately understood and the 
conflict between the Salafi Jihadists and the US is to he conceptualised. The belligerents 
in this conflict are evident, but its causes remain the subject of debate. This thesis has 
attempted to demonstrate how and why this conflict has come into being in the hope of 
bringing greater clarity to the matter hy observing the question fi*om a broader 
perspective.
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Appendix
Allah: The one, referring to the one God of Islam.
al-Aqsa: The third holiest site in Sunni Islam, located in the old city of Jerusalem 
containing the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
Apostasy: Formal denunciation of religious faith by and individual.
Assabiya: Term popularised by the 14^  ^century Tunisian sociologist Ibn Khaldun. It 
refers to social solidarity and group consciousness with a sense of shared purpose that 
defines the tribal Arab communities.
Ayas: The smallest units of the Quran, usually referred to as verses in English.
al-Azhar: Both a Mosque and a university it was founded in the 10* Century in Cairo 
Egypt. It is considered the foremost institution for Islamic Sunni scholarship.
Ba’ath: (also Ba’athist, Ba’athism) Meaning rebirth or renewal it refers to the Ba’ath 
nationalist party most prominently located in Syria and Iraq that promotes Arab 
nationalism and socialism.
Bilad al-Sham: Greater Syria. Historically it referred to a province established during 
the early Islamic empires encompassing the modem states of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and 
Palestine. Politically, it was reborn in the 20* century as a focal point of Hafez al- 
Assad’s territorial ambitions.
Caliph: Leader of the caliphate
Dar al-Ahd: Non Islamic lands with which Muslims have a temporary peace.
Dar al-Harb and Dar al-lslam: Most prominently this has been used to define a 
dichotomy between Muslim and non-Muslim territory. Dar al-Harb, literally the realm 
of war, is territory controlled by non-Muslims and Dar al-Islam, the realm of Islam, is 
territory under Muslim control.
Darwa: Government.
Din: Religion.
Fatwa: A legal ruling issued by someone with religious authority such as an Imam. 
Fiqh: Islamic jurispmdence.
Hadith: The recorded words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad which are to serve 
as an example to the Muslim people. The most widely accepted collections of Hadiths 
were published by al-Bukhari and al-Hajjaj.
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Hajj: One of the five pillars of Islam, the Hajj is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca that 
should be undertaken once in every Muslim’s lifetime.
Hanafi: The Hanafi is one of the four primary schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. 
Named after the 8*
Sunni disciplines.
* Century Iraqi scholar Abu Hanifa an-Nu‘man, it is the oldest of the
Hijra: In the summer of 622 of the Common Era around seventy of Muhammad’s 
followers left Mecca for the city of Yathrib, 275 miles to the north. This was a 
necessary exodus to escape the hostile conditions the newly formed Muslim community 
faced fi*om the tribes of Mecca.
Hijri: The Islamic calendar named after the Hijra of 622.
Ijma: The consensus of the Islamic community on a point of the law.
Ijtihad: The idea of legitimate religious endeavour in employing personal judgement to 
deal with matters not specifically detailed in the Quran and Sunnah, while using these 
sources as guidance. In the 11* century the so called ‘gates of ijtihad’ were closed by 
the Ulema, supposedly ending the practice. However, it was revived first by Ibn 
Taymiyya in the 14* century and later by the Salafist reformers.
Imam: A religious scholar.
Infidel: Nonbeliever.
Jihad: Translated as struggle it is a highly contested term both within and outside of 
Islam. It may refer to the lesser jihad (jihad al-asghar), generally understood as martial 
conflict for the physical defence of the community. It is also understood as the greater 
jihad (jihad al-akhbar) which is described as the jihad against the self, the struggle to 
become a better Muslim through self improvement.
Jahiliya: Ignorance of God’s will. Historically this described the condition of the Arab 
peoples before Muhammad’s revelation. This notion of the jahili society was revived by 
Ibn Taymiyya and later Sayid Qutb.
Khalifaa: (also caliphate) Refers to the Islamic empires from the time of Muhammad to 
the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Caliph who leads the caliphate is both a religious 
and political leader in an attempt to embody in one individual earthly and divine power.
Kufar: Nonbeliever, someone who denies belief in God.
Maghreb: The predominantly Arab inhabited North Africa.
Mujahedeen: Holy warriors. Term popularised to describe those who participated in 
the expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the 1980s. Now, it is a more 
generalised term describing the participants in the Global Jihad.
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Qiyas: A method of analogical reasoning to deal with matters not specifically detailed 
by the Quran and Sunnah.
Quran: Translated as the recitation. It is the word of Allah as communicated through 
the Angel Gabriel to Muhammad. It serves as the premier religious text for Muslims.
Quraysh: The dominant tribe of Mecca in the 7* century.
Ramadan: The ninth month of the Islamic calendar during which Muslim are to fast 
during the daylight hours as one of the five pillars of Islam.
Rashidun: The Rightly Guided Caliphs. The four Muslim leaders who succeeded 
Muhammad that ruled until 750; Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Kittab, Uthman ibn Affan, Ali 
ibnAbi Talib.
Ridda: Translated as apostasy. The death of Muhammad resulted in a revolt. The revolt 
prompted Abu Bakr to launch a series of military campaigns to suppress the revolt 
known as the Ridda Wars or the Wars of Apostasy.
Salaf: (also Salafism, Salfist, Salafi) Salaf is translated as righteous predecessor, 
referring to those who lived during the Rashidun. In the 19* century those who called 
themselves Salafists developed a methodology of looking to this time period as an 
example of how to deal with the contemporary issues of the Islamic world.
Shahada: One of the five pillars of Islam, it is the oral testimony of faith, “there is no 
God but Allah and Muhammad is his Prophet.”
Sharia: Islamic law. The implementation of sharia varies tremendously throughout time 
and place. However, sharia is based upon the Quran and Sunnah.
Shaykh: An honorific term referring to an elder leader.
Shi’ite: Shi’ite Ali, the Party of Ali. Representing around 15% of Muslims it is a sect of 
Islam that disputes the succession of leadership after the Rashidun. Additionally,
Shi’ites hold other distinct theological differences with the dominant Sunni sect.
Siyasa: Policy
al-Siyasi al Islami: Islamic political order. A government based on Islamic principles.
Sunnah: The words and deeds of the Prophet that are to serve as an example to 
Muslims. The Sunnah is recorded in the Hadiths.
Sunni: The dominant sect of Islam representing more than 80% of Muslims.
Sura: Chapters of the Quran.
Takfir: The practice of one Muslim accusing another of wilful apostasy.
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Tawhid: The concept of monotheism in Islam that speaks to the oneness and 
uniqueness of God.
Ulema: A group of Islamic scholars who serve as the arbiters of Islamic law and 
theology that became increasingly formalised under the various caliphs.
Umma: Community of believers, the concept of a single Islamic community. This 
notion has been interpreted as a literal territorial bound group with a singular leadership 
or a spiritual community bound by similar customs and beliefs.
Uqud: Obligations for maintaining membership in the community.
W ahabbi: A conservative branch of Sunni Islam rooted in Salafist thinking. It emerged 
in Saudi Arabia during the 18* century founded by Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahab.
Wasatiya: The middle way. Reflective of the neo-Islamists it represents the medium 
between the traditionalist Islamic position and those who wish to engage with 
modernity and the non-Islamic world.
Yathrib: Medina
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